The Trajectory of Evolving India-Australia Ties

The speed with which India has transformed its ties with Australia is a case of strategic clarity which was amiss in New Delhi’s foreign policy previously. Seizing every opportunity, India is clearly defining its objectives and interests and forging new relations and resurrecting old ties to rightly position itself as a leading power.

For a long time, the India-Australia ties with immense potential suffered strategic neglect. The last decade witnessed a sharp reconfiguration of India-Australia ties. Observers believe that the visits of Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2012 and Tony Abbott in September 2014 have laid the ground for a new phase in bilateral relationships marred with mistrust.

The real turnaround came with PM Modi’s iconic address to the Australian Parliament in 2014 which articulated the connected history and shared inheritances of India and Australia. Other than predominantly hyphenated common interests- Common Wealth, Curry and Cricket, Modi spoke of – demand, demography and development with prospective opportunities for Australia in India. He underscored the strategic regional salience of Australia, saying “today, the world sees Australia to be at the heart of Asia Pacific (Indo-Pacific gained prominence in the late 2010s) and the Indian Ocean” ¹ Modi called for bilateral security cooperation.

In 2008, even though President Obama batted for an exemption for India and supported candidature for NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) Australia refused to sell Uranium nuclear fuel to India until it signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. India was part of the Quadrilateral security dialogue for democratic countries envisioned by Shinzo Abe in 2007 for an open, inclusive Indo-Pacific. But owing to the dominant pro-China foreign policy Australia remained indifferent toward India. Australia cultivated strong trading ties with China and at the risk of irking the Dragon, Australia even pulled out from Malabar exercises dampening the Indo-Pacific framework even before its take off.

The Fukushima disaster in 2011 brought down the demand for Uranium after major countries shut down nuclear reactors. This directly affected Australia, which has World’s largest Uranium resources ranking among the top five producers. On her three-day visit to India in 2012, Julian Gillard signalled the beginning of negotiations for Uranium sale and countries sealed a civil nuclear agreement during Tony Abbott’s state visit to India in 2014. After three years, Australia shipped Uranium supplies to India.

During the Cold war and much later, India and Australia always found themselves in opposite camps. Canberra’s act of recalling the diplomatic entourage post India’s nuclear tests in 1998 left a bitter aftertaste in the relations. Marred with hesitations, both countries had strained relations. Ostensibly, Chinese aggressive expansionism, trade war with China that intensified in the aftermath of Covid and the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties have galvanised, India-Australia engagement. The common threat brought India and Australia closer on two fronts- security and trade.

Giving a major fillip to the shared visions, interests and opportunities, with a focus on the non-traditional security issues of Indo-Pacific, countries worked together to elevate the senior officials meeting (SOM) of India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral to foreign ministers and defence ministers meetings in 2021². To ratchet up cooperation among the Indian Ocean littorals, France announced a trilateral with resident powers of the Indian Ocean, India and Australia in 2018. The trilateral India-France-Australia (IFA) suffered a setback due to the AUKUS agreement. Albanese’s visit to France in June 2022, witnessed a thaw in the relationship and the meeting of foreign ministers of the three countries subsequently along the sidelines of UNGA effectively revived the IFA³.

These mini-laterals have a defined objective of adherence to the rules-based order and ensuring a free, open, inclusive and conflict-free Indo-Pacific region. The revival of the Quad and the new mini-laterals have notably put several countries in the region at odds with China. All these countries have strong economic ties with China and are averse to any strategic security alliance. Reckoning with the sensitivities of the countries to take on the Dragon, India and Australia have always asserted the centrality of the ASEAN countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s revisionism is posing a significant threat to strategic security calculus in the sphere of influence of both India and Australia. The common concern about China’s assertiveness- the string of pearls in India’s immediate neighbourhood and sweeping security deal for the Pacific Island Countries (PIC) has brought India and Australia much closer.  Further, they reaffirmed strengthening cooperation in the Pacific in line with the needs and priorities of the Pacific Island Countries (PIC). Clearly, mutual interests are driving them together.

Overcoming the covid imposed hurdles on in-person diplomatic engagement, PM Modi and PM Scott Morrison held two virtual summits to bolster bilateral ties. In 2020, India and Australia upgraded the strategic partnership of 2009 to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”.

Anthony Albanese’s three-day three-city state visit to India on March 8^th marked the first in-person annual summit between both countries, an arrangement that was agreed upon last year. This is Albanese’s first visit to India as the Prime Minister. The last Australian Prime Minister to visit India was Malcolm Turnbull in 2017. India has an annual summit arrangement with Japan and Russia. Australia is now on the privileged list.

Additionally, both countries have a slew of institutional mechanisms – Foreign Ministers Frame Work Dialogue, 2+2 Defence and Foreign Ministers Dialogue, Defence Chiefs talks, Joint Trade & Commerce Ministerial Commission, Australia-India Education Council, Energy Dialogue and Joint Working Groups on different issues to strengthen the engagement on multi-faceted issues. The rapid expansion of ties between the countries is further strengthened by frequent high-level contacts and ministerial exchange visits. There were 18 ministerial exchanges between both countries last year.

The interim free trade agreement, ECTA (Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement) is India’s first-ever FTA with a developed country. This besides laying the foundation for robust economic cooperation has expanded opportunities for the diversification of trade for both countries. Both Parliaments ratified the ECTA which came into force on December 29, 2022.

As of 2021, India is Australia’s sixth-largest trading partner and fourth-largest goods and service export market. Now countries are working on CECA (Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement). Expediting negotiations and pledging to conclude CECA by the end of 2023, trade ministers of both countries have set an ambitious target of $100 billion in bilateral trade in the next five years⁴.

For open, secure, inclusive, robust and dependable global supply chains, in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic, India and Australia along with Japan unveiled Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI). To stabilise global supply chain resilience, the US has launched Indo-Pacific Economic Framework under the Quad, both countries have now identified this new platform to work together.

India’s climate goals are inexorably linked to the clean energy transition which is reliant on the availability and access to critical minerals. Realising the criticality of these minerals both countries signed MoU for their sustained supply last year and resolved to take this cooperation forward through India-Australia Minerals Scholar Network. Alongside, countries have agreed to enhance cooperation in agriculture, science, technology, innovation, space, renewable energy, hydrogen, solar energy, health, climate, security, cybersecurity, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, critical & emerging technologies, and education⁵.

Under the pillar of Defence cooperation, countries have commenced General Rawat Officers Exchange Program to foster cooperation through the exchange of young soldiers between the countries. Furthermore, to increase interoperability, maritime domain awareness and maritime partnership, Australia besides hosting the Malabar 2023 exercises for the Quad countries invited India to participate in Exercise Talisman Sabre 2023⁶. In November 2022, countries commenced the first military exercise- AUSTRAHIND22 in Rajasthan. The defence ministers of both countries are pushing for a Joint Working Group on defence research and material cooperation⁷. India along with Brazil stopped China from posing hurdles to the supply of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the US⁸.

Indians form the second-largest overseas community in Australia. Expressing concerns over a spate of temple vandalizations and attacks on the Indian community, Prime Minister Modi sought assurance of the safety of Indians in Australia⁹. In a major boost to the strong educational ties between India and Australia, Australia announced to recognise Indian educational degrees by signing the Mechanism for Mutual Recognition of Qualifications¹⁰. Also, Australia’s Deakin University and the University of Wollongong confirmed to set up their first overseas campuses at GIFT city.

Countries have signed an agreement on Audiovisual coproduction, MoU on Cooperation in Sports, Terms of Reference on India-Australia Taskforce and a Letter of Intent for furthering innovation¹¹.

PM Albanese invited PM Modi for the Quad Summit meeting in May in Australia and announced to return to India for the G20 summit in September. Needless to say, these frequent highest-level engagements are bound to bring both countries closer. To nurture the expanding bilateral ties Australian government pledged to fund $28.1 million Centre for Australia-India Relations¹². Bilateral relations over a period of time ebbed and flowed. But now there is a new political will to deepen the relations.

Leaders exchanged views on various bilateral, regional and global challenges including Myanmar, Ukraine, North Korea and Afghanistan. Australia congratulated India on assuming the Chairmanship of the Wassenaar Agreement.

Celebration of ‘colours, culture and cricket’ that symbolised the spirit of friendship has been on a grand display with Albanese participating in Holi celebrations and watching the Gavaskar-Border trophy test match at Ahmedabad with PM Modi. PM Albanese also became the first foreign leader to receive a guard of honour at India’s indigenously built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. He also visited the Indian Naval station at Kunjali.

Seismic changes in the geopolitical alignment, structural changes in the economy, and multi-dimensional challenges from China propelled the strategic alignment of democratic countries, India and Australia. This new ‘strategic equilibrium’ is not a derivative of what a third country does. As of now the strategic convergence over shared interests has overwhelmed the differences including those on the Ukraine issue. To sustain this momentum, it is incumbent on leaders to continuously reevaluate and review the ties to iron out the differences and build a long-term robust partnership.

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PM Meloni’s visit Opens a Fresh Chapter in India-Italy Ties

Mired by the legacy defence and security issues, India-Italy bilateral relationship has been rather underwhelming. Accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister, foreign minister and a high-powered business delegation, Italy’s second youngest and first female Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni made a two-day trip to India on March 2-3, to commence a bilateral reset. This marks the first visit by an Italian Prime Minister to India in five years. The last visit was by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s in 2018.

The 2012 Italian marines’ issue and the 2013 Finmeccanica kickbacks issue severely roiled the bilateral ties. These developments led to a diplomat spat with Italy vetoing India’s entry into the 34-member exclusive nuclear club- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The defence scandal eventually led to an embargo on the purchase of defence supplies from Italy by the Indian government. The ban was lifted last year and even the Supreme Court proceedings on the Marines ended in 2022 with Italy agreeing to pay the compensation. The relations haven’t returned to normal.

Meloni’s delegation which included business leaders from the defence firms is an effort to reopen the channels for defence deals. Also, the geopolitical reset and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict which is weighing heavily on the European countries has prompted a serious recalibration of their policies, especially with regard to the Indo-Pacific region.  Realising the criticality of the region and the growing assertive claims of China, Italy signalled an intention to enter the region.

Amid the growing pushback against China, former Italian Prime Minister Draghi joining the chorus against Beijing’s “unfair practices” highlighted by the EU, expressed interest to join a trilateral cooperation with India and Japan for a free and open Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the foreign ministers of all three countries officially launched India-Italy-Japan trilateral. Italy has strong ties with Japan and deep Indo-Japanese bilateral ties are indeed the pillar of the Indo-Pacific framework. Thus, the consolidation of ties between these three countries through economic cooperation besides having a beneficial effect on global supply chain resilience would cultivate an effective strategic and security dialogue.

The continuity of the engagement which took a hit due to the domestic political turbulences got a lease for life with the bilateral discussion between Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Meloni along the sidelines of the Bali Summit in November 2022. With stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region becoming a major concern in the wake of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, Italy is making a major foreign policy turnaround.

In 2019, Italy created a stir in the western world becoming the first G7 nation to sign BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). But two years hence, the MoU started tethering with Italy suspending space cooperation and increasingly leaning on the West’s stance regarding Huawei¹. A year later, with the unravelling of the pandemic, PM Draghi, an avowed Atlanticist and vocal critic of China’s human rights in line with the EU, froze the BRI MoU². Subsequently, PM Draghi substantially distanced China and even stalled some of the Chinese investments.

The conservative party, Brothers of Italy, headed by Meloni in power followed Draghi’s foreign policy. She is supporting Taiwan and opposes the auto-renewal of the BRI in 2024.

Around the same time, India’s ties with Italy improved with both countries signing an agreement in textiles and announcing a strategic partnership in renewable and clean energy along the sidelines of the 2021 Rome G20 Summit. Leaders have agreed on exploring partnerships in energy storage solutions, smart grids, gas transportation, integrated waste management, biofuels, and green hydrogen³.

With India tipped to assume the G20 chair, India became part of the G20 troika which also gave Delhi an opportunity to work closely with Rome⁴. Months after the bilateral discussion with PM Modi on regional and global security challenges, in a huge fillip to the India- Italy-Japan trilateral, Meloni elevated ties to a ‘strategic partnership’ on Japanese PM Fumio Kishida’s visit to Rome.

Echoing Italy’s Indo-Pacific aspirations, India invited Prime Minister Meloni as the chief guest and keynote speaker for the 2023 Raisina Dialogue, themed “Provocation, Uncertainty, Turbulence: Lighthouse in the Tempest”. Amid China’s burgeoning assertiveness, Italy is seeking rapprochement with India building on mutual interests, shared values and the commitment to a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific.

Nearly 70% of the EU’s trade passes through the Indian Ocean and the SCS region which make the Indo-Pacific. Hence what happens in Indo-Pacific has direct consequences for Europe. India is the resident power of the Indian Ocean and central to the Indo-Pacific. Italy as part of the EU’s anti-piracy mission in the Western Indo-Pacific, Operation Atalanta, is a natural partner of India. Clearly, Indo-Pacific is central to Italy’s maritime security.

In 2012 Italy became the second largest manufacturer surpassing France and after Brexit, it became one of the most important nations in Europe. Traditionally pillars of Italy’s foreign policy are- Europeanism, Atlanticism and Mediterraneanism.  Aflush with opportunities for investment and growth, Italy is focusing majorly on Mediterraneanism⁵.

Steadily it developed connectivity networks with the North African countries and Italian companies became one of the largest shareholders of the various oil companies in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Cyprus and Libya. In 2021, when the countries were struggling to manage their economies, Italy emerged as the rising economic power in the Mediterranean region becoming the largest trading partner of North Africa and the Balkan nations.

Giving wings to its commercial prowess, Italy gave shape to its ‘Enlarged Mediterranean’ strategy and signed China’s BRI which resonated with Rome’s pursuit of increasing its economic influence and geopolitical heft. But China’s muscular policies and aggressiveness forced a reset in Italy’s ‘Enlarged Mediterranean’ Strategy. Considering the shared conviction of rule of law, Italy is now finding greater congruence between its Enlarged Mediterranean strategy and the Indo-Pacific framework of India and Japan.

Inaugurating the multilateral Dialogue, Meloni enunciated her vision for Indo-Pacific and said, “India is a key player in this broad landscape, bathing in the Indo-Pacific much as Italy is at the heart of the Mediterranean, and our two countries have important contributions to make together”⁶. Explicitly describing her visit to India as a matter of strategic choice⁷, Meloni made New Delhi the destination for her first visit to Asia. Demonstrating an intent to resurrect the ties and evolve a functional framework for the India-Italy-Japan trilateral, the ties have been upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership’.

In line with its Indo-Pacific vision, Italy joined the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) under Science, Technology and Academics Cooperation pillar. To contribute to the concept of indivisible security and underscore the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific, Italy announced to send Morsini offshore patrol vessel to the region⁸ and planning to hold exercises with friendly naval countries.

Italy is among India’s top five trading partners in the EU. Last year, countries recorded an all-time high of $15 billion in bilateral trade. Recognising the range of opportunities in the Indian economic system for the Italian industries, leaders identified five sub-sectors for economic cooperation. These include- trade; investment; design, innovation, and manufacturing; friend shoring and supply chain resilience partnership; fifth sub-sector- converging on complementarities of skill sets available in India and the industrial ecosystem in Italy. Italy is Europe’s second-largest industrial power. To facilitate the movement of skilled personnel, countries signed a Declaration of Intent on Migration and Mobility and also announced India-Italy Startup Bridge⁹.

Concluding the MoU on defence cooperation, leaders agreed to cooperate strongly in manufacturing, co-development, co-design and co-innovation and also expand and deepen military and maritime cooperation. Leaders held a gamut of discussions on bilateral, regional and global cooperation and expressed their interest to advance cooperation in the respective Make in India and Make in Italy frameworks¹⁰. PM Modi and President Murmu have invited Italian companies to actively participate in Make in India initiative and make the best of the opportunities in India.

Italy strongly condemned the ‘unprovoked and unlawful aggression against Ukraine by the Russian armed forces’. As the G20 Chair, Italy wanted India to play a ‘central role’ in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite differences over the Ukraine crisis, both countries expressed concerns over the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, the destabilising effect of the conflict and its broader regional and global implications.

Countries have agreed to deepen cooperation in space, cybersecurity, HADR cooperation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), Internet of Things (IoT), advanced manufacturing, Bio and RNA technologies, energy transitions, conservation of biodiversity, agriculture and food technologies. Countries recognised the need for expanding cooperation on climate change and the energy crisis which are global challenges and also on beneficial multilateralism.

Unfortunately, one of the major hurdles in reforming and expanding the UNSC is the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) nicknamed Coffee Club founded by Italian ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci along with Pakistan, Mexico and Egypt¹¹. Slowly the group grew in numbers and strength, strongly opposing the G4 comprising India, Germany, Japan and Brazil rooting for UNSC reforms. Italy’s support for India’s UNSC membership can thus be a real game changer.

The recalibration of India-Italy ties began in 2017 with countries scripting a new chapter through a Joint Statement in 2018, Action Plan 2020-24 and strategic partnership in the energy transition in 2021. Meloni has infused new momentum in the bilateral ties proposing collaborations through the ‘Blue-Raman’ project, the state of art, high-speed submarine data cable connection that can connect India to Italy through the Middle East. This new-age digital communication network has two main branches- the blue system will connect Italy, France, Greece and Israel while the Raman branch will reach Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Oman and India¹¹.

As an influential player in the EU, India-Italy ties can augur well for the implementation of the India-EU connectivity partnership and the ongoing negotiations on the India-EU partnership. Italy is competing for a leadership position in the EU and strengthening its position as Europe’s energy hub through a series of energy partnership agreements with the MENA (Middle East and North African) countries as part of Mattei Plan¹².

Meloni referred to this in her address, to highlight Italy’s prioritisation of relations with countries in the South and along the Mediterranean. Meloni projected Italy as a strategically important global player ready for a mutually beneficial partnership.

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India and Germany Accelerate Multidimensional Cooperation

The overwhelming reams of editorials and extensive media debates on the first anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict have taken the wind out of the strategic importance of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s state visit to India.

With imbued geopolitical, economic and security significance, the visit is of great consequence to both the countries-India and Germany.  Accompanied by a business delegation comprising CEOs of 12 major companies, Chancellor Scholz made a two-day visit to India on Feb 25-26, not part of the regular ICG. India and Germany have an established format of biannual Inter-Governmental Consultations (ICG) hosted by respective countries alternately since 2011 to review the bilateral ties. Last year, PM Modi travelled to Germany for the 6^th ICG.

With India scheduled to host the G20 summit in September this year and the German Chancellor, all set to attend the event, the current state visit is rather unusual. This standalone visit first by a German Chancellor is truly unprecedented.

The Ukraine crisis has brought about a remarkable change in the global world order. While major powers are jostling to bolster their global heft, middle-order countries are trying to redefine their policies to leverage their strengths in this era of contestation. The Ukraine war brought a real crisis to Europe and more so to Germany which is dependent on Russia’s cheap oil supplies. With its autonomy compromised and its economy threatened, Germany is finding India’s autonomous position regarding the Ukraine crisis, a real hope for the much-needed peace negotiations.

This was evident from German Ambassador to India Philipp Ackerman’s press briefing ahead of Scholz’s trip to India, “India buying oil from Russia is none of our business. If you get it at a low price, I can’t blame India for it. India is an appropriate candidate to come up with a solution (to stop the Russia-Ukraine war). India has skilled and good diplomacy”¹. This indeed, is an unambiguous acknowledgement of India’s advocacy of “diplomacy and dialogue” for the Ukraine crisis.

At the recently held Munich Security Conference, Chancellor Scholz endorsed EAM Jaishankar’s reference to the “European mindset” of “somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problem is the World’s problem but the World’s problem is not Europe’s problem”. Scholz said, “he has a point. It wouldn’t be Europe’s problem alone if the law of the strong were to assert itself in international relations”². Jaishankar’s quotes are now part of the Munich Security Report.

Amid the perennial weapons supply pledges and military assistance which is ostensibly deepening the crisis, India’s middle position is finding acceptance in Germany which is now dragging its feet to tow America’s line. Forced to parrot the words of NATO and the US, European countries are now feeling the heat of the crisis with rising fuel prices, and record inflation affecting the domestic constituency. As the G20 chair, India can don a crucial leadership role in addressing global challenges and crises. Ukraine is thus one of the major issues of the visit.

Domestically, the Ukraine crisis has woken up Germany to new realities causing a rethink on increased defence spending and a strident security posturing. Having paid a heavy price for its dependence on Russian energy supplies, Germany is now applying the same lessons to China. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock suggested that Germany should reduce its economic dependence on China³. Unlike in the Merkel era, the political resolve toward China has shifted.

Reportedly, a muscular policy is underway with Minister Baerbock shaping the National Security Strategy of Germany who on her visit to India called Beijing a “systemic rival”. In a veiled reference she said, “we’ve seen, in a very brutal way, that when we have deep economic ties with partners who are not partners in values, it can have dramatic repercussions on our economies and this is not in our interest”. She added, “India is not a ‘substitute partner’ for Germany….. we are connected to India not only by economic or people to people partnerships but also by a partnership of values”⁴.

The Ukraine crisis has been a rude awakening for Germany and forced it to talk about security challenges beyond the borders of Europe. Germany is now part of India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and it has deployed a frigate for seven months in the Indo-Pacific region. With a focus on the Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany is strengthening ties with Japan and India.

Seeking closer ties with countries that share democratic values and to share an engagement with the Indo-Pacific region, Scholz made Japan his first destination for his Asia trip. He also met PM Modi thrice in the past year- 6^th ICG, G7 meeting, G20 Bali Summit and travelled to Vietnam and Singapore.

Notably, he became the first European leader to visit Beijing after President Xi’s elevation post-20th CCP Congress. While there is a shift in Berlin’s position on China, its policies are by and large dictated by German businesses.

India-German relations rest on the strong pillar of trade and investment. Germany is India’s largest trading partner in Europe and is among the top 10 global partners. The pandemic and the Ukraine crisis underscored the need to build sustainable, reliable and diversified supply chains. India’s versatile and resilient markets with immense growth potential are now propelling a latent decoupling of trade with China in Europe. German businesses betting on China plus one approach are seeking to outsource R&D and expand manufacturing to new shores.

In January Germany’s Siemens clinched a $3.2 billion Indian Railways order to manufacture 1200 electric locomotive units for a period of 11 years. In a boost to “Make in India” the locomotives will be manufactured at Siemens India unit and assembled in Gujarat. This order includes 35 years of maintenance and repair work⁵.

The new coalition government in Germany with Greens as a major coalition partner has added a new facet to the existing Indo-German bilateral agenda. At the 6^th ICG held in Germany, countries unveiled Green Sustainable Development Partnership (GSDP) to steer collective political commitment toward climate action. Shared interests in renewable energy and energy transition positioned Germany as a crucial partner for India in technological collaboration.

Germany pledged Euro 10 billion for this development cooperation for the period up to 2030 of which Euro 983 million commitments were finalized during the Annual Negotiation Meeting (ANM) held in November 2022. Countries have agreed on Green Hydrogen Mission and set up Green Hydrogen Task Force in September 2022⁶.

Besides the congruence over ambitious climate goals, India and Germany agreed on triangular development cooperation in third countries- Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi and Peru which is now in an advanced stage of implementation. This rapid progress in both areas together with Migration and Mobility Partnership signed by both countries in December 2022 will enhance cooperation in trade and investment and people-to-people ties.

India has already ratified the partnership. Pending its ratification in the Bundestag, Scholz on his Bengaluru leg of the trip has welcomed India’s skilled and talented pool to Germany. Countries have inked an MoU in skills during his visit. Scholz announced that India will host the Asia-Pacific of German Businesses in 2024. Indians form the second largest group of international students in Germany, pursuing higher education in STEM. Currently, 35000 Indian students are enrolled in Germany⁷.

The existing framework of bilateral cooperation includes security, defence and space. During Scholz’s visit, leaders unveiled a vision document to enhance cooperation and innovation in technology to use scientific and technological knowledge for the economic development of both countries and to address global challenges. This has five different aspects to it-energy partnership and clean technologies; strengthening the framework and ecosystem of technology enterprises; digital technologies; fintech to achieve SDG and artificial intelligence⁸.

India is among the fastest-growing developing economies in the world and given its centrality to Indo-Pacific and the EU’s growing interest in the region, an FTA (Free Trade Agreement) would augur well for the aspirations of both sides. Germany is a major player in India-EU FTA. Scholz asserted his commitment to expediting India-EU FTA and assured personal involvement⁹.

Defence cooperation also majorly figured in the talks with a discussion on a $5.2 billion proposed deal for Germany to build six conventional submarines for the Indian Navy. Associated aspects of defence cooperation like co-design, co-development, manufacturing and transfer of technology have featured in the meeting¹⁰. The two countries are actively cooperating to reform the multilateral institutions. Both countries within the G4 are working to reform the UNSC.

Since the Ukraine crisis, India has consistently articulated its position and robustly defended the criticism of being soft towards Russia. Summarily expressing discomfort “I know this is not an era of war”, India resonated with the West causing the shift in perceptions from a stinging rebuke to an uncommon appreciation. At the press briefing post-bilateral talks, PM Modi said, “since the beginning of the developments in Ukraine, India has insisted on resolving this dispute through dialogue and diplomacy. India is ready to contribute to any peace process”¹¹. India’s approach to seeking opportunities for a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis echoes the German position.

Ukraine crisis and China’s muscular adventurism have exalted European fears of a similar kind of scenario in the Indo-Pacific region. Amid major geostrategic challenges to counterbalance China and to advance the shared interests of a multipolar world, rule-based order and multilateral cooperation India and Germany are finding rare strategic congruence.

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