As a regional power India has many
a times rescued neighbouring countries in times of distress and need. But one
of its biggest strategic blunders of sending IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Forces)
troops to Sri Lanka will forever will be etched in the history as an
unwarranted external intervention. The book, “India’s Sri Lanka Fiasco: Peace
Keepers at War” by Rajesh Kadian throws light on the finer details of the
entire saga.
By the time British left Sri Lanka,
Ceylon Tamils who constituted 12.9% of the population dominated the
administrative, professional and other government jobs. Even the Indian Tamils
who were sent as indentured labour to work in Sri Lankan tea and coffee plantations
also formed a huge chunk of population in the central Kandy region of the
island. Over-representation of Ceylon
Tamils created resentment among the majority Sinhalese. The British who
believed that minorities might suffer in an independent Sri Lanka, left behind
a constitution that suggested a 50:50 representation of majority, Sinhalese and
minorities which included Tamils, Hindus, Muslims and others. But Sinhalese
rejected the constitutional recommendation and what ensued was a systemic
discrimination against Tamils. This led to a series of riots where majority clashed
with Tamil minority in the Northern and Eastern territories snowballing into an
eventual Tamil genocide. To escape persecution thousands of Tamils sought refuge
in India.
Alarmed by mass influx of refugees,
Indian government called for an India-Sri Lankan accord in early 1987 with an
objective of preserving the territorial integrity of the Southern neighbour as
opposed to protecting the suppressed Tamils. Interestingly, instead of convincing
the Sri Lankan government to negotiate with Tamils fighting for their rights, in
a serious lapse of judgement India committed to send forces to restore peace in
the region. India’s unwarranted intervention irked both the parties. Tamil
groups considered India. But post peace accord, Indian troops battled these groups
in a guerrilla war. To bring about normalcy in the region, India appealed reluctant
Sri Lankan government to hold elections and even propped up a political entity.
Though the party managed to win elections, it floundered within months. Extended
presence of Indian forces began to irk Sri Lanka. After 1000 days on ground, having
invested men, material and money India not only failed in bringing any semblance
of peace but earned ire of both the parties- Sri Lankan government and Tamil
fighters.
Drawing parallels with the 1971
Bangladesh Liberation war, the author tries to explain the absurdity of India’s
adventurism in Sri Lanka. He argues that since independence, India had a “principles-based”
approach towards foreign policy but failed to frame a policy. Though written in
1990, the author in this book, warns India of two impending threats to India’s sovereignty
in the form of China and Pakistan. junks
the justification of ethnological burden as the reason for India’s intervention
in Sri Lanka and rues India’s low-key behaviour in Sri Lanka.
Unfortunately, this fiasco took a huge
toll on India-Sri Lanka bilateral ties and dented India’s image as a big power
in the region. India’s paid heavy price for its irresponsible action through
the life of former Prime Minister Rajiv who signed the accord. He was assassinated
by LTTE suicide bomber. Geopolitically, India’s boots on ground approach
irreparably damaged the ties ceding space to China, anxious to expand its foot
print in the region. Beijing exploited the rift between India and Sri Lanka and
soon gained firm foothold in the island. Through sustained efforts India managed
to bring some warmth in the relations. Prime Minister Modi’s state visit to the
island in 2015 after a gap of 28 years has been India’s best foot forward towards
earning the trust of its neighbour.
Clearly, Rajesh Kadian’s diligently
researched book is a good read for anyone interested in South Asian studies.
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