Of late references to India as steward
of the Indo-Pacific region have become more prominent. While it is little
challenging to appropriately make out geographical mental map of the region,
strategically Indo-Pacific region refers to maritime space encompassing
littorals of East Africa, West Asia, Indian Ocean, Western Pacific Ocean and
East Asia. For the first time, Indo-Pacific
term was used by Gurpreet Khurana in his article titled “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan cooperation”. The
term assumed significant diplomatic relevance when Shinzo Abe used the term
during his address to Indian Parliament in 2007 in the context of “Confluence
of Indian and Pacific Ocean”. Slowly this term was internalized by highest
authorities of India and by 2011 it was extensively used by India, Japan, US
and Australia and was first officially documented in Australia’s Defence White
Paper in 2013.
China for all practical purposes
always used the term Asia-Pacific as Indo necessarily meant India. In the
joint statement signed between India and US in 2017, the term made a resurgent
comeback with both countries agreeing to forge close partnership as stewards of
Indo-Pacific Ocean. Ever since Indo-Pacific was used in lieu of Asia-Pacific
extensively. Days before revival of “the Quad” Rex Tillerson, US secretary of
state religiously referred to the region as Indo-Pacific underscoring the
importance of coming together of India, US, Japan, Australia to counter rising
China. Needless to say, extensive use of Indo-Pacific region necessarily
reiterates the importance of India in this maritime stretch. In fact, navies of
British India used to operate and protect the seas stretching from Gulf of Aden
to Malacca Straits and commanded immense respect as net security provider of
the region. Though British left after India’s independence, the Royal Naval
continued to operate in the Indian Ocean to secure Sea Lines of Communication
and trade until their eventual withdrawal from the East of Suez in 1968. Post-independence,
preoccupied in guarding western and northern borders India gradually squandered
its commandeering position in the vast maritime stretches. India’s strategic
geographical position always presented it with an excellent opportunity to
develop a Blue Water Navy. But enthralled by the prospect of championing values
and idealism, oblivious of real politics India undermined the importance of power
projection along the busiest shipping routes of Indian Ocean region (IOR) which
is its backyard. While countries like France and Russia, realizing the growing
salience of India Ocean acquired bases, India remained complacent.
On the other hand, to ensure an
uninterrupted flow of energy supplies through various chokepoints, a growing
China began stealthily increasing its presence in the IOR. It unveiled the
concept of String of Pearls along the
sea lines of communication from Chinese mainland to Port of Sudan. Later under
the ruse of coordinating and assisting the anti-piracy operations Chinese
flotilla along with a submarine began to frequent Indian Ocean. China began to
penetrate India’s sphere of influence. Having established firm control over
critical sea lines of communication in South China Sea, Beijing steadily adopted
similar strategy to position itself in the Indian Ocean. While strategists hinted about China’s
ambitious maritime expansions, India turned a deaf ear. Beijing steady
acquisition of bases in the strategic IOR served as a much-needed wakeup call
for India.
Negating India’s dominance in IOR,
Beijing having acquired Hambantota port of Sri Lanka under debt-equity swap in
Indian Ocean officially on a lease for 99-years is now all set to establish
logistics base in the Arabian Sea in Southern Maldives Laamu Atoll. Earlier,
China eased its way into Arabian Sea through CPEC by obtaining Gwadar port on
lease for over four decades from Pakistan. Reports suggest China is building
second overseas military base in Pakistan at Jiwani, a port
close to Iranian border on Gulf of Oman (Makran Coast). Last year, China
officially opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Over years,
Dragon developed a formidable string of pearls that facilitated unobstructed
flow of energy supplies and strategic maritime presence in IOR. Besides China
continued to buttress its presence along the supply lines by building a railway
line from Khartoum, capital of Sudan to Port of Sudan and Bagamoya port in
Tanzania. A Chinese company now controls container terminal in Colombo.
India torn between idealism and
real politick remained a reluctant player for long. Erosion of Indian dominance
in its backyard generated a new sense of urgency in New Delhi to acquire bases
and facilities. Giving a direction to India’s maritime aspirations, Prime
Minister Modi on his visit to Indian Ocean states Mauritius and Seychelles in
2015 assured them of India’s commitment of being security provider in the
region. He also indicated India’s interest in developing military facilities at
Aga Lega in Mauritius and Assumption Island in Seychelles.
In a shot in arm to Indian
aspirations, on January 31st India signed an agreement with
Seychelles to develop, build, manage and maintain facilities on Assumption
Island. The island is leased to India for operating a naval base and an air
strip. Similarly, India is all set to refurbish crucial infrastructure
facilities at Aga Lega in Mauritius. Both bases lying along the periphery of
Africa can be highly useful in monitoring shipping routes. Reports now indicate
that India is likely to sign an agreement with Oman for setting up a military
base during Prime Minister’s tri-nation state visit to Palestine, Oman and UAE.
India is seriously mulling the plausibility of having a base along the busiest
shipping route in the strategically important Persian Gulf. India is gearing up to ink a defence logistics
agreement with France, like the LEMOA with US. With this, India can access
French Military bases in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa like the Reunion
Island near Madagascar and Djibouti. The pact is expected to be signed during
France President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to India. The LEMOA with US entitled
India to access the strategic Guam port at the edge of Pacific Ocean and Diego
Garcia in Indian Ocean. India has recently signed logistics agreement with
Singapore whereby India can dock its ships for much longer time in Singapore,
use facilities and carry out maritime surveillance in South China Sea. Reports
indicate that Australia evinced interest in pursuing LEMOA kind of agreement
with India which can considerably increase Indian presence in the vast maritime
expanses. While Indian efforts pale in comparison to China, which has leased
several ports along major trading route, an effort to increase the
interoperability of Indian Navies by collaborating with foreign Navies might
put India in a good stead. These agreements on long term will play a
significant role in building a reliable security architecture.
Languishing in the self-inflicted
trap of imbued idealism, India lost precious time. Modi regime is making good
attempts to catch up with China whose mountains of finances and economic muscle
power ensured it an uninterrupted maritime power-projection run. Indian efforts
to operationalize Chabahar have been a good move in this direction. But unlike
China which has absolute control over various military bases, India as of now made
agreements with respective countries to avail logistics facilities. It is a
long road ahead and Indian efforts to bolster its maritime aspirations are
commendable.
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