Dragon’s Challenge to Indo-Bhutanese Time-tested Security Cooperation

An arena that is gaining traction other than the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theatres is the Indian sub-continent. Bhutan Prime Minister Lotay Tshering’s interview with a Belgian newspaper Le Libre, where he mentioned that “Doklam is a junction point between India, China and Bhutan. It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem. We are three. There is no big or small country, there are three equal countries, each counting for a third. We are ready. As soon as the other two parties are ready, we can discuss. India and China have problems all along the border. We are waiting to see how they will resolve their differences” elicited swift criticism and sparked fresh debates about the robustness of the India-Bhutan partnership and China’s intimidatory tactics.

In the face of growing apprehensions in India following his remarks, PM Tshering immediately reiterated, “I have said nothing new and there is no change in position” in the Bhutanese newspaper. PM Tshering’s take on Doklam, in the aftermath of the Sino-Bhutan 11^th Expert Group Meeting at Kuming in January 2023 and a lengthy propaganda piece in the Global Times- “How India tries to interfere in and take control of Bhutan” by Sun Xihui, a researcher with the National Institute of International Strategy, has raised many eyebrows. The pattern and timing are the real suspects with Beijing raking up the trijunction issue at a time when India’s frosty ties with China diving south.

Aside from stirring up the Bhutan boundary issue, in response to India’s G20 meeting held at Arunachal Pradesh which the Chinese representative participated virtually, Beijing has released a fresh list of 11 Chinese names for geographical locations in Arunachal Pradesh. Unable to convince India to normalise ties and the LAC terms as per its own terms, China is now exerting pressurizing on New Delhi. Renaming exercise to bolster its claims is part of China’s “lawfare” employed to have a legal high ground. The announcement came days ahead of the three-day visit of Bhutan King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk to New Delhi accompanied by Tande Dorji, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade and other senior officials on April 3^rd.

Beijing has infiltrated India’s immediate neighbourhood to encircle India. China settled territorial disputes with 14 neighbouring countries baring India and Bhutan. India has a longstanding relationship with Bhutan characterised by “trust, goodwill, mutual understanding” and to keep India on the edge, China is now slowly escalating another front in India’s north which is the Doklam trijunction. Five years ago, India stopped Chinese incursion at Doklam in a standoff that lasted for 73 days following which China has to pull back its forces.

Bhutan signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1949 and established diplomatic ties with India in 1968 but remained neutral to China despite its overtures. After China’s annexation of Tibet, despite India’s defeat in 1962, Bhutan chose to closely align with India and accommodate New Delhi’s interests after China started laying claiming its territories issuing new maps in 1959.  

Geographically located between two military powers of the region, India and China, Bhutan adopted a ‘Balance of Threat’ policy and refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with P5 countries. But, Thimpu always remained assertive and defensive in matters of self-interest and security that essentially dictated its foreign policy.

In 1979 China made major incursions into Bhutan¹ to push for direct open border negotiations on disputed regions as both countries do not have diplomatic relations. The disputed regions in contention were Doklam, Dramana, Shakhatoe, Yak Chu, Charithang Chu, Sinchulungpa, Langmarpo valleys which are rich pasture lands in the Western region and Jhakurlung and Pasamlung valleys in the north considered very sacred by the Bhutanese. Bhutan which had religious and cultural relations with Tibet had no clearly demarcated boundaries. After Tibetan annexation, China made seven claims in total which account for 10% of its territory. 

Finally, Bhutan commenced back-channel talks in 1984 led by the Embassy of Bhutan in India. Since then, both countries had 24 rounds of border talks and 11 expert group meetings. In 1988 both countries agreed on guiding principles. In 1996 the negotiations reached a major breakthrough when Beijing offered to concede 495 Sq Km in the north in lieu of the 269 sq km in the West at Doklam. Doklam plateau offers a commanding view of the Chumbi valley abutting Sikkim and is close to the 14 miles wide India’s land bridge, Siliguri Corridor, or the Chicken Neck. It connects India to the Seven sisters of the North East.

Bhutan resisted accepting this package which would have given China a significant terrain advantage and put India’s security interests under severe strain. Instead, Bhutan and China signed “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility in the Bhutan-China Border Areas-1998” Treaty to Maintain Peace and Tranquility in 1998 pledging no unilateral change to the status quo.

Being a habitual violator of agreements, Beijing went ahead with the construction of roads, buildings, and settlements along the border regions of the disputed regions. Along with border fortifications, China also adopted a carrot-and-stick policy to accept the exchange of territories proposal.

China offered economic assistance packages to cede Doklam region. After China launched the ‘Xiokang’ border village program in 2006, infiltration by Tibetan herders intensified in the northern regions of Bhutan. Owing to relentless encroachment, Bhutan came up with a new map in 2006 that excluded the northernmost Kula Kangri region. Under pressure, Bhutan gave up its glacial reserve in a bid to resolve border disputes with China².

Anticipating a change in Chinese tact, after gifting away Kula Kangri, Bhutan revised Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007 to make its own foreign policy decisions. Reportedly, Bhutan Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley met the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in June 2012 along the side-lines of the Rio Summit. But Bhutan’s dismay despite its concessions, Beijing continued to intensify its salami-slicing³.

In 2017, India objected to PLA’s infrastructure building spree close to the trijunction at Doklam in a bid to wrest control over the plateau, a region where China is strategically vulnerable and reminded China of the 2012 agreement.

In 2012 India and China reached an agreement wherein trilateral junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries⁴. While Bhutan criticised China for occupying the disputed region, which even the official legislature records note that Doklam is a territorial dispute between Bhutan and China⁵ it didn’t make any statement on the 2012 agreement.

Strategically located between the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, the territorial integrity of Bhutan is pivotal for India’s security. Post Galwan clashes India asked Bhutan to resolve its territorial disputes with China so that all three parties can concentrate on the trijunctions.

To put Bhutan under pressure and extract maximum concessions, China started adopting the usual maximalist approach. In June 2020, at the virtual Global Economic Facility (GEF) Meeting, China made new and non-existent claims to Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary (SWS) in Eastern Bhutan’s Trashigang district bordering Arunachal Pradesh. In fact, these claims about Sakteng weren’t made during their previous negotiations in July 2018. To nip the matter in the bud, Bhutan firmly rejected Beijing’s claims on the SWS at the GEF meeting⁶ and urged the organizers to purge all references to the SWS in meeting minutes as well.

By and large, Bhutan had always adopted silent diplomacy of not antagonizing China. Hence, even though satellite images clearly documented Chinese villages in the north, and in Pangda in the West, Bhutan’s ambassador Major General V Namgyel in 2020 declared that there were no Chinese villages in Bhutan⁷. PM Tshering also held on to the same position with a Belgian newspaper interview. Indeed, Bhutan accepted the ‘One China policy’ and stayed away from the Taiwan issue.

In October 2021, four years after the Doklam standoff, Bhutan and China formalised a “Three-Step Roadmap (TSR)” to expedite border negotiations. Bhutan assured India that TSR focuses on addressing the bilateral issues with China and wouldn’t impact the trilateral junctions⁸. For the first time in 2022, PM Tshering in his interview explicitly stated that Bhutan-China talks will not focus on trilateral junctions and hinted at settling the Doklam issue trilaterally⁹. Hence, all the hue and cry made by critics over PM Tshering’s interview is clearly ill-founded.

In October 2022, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong made a three-day visit to Bhutan to improve ties and expand the win-win cooperation. But China’s attempts to woo Bhutan hardly met with any success. Reportedly, during TSR negotiations Bhutan delegation told the Chinese counterparts that “diplomatic relations between the two countries can be established only after the final boundary settlement is arrived at and on-ground demarcation is completed”¹⁰. Until Bhutan establishes diplomatic ties with China, Beijing can’t pull out Bhutan from India’s orbit.

China’s intimidation of Bhutan is indicative of its urgency to end the border disputes and upend the special relationship between India and Bhutan. Beijing is thus using every trick in the book to force Bhutan to accept the 1996 proposal and settle the dispute in its favour to gain a strategic advantage against India which it considers a competitor in the region.

Amid China’s increasing intimidation, on Bhutan King’s visit to India, countries announced a framework for expanded cooperation. King Jigme and PM Modi held wide-ranging discussions. India agreed to step up support for Bhutan’s 13^th Five-Year Plan and extend additional standby credit for the next five years which is in addition to the existing credit facility¹¹.  Bolstering the hydropower cooperation, the cornerstone of the India-Bhutan relationship countries agreed to a trilateral subregional cooperation with Bangladesh. To strengthen bilateral trade and facilitate the private players in developmental projects, King Jigme held meetings with Indian business leaders.

Leaders contemplated expanding cooperation in trade, connectivity, technology, space, STEM, and startups and extending energy partnerships to non-hydro alternatives like Solar, wind, and e-mobility. India assured Bhutan of the supply of critical commodities like coal, petroleum, and fertilisers. Notably, in November 2022 countries successfully developed and launched the first satellite India-Bhutan SAT and inaugurated Ground Earth Station at Thimphu.

For hassle-free trade and movement of people, countries have set up the first Integrated Check post near Jaigaon and Phuntsholing with additional check posts between Bhutan and Assam. India announced support for the operationalisation of the Third International Internet Gateway for Bhutan and the building of cross-border rail connectivity between Kokrajhar in Assam and Gelephu in Bhutan¹².

China is exerting disproportionate pressure on Bhutan to have a strategic terrain and diplomatic advantage against India. While it would be churlish to believe that Bhutan can resist this intimidation for eternity, Bhutan’s trade, connectivity, infrastructure development, transportation, and communication are inextricably linked to India. India is the major developmental and trading partner of Bhutan.

From India’s ongoing negotiations with China over disengagement at the LAC, Bhutan believes that patience is the key while dealing with Beijing. Thimpu realises that generosity and extending concessions can’t alleviate its security concerns and threats. Certainly, while New Delhi can’t force Bhutan to take a stand, an assurance and robust framework of expanded cooperation can provide leverage to Bhutan in negotiating with China. By committing to make India an equal stakeholder in the Doklam dispute Bhutan has inadvertently reposed trust in its security cooperation with New Delhi.

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