Book Review: A Life in Diplomacy

Very few books are written about gradual evolution of Indian Diplomacy. The book “A life in Diplomacy” by Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra, offers rare insights about the individuals and early events that shaped India’s fledging foreign policy. He was among the second batch of 10 officers who joined the prestigious Indian Foreign Services (IFS) in 1949. Born on September 11, 1924, in a humble Dogra Brahmin family, Rasgotra obtained Masters in English from Punjab University and began his career as a tutor. The opening chapters of the autobiography gives the reader a glimpse of his childhood days, achievements at school and college, eloquence in Hindi poetry and the travails endured during partition. Aside emphatically interpreting crafty high-level diplomatic negotiations, Rasgotra unhesitatingly, narrates the tragedy that stuck their lives when they lost their 10-year old son. The equanimity and poise exuded by him is worth emulating.

During his long and eventful career, Rasgotra held official positions at mission offices at UN, UNESCO, Nepal, Britain, US, France, Morocco, Tunisia, Netherlands, besides serving as Foreign Secretary during the reign of former Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. He officially retired from service in January of 1985 but continued to work as High Commissioner to the UK till 1990 upon the Prime Minister’s request. Written entirely from his memory, at the age of almost 90, the author eloquently narrates the story of India, the trials and tribulations faced.

Rasgotra begins the story of independent India by pondering on the unique contributions of pioneering leaders in Indian Diplomacy- Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Dr. Sarvepalli RadhaKrishna, V. K. Krishna Menon and K. M. Panikkar. Days before independence, majority of the British officers who occupied high positions in External Affairs Department began to return to London or went to Pakistan. India was tasked with the burden of reorganization of the two departments, Departments of Common Wealth Relations and External Affairs. Rasgotra pays ode to Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, who took the onerous task of the overhaul and reorganization of the department as the secretary general. Bajpai channelized and instituted the process of recruitment young and talented candidates to foreign services.

The book, unveiled by Yashwant Sinha, caught instant attention of strategic analysts with stunning revelations about Nehru’s refusal to accept President Kennedy’s offer for help in detonating a nuclear bomb in 1961. US intelligence was cognizant of China’s swift progress towards developing a nuke in late 1950’s. Kennedy who was admirer of India’s democracy wanted India to be the first country to test a nuke and not the Communist China. Hence Kennedy sent a hand written letter through US ambassador Galbraith with a technical note from the chairman of US atomic Commission offering assistance to Indian scientists for detonating an American nuke from the top of a tower in Rajasthan Desert. Being aware of Nehru’s commitment against nuclear arms, Kennedy persisted that “Nothing is more important than nuclear security”.  Nehru shared the letter with G. Parthasarathy and Dr. Homi Bhabha. Dr. Bhabha favored acceptance, but Parthasarathy sought time. After holding talks with Galbraith and B.M. Mullick, Parthasarathy recommended to spurn the offer. (B. N. Mullick, Director Intelligence Bureau, was indicted by Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, for failing to assess Chinese preparedness along the border in 1960-61 leading to worst ever defeat of India at hands of China during 1962 war). A diplomatic misjudgment and seeking counsel from incompetent authorities played a havoc for India. This disclosure came at a time when India was valiantly lobbying various countries for NSG membership. Fifty years, hence, India is now struggling to get into the nuclear regime. The offer, if accepted then, could have averted the wars of 1962 and 1965 with China and Pakistan respectively. Besides these oft known diplomatic secrets, the book is replete of numerous anecdotes and incidents that offer a glimpse of Rasgotra’s rare mastery over India’s scriptures too.

Nehru was concerned about Tibet, which remained as an autonomous region from 1911. Emboldened by its triumph over Japan, China was eyeing to annex Tibet by late 1945. Rasgotra, mentions how Nehru wary of Chinese ways, sent an emissary asking members of Dalai Lama’s cabinet to apply for membership of the UN. Nehru indeed advised that newly formed UN is a powerful body and if Tibet becomes a member of UN, other member countries would definitely intervene in an event of Chinese occupation. Despite repeated emissaries, Lhasa evinced no interest. Before, it could wake up and realize the importance of UN membership, China annexed Tibet. Tibetan reoccupation in January 1950 critically altered India’s security stratagem. Till then India hardly bothered about the North-Eastern Frontier since, the friendly Tibet and the majestic Himalayas served as impenetrable barrier.

Similarly the book sheds light on the Shimla Agreement wherein India was criticized to have conceded to demands of Pakistan. A popular perception “we won war and lost the peace” emerged. In 1972, India won convincingly over Pakistan. Bangladesh was liberated, 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war were captured and India occupied areas of strategic importance to Pakistan (through which Pakistan gained entry into Kashmir Valley in 1965 and 1971). But according to the Shimla Agreement, India handed over prisoners of war and agreed to vacate the strategic positions as a goodwill gesture. Also, both countries agreed to resolve differences through peaceful bilateral negotiations ruling out third party intervention and that cease-fire line of 17^th December 1971 will be converted into Line of Control (LoC). Indeed Z.A. Bhutto in one-to-one talks with Indira Gandhi agreed to treat LoC as the international border and promised to persuade his people to support the same but later reneged. The architects of Shimla agreement were Haksar, D. P. Dhar and P.N. Dhar. Rasgotra says that he later asked Haksar as why he offered concessions at LoC, he revealed that Bhutto sought private meeting with him and fell on his feet.  Bhutto begged Haksar not to send him back empty-handed as he will be butchered by his enemies back in Pakistan. Haksar indeed trusted words of Bhutto only to be backstabbed later. Besides throwing light on oft discussed oracles of diplomacy, Rasgotra suggested few stratagems to evolve a sturdy foreign policy suited for changing global scenarios of 21^st century at the end of the book.

Shedding light on factors that messed up the Kashmir issue, Rasgotra indicated that armies of both India and Pakistan during the 1948 war were commanded by British Officers. Officers fighting for both sides were in touch with each other regularly and were controlled by British authorities. The British officers fighting for India ignored Nehru’s command and failed to Pakistan troops packing from the Gilgit-Baltistan region creating a formidable rift between warring neighbors. Consequently, the strategically important region is now jointly exploited by China and Pakistan. Harboring grudging animosities against India, Britain always sided with Pakistan and supported its stance on Kashmir at UN. Even as US gifted a submarine to Pakistan despite repeated pleas, Britain refused to sell one to India. In August 1953 India and Pakistan were close to resolving Kashmir issue through Nehru-Bogra agreement but US sabotaged the bilateral settlement. Nehru wanted to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir even it meant losing the valley. Bogra agreed to appointment of neutral administrator for plebiscite in Delhi but after his visit from US, he backtracked.

Though US displayed rejuvenated interest in fostering ties with India in past decade bestowing the status of strategic partner, he opined Russia had been India’s formidable ally. Russia had indeed vetoed at several occasions to protect Indian interests at UN. India must strive hard to strengthen bilateral ties with Russia. Regarding neighborhood policy he believed that India must deepen relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma and form a strong regional entity. He was highly critical of the double-speak of Nepal and firmly believed that India should be highly cautious of its Himalayan neighbor since it harbored anti-Indian forces and conceded vast ground to both China and Pakistan. He conceded that during 70’s and 80’s India was considered to be preachy, argumentative by the Machiavellian countries. India’s foreign policy buttressed by Non-Alignment was an idealist concept. Pragmatism, idealism and realism worked hand in hand in this policy. This concept evoked a flurry of reactions from nations ranging from curiosity to hostility. Major Powers misconstrued India’s policy and disliked it.  With global the fall of Soviet Union, NAM movement held no ground and it withered away throughout India firmly held on to the democratic principles and laid emphasis on peace and cooperation. With changing times, India has opened up its markets and adapted itself to the tunes of modern globalized society. These new transformations are now welcomed by nations and are keen on forging bilateral ties with India. Rasgotra advocates that India has entered such a propitious phase. But he warns that India should take lessons from past and should develop stable and unwavering neighboring policy rooted in the principles advocated by Kautilya. Above all he opines that foreign policy as a doctrine is primarily determined by civilizational and cultural cues.

Together,  the book is an amazing read to all foreign policy enthusiasts offering a fantastic overview of India’s diplomacy during the early years of independence and later. For all the rich details and rare insights the book, it qualifies to be a compendium on Indian diplomacy.

 

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