Saturday, 8 July 2023

Wolf Warrior Diplomat Bares Out China’s Duplicity

In response to a question on whether Crimea was part of Ukraine or not, Chinese envoy Lu Shaye in an interview with the French television channel LCI said, “These ex-USSR countries don’t have actual status in international law because there is no international agreement to materialise their sovereign status1. Known for his abrasive style and hawkish approach, the wolf-warrior diplomat, Lu’s statements drew the ire of the European countries and kicked up a storm.

The three Baltic nations- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the former Soviet Union nations, and part of the EU bloc, including Ukraine, took a serious exception to his remarks. Baltic countries demanded official clarification and reportedly issued summons to their Chinese envoys in their capitals for an explanation. Though France appeared frazzled by Lu’s remarks, the ambassador wasn’t summoned for any explanation. Baltic nations termed the Chinese envoy’s remarks totally unacceptable and Latvia demanded an “explanation from the Chinese side and complete retraction of his statement”.

These reckless remarks have come at a time when President Emmanuel Macron’s statement has deepened the existing fissures within the EU. Pushing for an independent foreign policy, Macron suggested that EU member states should stop being “vassals” and that the bloc could function as a “third bloc” in geopolitics alongside the US and China2. He also mentioned that France’s position on the “statusquo” in Taiwan remains unchanged and that Paris, “supports the One China policy and the search for a peaceful resolution to the solution3.

Independent security and foreign policy have always been central to Macron’s vision for Europe and a call for strategic autonomy received a huge fillip amid fraying trans-Atlantic bonds during the Trump era. But the Ukraine crisis has ebbed the calls for strategic autonomy. Macron’s comments drew instant criticism from leaders in European who had to defend his statement which had reference to the Taiwan issue as well. But his comments were more are less in line with France’s hesitancy to take a hard line with Beijing.

Lu’s statement has created a massive furore and backlash in Europe.  EU’s high representative Josep Borrell called the statement, “unacceptable” and EU Council president Charles Michel announced that ‘EU-China policy’ would be on the agenda of the next Council’s meeting in June. Europe’s pushback forced China’s foreign ministry to clarify its official stance.

Spokesperson Mao Ning said that Beijing, “respects the status of the former Soviet Republics as sovereign countries after the Soviet Union’s dissolution” and reiterated that the country’s position remains “unchanged4. China distanced itself from Lu’s statements and reportedly removed the official transcript of the interview from the official WeChat account. Issuing a clarification, Chinese Embassy in France stated that Lu was not making a “political declaration, but an expression of his personal view during a televised debate”.

Be as it may, Lu’s statements have exposed China’s duplicity on two fronts. Lu’s reply to his position on Crimea “It depends on how you look at the problem. There’s history. Crimea was Russian at the start” has inadvertently sowed suspicion about China’s outlook. Lu’s position mirrored the West’s understanding of the Kremlin’s unwillingness to accept the sovereignty of Ukraine which is believed to be at the heart of the current Ukraine crisis by some analysts5. Aspersions on the sovereignty fly in the face of China which overtly towed a neutral position on Ukraine and now it mischievously raked doubts about its independent existence. These statements apparently blew into smithereens China’s façade of neutrality.

Trumping the Western belief of China playing a crucial role in finding the ‘path of peace’ in Ukraine, Lu’s statement has exposed the duplicity of Beijing. Since the eruption of the Ukraine conflict, Beijing has firmly resisted every attempt to condemn Russia. To abate Western criticism, Beijing has announced a 12-point peace plan on the eve of one year of the conflict and plans to speak to Zelensky. While there has been no progress on this front, flexing diplomatic muscle and riding high on the path-breaking mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Xi on his visit to Russia issued a joint statement on “deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era and stress settling the Ukraine crisis through dialogue”.

Notably, on the Ukraine issue, Russia and China agreed that “the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter must be observed and international law must be respected6. By invoking “international law” and questioning the status of the Ex-Soviet Union countries, Lu has raised doubts about the ambiguous interpretations of the international law to which China subscribe to. The sub-continent is no stranger to China’s dubious interpretations of International Law. Through sweeping statements, Lu has made an attempt to upend the sovereignty of the nations.

Also, this has again brought to the fore, the discourteous overbearing nature of Lu Shaye who in January 2019, accused Canada of “white supremacy” imploring the release of two Canadian detained by China following the arrest of Huawei’s executive Meng Wanzhou. He triggered a diplomatic spat in 2021 by calling a French researcher, Antoine Bondaz critical of China’s Taiwan policy a “little thug” and a “troll”. He even tweeted that those who “portray themselves as researchers and members of the media and who furiously attack China were crazy hyenas”. He also lashed out at the French government and the EU in the past for condemning Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong7.

Lu’s comments mark the return of the imperious and tyrannical disposition of Chinese envoys that heralded the Wolf Warrior diplomacy. Macron on his state visit to Xi said, “I know I can count on you to bring Russia to its senses and everyone to the negotiating table8. Lu’s outlook would now certainly prompt a reassessment on the part of French and Europe about China.

These comments should serve as a wake-up call to Europe which has pinned hopes on China to negotiate the Ukraine conflict. China’s territorial claims in the region stem from its refusal to accept the sovereignty of nations. Scrupulous about its thousand-year history, China never acknowledges the current boundaries of various nations in the region. On the pretext of China being the suzerain of Tibet for a brief period of time, Beijing annexed it and refused to accept the Mc Mahon line. This is at the root of the current border dispute between India and China. Similarly, it regards Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet and rejects Indian sovereignty and maliciously labels it as an illegal occupation.

The Taiwan issue is an extension of China’s non-acceptance of the independent existence of the island nation. Taiwan Presidential Debatesin 2016, has laid out bare the Chinese claims highlighting the fact- “Taiwan was only ruled by a Han Chinese regime based in China for only four years from 1945 to 1949; the worst four years in the nation’s history when troops systematically killed more than 20,000 elites, students and other people9.

Guided by the doctrine of “Tianxia” or ‘all under the Heaven’, which alludes to China having received the Mandate as ruler of the World, China is rather insensitive towards the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other nations. It blatantly disregards the sovereignty of nations. Laying territorial claims to foreign lands has been integral to Chinese foreign policy. Building propaganda to bolster its claims is another accompanying aspect of it. The policy typically rests on the foundation of “what is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable”. Adopting a maximalist position and bereft of negotiations, China’s intransigent policy has destroyed regional stability and peace. Given the reluctance of major European powers France and Germany to decouple from China and their push for a moderate stance toward China, it would be incumbent on the European Union to reassess its China policy in light of the current remarks of its envoy.

Ukraine crisis ramifications are looming large on Europe impacting its foreign policy. It is time, the EU takes stock of the baffling cacophony of views of European nations on China before overly relying on Beijing for the role of conflict mediation and for a deepening strategic partnership over a slew of issues.


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Sudan: Rival Generals Pushing the Country to the Brink

An Indian national hit by a stray bullet died two days ago in Khartoum. Close to 4000 Indians are stranded in conflict-ridden Sudan waiting for immediate evacuation. India is in touch with Quartet countries- the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and UAE to ensure the safety and security of Indian nationals. At the behest of the UN, the Sudanese Army has agreed to humanitarian passages for three hours1. Responding to the crisis, Dubai Airport announced to provide accommodation to Sudanese transit passengers2.

Amid these developments, back in India, politicians have triggered a row to bring back 31 Karnataka tribals belonging to the Hakki-Pikki tribe trapped in Sudan. Sudan is going through one of the worst conflicts. Amid tensions and reports of looting, the Indian Embassy at Khartoum issued a third advisory to Indian nationals to stay indoors and not venture out. The Ministry of External Affairs has set up a 24X7 control room to provide information and assistance and is in touch with stranded Indians3.

Meanwhile, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) halted operations after three of its staff were killed. As the war enters the fifth day, thus far, a US diplomatic convoy was fired upon and the EU envoy to Sudan was attacked.

Massive conflicts have erupted in Sudan with reports of over 56 killings in the first three days of clashes. Though the country is not new to conflicts and known for prolonged tensions, military coups, the current crisis, an offshoot of a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Paramilitary Forces (RSF) Rapid Support Forces has brought the country to the brink. RSF seized control of the Presidential Palace, military headquarters and airports. The death toll is mounting. Though the Army and rival forces have initially agreed to the US mediation for a 24-hour ceasefire, the violence continues unabated.

The third largest country in Africa, Sudan is witnessing a grave political crisis which more or less began with the ouster of a three-decade rule of despot Omar al-Bashir in 2019 by a democratic uprising. Subsequently, a hybrid civilian-military government headed by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok stormed to power. However, efforts to install a stable civilian rule were torpedoed in October 2021 due to a military coup led by SAF commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan actively supported by RSF chief Mohammed Hamdon Dagalo, known as Hemeti. Burhan is now the defacto Sudanese head of the state and Hemeti is his deputy.

Civilian rule has been eluding Sudan since the first attempt to institute civilian rule was disrupted by the military coup. To end the military rule and enable the two-year transition into the civilian rule, the envoys of the US, France, the UK, Norway, Germany and the EU pushed for a framework deal between the military and the civilian stakeholders in December 2022. The Civilian groups include- Forces Freedom and Change (FFC), the Islamist Popular Congress Party (PCP) a section of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), some rebel movements, Salafists and civil society organizations.

According to the deal, the civilian rule would commence with the appointment of a prime minister by the civilian groups4. The framework is backed by the Quad- the US, the UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia; EU, African Union, and United Nations but doesn’t include Egypt which is a pivotal player in Sudan affairs.

Welcoming the framework, Burhan and Hemeti vowed to refrain from intervening in the civilian administration. But the major challenges to implementing the framework included- reforms to the military and civilian sector, the crisis in eastern Sudan, the Juba Peace Agreement, the restoration of stability and development in the region, the structural dismantling of the previous regime, and the establishment of a unified army.

But political disagreements erupted over military restructuring stalling the signing of the deal scheduled for April 1. The disagreements stem from the integration of the RSF militia into the country’s military, which is mandated under the deal. SAF favoured a two-year transition for integration, while Hemeti wanted it to take 10 years.

The integration roadblock stems from the personal rivalry between Burhan and Hemeti. Both men powerful, influential and with huge authority under their belt have brought the country to its current state. Burhan, SAF commander is backed by Egypt and the Islamist forces who held powerful positions in the dismantled Bashir regime. Burhan controls the military-industrial complex.

Hemeti born into the Chadian Arab clan with no formal education became the leader of the Janjaweed (meaning devil on the horseback) militias deployed by Bashir to fight the rebels. In 2013 to crush the massive protests in response to Bashir’s rollback of subsidies, he allowed the regrouping of the militia under the name of RSF headed by Hemeti. In the process, RSF has established bases in Khartoum.  Bashir cultivated Hemeti who along with his men served him and his party National Congress Party (NCP) members as bodyguards. Hemeti along with SAF was accused of severe human rights abuses.

In 2018, at the height of the democratic uprising, Hemeti opportunistically supported the ouster of Bashir. Ironically, despite the support, RSF under Hemeti opened fire on the silent sit-protests in June 2019 killing over 100 people. Overthrowing the hybrid government, Hemeti entered into a marriage of convenience with Burhan to rule the country in October 2021.

Hemeti and his brothers who control the gold mines in Darfur flourished after Sudan transitioned from an oil economy to a gold economy seamlessly smuggling gold using the RSF.  Hemeti is supported by UAE and Saudi Arabia for supplying militias to the Yemen War. Burhan and Hemeti have parallel foreign policies and have respective external forces backing their moves.

With street-level protests gathering steam and believing that the framework proposal favoured RSF, Hemeti changed the track. Rebranding himself as a champion of democracy, Hemeti issued a statement regretting October 2021 while his men continued to crush the street protests. Ostensibly, Burhan and Hemeti are keen on wresting their control over Khartoum.

Besides, the integration of RSF into national military forces, another reason for the present conflict as per historian, Dr. Willow Berridgehas been the gradual re-empowerment of Islamist groups of the Bashir regime by Burhan. Hemeti felt threatened by possible revenge from them for his betrayal. Hence, Hemeti wants the complete extrication of the Islamists from the SAF before integration.

Civilian groups FFC and UAE consider Hemeti as a bulwark against the return of the Islamist forces to Sudan. Burhan is leaning toward Islamist groups close to Egypt to consolidate his power, Hemeti is looking to UAE support. With the deepening of disagreements, Hemeti moved his forces from Western Sudan to Khartoum and the northern city of Merowe, the second largest airport in Sudan to prevent any joint action between SAF and Egyptian forces against RSF.

Some analysts believe that this Game of Thrones is essentially a battle between unequal forces. SAF has more troops and a superior air force while RSF has battle-hardened forces and substantial armoured vehicles. Sadly, this fighting between the two insiders of Sudan is influenced by external actors as well.

Sudan is located in the horn of Africa abutting the Red Sea and major geopolitical players are now seeking to gain influence in this volatile region. The steady flow of foreign leaders to Sudan ahead of these tensions provides a sneak peek into the complex interplay of different nations in action in the region.

Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov held separate meetings with Burhan and Hemeti on his visit to Sudan in February. He announced that Moscow would establish a military base along Sudan’s Red Sea Coast as the Russian mercenary Wagner group is fighting terrorism in the Central African Republic. Hemetia’s RSF militia has close ties with Wagner group of Russia and visited Moscow after the Ukraine conflict began. But Burhan is opposed to Russia’s port plans.

Though Egypt is not part of the framework proposal, it has close ties with Sudan. President Sisi is an old ally of Burhan. But Burhan is supported by Sudanese Islamists who have close ties with Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, an adversary of Sisi. Despite the knotty tangle, Egypt still has a larger say in Sudan. But the regional dynamics are suddenly shifting with Sudan getting closer to Ethiopia due to the Grand Renaissance Dam. Egypt and Ethiopia find themselves on opposite sides.

Due to the parallel foreign policies of Burhan and Hemetia, Sudan has turned into an important and contentious pawn in the larger geopolitical matrix of the region. Sudan has a complex relationship with Israel. Sudan supports Palestine’s cause. Sudanese forces fought against Israel in 1948 and 1973 and the arms bound for Hamas pass through Sudan. But Sudan drifted from this position and in 2016 a cash-strapped Sudan softened its stance towards Israel.

As per some reports, in lieu of US financial assistance, Sudan has agreed to sign a normalisation agreement as part of the Abraham Accords with Israel in October 20206. RSF supplies gold to UAE and Hemeti enjoys close ties with ruler Mohammed bin Zayed. Indeed, the close Emirati, Saudi connection might have also driven forward the normalisation agreement.

Interestingly, while Burhan has connections with the political establishment of Israel, Hemeti is in touch with Israeli intelligence Mossad. Keen on launching direct flights from Israel to South America, Prime Minister Netanyahu is seeking to secure an agreement with Sudan, Chad and Nigeria to pass through their air space. Sudan is interested in acquiring Israel’s Pegasus spyware, irrigation and desalination technology7. Sudan is thus, a very important piece in the region’s geopolitical jigsaw puzzle.

The steady rise of Islamist influence in Sudan is yet another reason why the US, UAE and Saudi Arabia are pushing forward the framework deal to institute a civilian government. But all the plans of a transition to a peaceful political solution are now shattered by the power struggle between the most influential players of Sudan.

The people of Sudan are caught in the crossfire in the war between the two anti-democratic forces- SAF and RSF. Khartoum is now a ghost city. People are looking for shelter from the SAF’s air strikes and RSF’s artillery fire. A protracted conflict is bound to derail the country and destabilise the region already reeling under the unabated Ethiopian civil war. International mediators must step up their efforts to bring about a ceasefire before the tension pushes the country to the brink.

Unfortunately, an intractable and defiant approach of Sudan has decimated all hopes of international mediation facilitating an amicable resolution. In an interview to Wion, Sudanese envoy, Abdalla Omer Bashir Elhusain said, “The international committees, African Union and other countries, they have expressed their interest and availability and they send the calls to both parties to stop the clashes. But our government thinks that this is a battle, in which we are defending Sudan and we think this is an internal issue, and it should be left to Sudanese people, to solve the problem between themselves and our government is completely not accepting any sort of international interference, so no international interference”. Outrightly rejecting international support and mediation Sudan has precluded all hopes of ending the current turmoil.


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Revolutionaries: The Other Story of How India won its Freedom

The saga of India’s quest for independence and freedom from centuries of foreign rule has many heroes. Each of them had a different approach and religiously adhered to a certain frame of thought to work towards this pursuit of freedom from colonial powers. So, the freedom struggle was never a straight-jacketed approach nor did a specific ideology or a value system had made this dream of being independent a reality. The freedom struggle was replete with the selfless sacrifices of numerous leaders and visionaries from every nook and corner of the land.

Ideally, India’s contemporary history should have been etched with the extraordinary feats of the ordinary heroes who made the freedom struggle a mass movement. Instead, slyly scrubbed off the legendary acts of several unsung heroes a dominant monochromatic view of the independence movement has become the most coveted narration even after over seven decades of becoming a free nation. The heroes of the freedom struggle never received their due. They were never credited for their sacrifices and courage.

Of late, to counter this chicanery and abject whitewashing of the different strands of thought, historians, and intellectuals are steadily bringing out to the fore the legendary acts of several lesser-known freedom fighters. The contributions of these legends have generated new interest and set a platform to explore a hidden side of the freedom struggle that was deliberately side-lined.

Several strands of thoughts were brought to light by these works.  But it needed master craftsmen to join these links or join the dots to effectively discern a spectrum of thought that relentlessly strove and worked for the liberation of the motherland from the foreign shackles. Piecing together these disparate strands is Sanjeev Sanyal’s book “Revolutionaries: The Other Story of How India Won Its Independence”. Know for his immaculate style of writing, Sanyal who is hugely popular for his books on history that sparked new interest among gen-X, in his present work has put things in perspective and shaped a narrative.

Indian freedom struggle is invariably identified with the non-violent doctrine of M. K. Gandhi. While the lesser-known deterrent and the real force majeure that advanced the exit of the colonial masters have been the armed resistance and peerless acts of courage and dare. Often dubbed as random events, these fierce acts of patriotic fervour had a story to them which were unrecognised and underappreciated. Sanyal’s new book fills the gap in the general understanding of people about the role of armed resistance in India’s independence.

Indeed, the impact of armed resistance on the independent struggle remained understated with bits and parts of the heroic acts often appropriated to certain ideologies. Giving a perspective to this disjointed understanding, Sanyal has done a brilliant job of connecting these dots and lending credence to the revolutionary network that wasn’t just confined to different parts of the country but had established nodes in far-off lands like the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Japan, Thailand, Russia and Ireland.

Other than the 1857 revolution or the first war of Indian independence that has been the dominant influence, Irish nationalism, Hindu revivalist leaders like Swami Vivekananda, and Japanese pan-Asianism were among the major intellectual influences of the revolutionaries. Ironically, the book also shreds the prevalent dogmatic view about revolutionaries. The majority of the revolutionaries in the early 19th century were unapologetic Hindus and followers of Shakta tradition who took a solemn oath on Bhagavad Gita to dedicate their entire lives to the cause of independence. They were deeply religious and the personification of India as Bharat Mata is an extension of this view. But they weren’t bigoted and worked with varied groups of people including pan-Islamists, Japanese imperialists and communist-leaning cadres. They were pragmatists, open to new approaches, soaked in ideas from similar fights against oppression and actively collaborated with like-minded people to liberate India.

Indeed, the broad group of revolutionaries by the 1940s comprised Anushilan Marxists, Royists (followers of MN Roy founder of CPI), and the Congress Socialist Party led by Jaya Prakash Narayan. Despite the ideological differences, they worked together as a group towards the mission of ending foreign rule. On the contrary, issuing a press statement Jawaharlal Nehru said, “I do believe that the choice before the world today is one between some form of Communism and some form of Fascism, and I am all for the former, that is Communism”. Instead of taking sides, Subhash Chandra Bose opinioned, “unless we are at the end of the process of evolution or unless we deny evolution altogether, there is no reason to hold that our choice is restricted to two alternatives”. (p-224)

The book also exposes the double-speak and fawning hypocrisy of the mainstream narrative and its approval of the ‘alliance of convenience’ of President Roosevelt being colonial sympathiser siding with imperialist Churchill and despot Stalin but demonised Subhash Chandra Bose for allying with Axis powers. This is the narrative that relentlessly derided the installation of the Netaji’s statue at the Kartavya Marg by PM Modi.

Sadly, even now the luminaries who ignited and sustained the spark of devotion towards the nation among successive generations of revolutionaries have failed to get their due. They are unfortunately relegated to the footnotes of history.

A continuum of thought spans the entire expanse of the book laid out in eight chapters. Chronologically, the book starts off with the leading lights of this armed resistance in India- Aurobindo Ghosh, Veer Savarkar, Sachindranath Sanyal and characteristically ends with the declaration of India’s freedom. But the thread extends into the epilogue that talks about -some of the revolutionaries in the post-Independence era, the rise and accommodation of the ‘collaborator class’ in the political spectrum, the punitive downplaying of the armed resistance in freedom movement and the emergence of RSS as an influential religio-cultural organisation.

Suffused with acts of defiance against the colonial rule carried out by young, patriotic revolutionaries a sense of awe certainly overwhelms the readers. With an ambitious task of presenting the resistance saga of revolutionaries spanning over five decades, Sanyal expertly packs and duly hails the bold acts of revolutionaries like Chapekar brothers, Prafulla Chaki, Khudiram Bose, Madanlal Dhingra, Udham Singh, Ram Prasad Bismil, Ashfaqullah Khan, Bhagat Singh, Jatin Das, Bina Das, Surya Sen, Rashbehari Bose, Ghadarites, Padurang Sadashiv Khankoje and several others.

Resisting the temptation of cramming more information, Sanyal limits the introductions of revolutionaries to cursory details and constructs the narrative by highlighting pathbreaking events and people associated with them. Peppered with numerous anecdotes and the personal tragedies, the book feels like a roller coaster ride with few hits and several misses with men of undaunting courage unshaken by the vagaries of life and degeneration of the movement, making every attempt to resurrect it.

Sanyal underscores the seminal efforts of Sachindranath Sanyal, his great grand uncle who was the only person sent to Cellular Jail in reviving and reaching out to the people all over again just an hour after his release. The violent acts of revolutionaries are not just isolated acts or sporadic heroism but they were part of an organised network with a defined objective and mission. Instrumental in installation of the Provisional Government of Free India, the revolutionaries have partly succeeded in accomplishing their mission.

Neatly packing a wealth of information that was systematically erased from public memory and the invaluable gist of the armed resistance in 352 pages, Sanyal has done a brilliant job of providing a perfect overview of the revolutionary movement, the backbone of India’s resistance.

The book also highlights the British tactics of frustrating the revolutionary heists at regular intervals, infiltrating Gurudwaras and excoriating Sikhs of Hindu identity, deliberately introducing and encouraging the political prisoners to the Marxist ideology and even hand-holding them into starting indoctrinating centres in India to create rift. Wielding the Divine and Rule Policy, the British ruled by pitting Indians against each other.

The meat of the book is clearly the epilogue that fleetingly rushes through post-independence era bundling together the partition woes including death, rape, betrayal and neglect endured by revolutionaries, minority appeasement, opportunistic politicking, Brahmin pogram etc. Without getting into details, this chapter enlists the British legacy interventions which has turned into perennial problems -Khalistani separatist movement, the Rohingya conflict a consequence of arming the local Muslim-Buddhist rivalry, official patronisation of loyalists or the ‘collaborator class’ which orchestrates and sets the discourse, emergence of a cult of westernised ‘brown sahibs’, secularisation of akhadas, proliferation of communist ideology, etc.

Drifting through various aspects that continue to afflict the independent India, Sanyal recounting the real inheritor of the Indian revolutionary movement, points to RSS that has grown by leaps and bounds with Sakhas or the youth clubs even in foreign countries. The apolitical Sakhas, akin to social network of akhadas of ancient India, where youth practice physical skills managed by pracharaks (usually bachelors) have uncanny similarities to the Bhawani Mandir concept envisioned by Aurobindo Gosh. The effort to draw parallels is certainly not lost on the readers.

Given his own family connect with the revolutionary movement, Sanyal even takes us along to the places of consequences by narrating its importance and its present condition as well. This nuanced narrative building of Sanyal really sets this book apart and makes it an essential read for everyone who wishes to discern the Indian resistance to foreign domination.

Pages: 352

Publisher: Harper Collins


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Dragon’s Challenge to Indo-Bhutanese Time-tested Security Cooperation

An arena that is gaining traction other than the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theatres is the Indian sub-continent. Bhutan Prime Minister Lotay Tshering’s interview with a Belgian newspaper Le Libre, where he mentioned that “Doklam is a junction point between India, China and Bhutan. It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem. We are three. There is no big or small country, there are three equal countries, each counting for a third. We are ready. As soon as the other two parties are ready, we can discuss. India and China have problems all along the border. We are waiting to see how they will resolve their differences” elicited swift criticism and sparked fresh debates about the robustness of the India-Bhutan partnership and China’s intimidatory tactics.

In the face of growing apprehensions in India following his remarks, PM Tshering immediately reiterated, “I have said nothing new and there is no change in position” in the Bhutanese newspaper. PM Tshering’s take on Doklam, in the aftermath of the Sino-Bhutan 11th Expert Group Meeting at Kuming in January 2023 and a lengthy propaganda piece in the Global Times- “How India tries to interfere in and take control of Bhutan” by Sun Xihui, a researcher with the National Institute of International Strategy, has raised many eyebrows. The pattern and timing are the real suspects with Beijing raking up the trijunction issue at a time when India’s frosty ties with China diving south.

Aside from stirring up the Bhutan boundary issue, in response to India’s G20 meeting held at Arunachal Pradesh which the Chinese representative participated virtually, Beijing has released a fresh list of 11 Chinese names for geographical locations in Arunachal Pradesh. Unable to convince India to normalise ties and the LAC terms as per its own terms, China is now exerting pressurizing on New Delhi. Renaming exercise to bolster its claims is part of China’s “lawfare” employed to have a legal high ground. The announcement came days ahead of the three-day visit of Bhutan King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk to New Delhi accompanied by Tande Dorji, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade and other senior officials on April 3rd.

Beijing has infiltrated India’s immediate neighbourhood to encircle India. China settled territorial disputes with 14 neighbouring countries baring India and Bhutan. India has a longstanding relationship with Bhutan characterised by “trust, goodwill, mutual understanding” and to keep India on the edge, China is now slowly escalating another front in India’s north which is the Doklam trijunction. Five years ago, India stopped Chinese incursion at Doklam in a standoff that lasted for 73 days following which China has to pull back its forces.

Bhutan signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1949 and established diplomatic ties with India in 1968 but remained neutral to China despite its overtures. After China’s annexation of Tibet, despite India’s defeat in 1962, Bhutan chose to closely align with India and accommodate New Delhi’s interests after China started laying claiming its territories issuing new maps in 1959.  

Geographically located between two military powers of the region, India and China, Bhutan adopted a ‘Balance of Threat’ policy and refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with P5 countries. But, Thimpu always remained assertive and defensive in matters of self-interest and security that essentially dictated its foreign policy.

In 1979 China made major incursions into Bhutan1 to push for direct open border negotiations on disputed regions as both countries do not have diplomatic relations. The disputed regions in contention were Doklam, Dramana, Shakhatoe, Yak Chu, Charithang Chu, Sinchulungpa, Langmarpo valleys which are rich pasture lands in the Western region and Jhakurlung and Pasamlung valleys in the north considered very sacred by the Bhutanese. Bhutan which had religious and cultural relations with Tibet had no clearly demarcated boundaries. After Tibetan annexation, China made seven claims in total which account for 10% of its territory. 

Finally, Bhutan commenced back-channel talks in 1984 led by the Embassy of Bhutan in India. Since then, both countries had 24 rounds of border talks and 11 expert group meetings. In 1988 both countries agreed on guiding principles. In 1996 the negotiations reached a major breakthrough when Beijing offered to concede 495 Sq Km in the north in lieu of the 269 sq km in the West at Doklam. Doklam plateau offers a commanding view of the Chumbi valley abutting Sikkim and is close to the 14 miles wide India’s land bridge, Siliguri Corridor, or the Chicken Neck. It connects India to the Seven sisters of the North East.

Bhutan resisted accepting this package which would have given China a significant terrain advantage and put India’s security interests under severe strain. Instead, Bhutan and China signed “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility in the Bhutan-China Border Areas-1998” Treaty to Maintain Peace and Tranquility in 1998 pledging no unilateral change to the status quo.

Being a habitual violator of agreements, Beijing went ahead with the construction of roads, buildings, and settlements along the border regions of the disputed regions. Along with border fortifications, China also adopted a carrot-and-stick policy to accept the exchange of territories proposal.

China offered economic assistance packages to cede Doklam region. After China launched the ‘Xiokang’ border village program in 2006, infiltration by Tibetan herders intensified in the northern regions of Bhutan. Owing to relentless encroachment, Bhutan came up with a new map in 2006 that excluded the northernmost Kula Kangri region. Under pressure, Bhutan gave up its glacial reserve in a bid to resolve border disputes with China2.

Anticipating a change in Chinese tact, after gifting away Kula Kangri, Bhutan revised Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007 to make its own foreign policy decisions. Reportedly, Bhutan Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley met the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in June 2012 along the side-lines of the Rio Summit. But Bhutan’s dismay despite its concessions, Beijing continued to intensify its salami-slicing3.

In 2017, India objected to PLA’s infrastructure building spree close to the trijunction at Doklam in a bid to wrest control over the plateau, a region where China is strategically vulnerable and reminded China of the 2012 agreement.

In 2012 India and China reached an agreement wherein trilateral junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries4. While Bhutan criticised China for occupying the disputed region, which even the official legislature records note that Doklam is a territorial dispute between Bhutan and China5 it didn’t make any statement on the 2012 agreement.

Strategically located between the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, the territorial integrity of Bhutan is pivotal for India’s security. Post Galwan clashes India asked Bhutan to resolve its territorial disputes with China so that all three parties can concentrate on the trijunctions.

To put Bhutan under pressure and extract maximum concessions, China started adopting the usual maximalist approach. In June 2020, at the virtual Global Economic Facility (GEF) Meeting, China made new and non-existent claims to Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary (SWS) in Eastern Bhutan’s Trashigang district bordering Arunachal Pradesh. In fact, these claims about Sakteng weren’t made during their previous negotiations in July 2018. To nip the matter in the bud, Bhutan firmly rejected Beijing’s claims on the SWS at the GEF meeting6 and urged the organizers to purge all references to the SWS in meeting minutes as well.

By and large, Bhutan had always adopted silent diplomacy of not antagonizing China. Hence, even though satellite images clearly documented Chinese villages in the north, and in Pangda in the West, Bhutan’s ambassador Major General V Namgyel in 2020 declared that there were no Chinese villages in Bhutan7. PM Tshering also held on to the same position with a Belgian newspaper interview. Indeed, Bhutan accepted the ‘One China policy’ and stayed away from the Taiwan issue.

In October 2021, four years after the Doklam standoff, Bhutan and China formalised a “Three-Step Roadmap (TSR)” to expedite border negotiations. Bhutan assured India that TSR focuses on addressing the bilateral issues with China and wouldn’t impact the trilateral junctions8. For the first time in 2022, PM Tshering in his interview explicitly stated that Bhutan-China talks will not focus on trilateral junctions and hinted at settling the Doklam issue trilaterally9. Hence, all the hue and cry made by critics over PM Tshering’s interview is clearly ill-founded.

In October 2022, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong made a three-day visit to Bhutan to improve ties and expand the win-win cooperation. But China’s attempts to woo Bhutan hardly met with any success. Reportedly, during TSR negotiations Bhutan delegation told the Chinese counterparts that “diplomatic relations between the two countries can be established only after the final boundary settlement is arrived at and on-ground demarcation is completed10. Until Bhutan establishes diplomatic ties with China, Beijing can’t pull out Bhutan from India’s orbit.

China’s intimidation of Bhutan is indicative of its urgency to end the border disputes and upend the special relationship between India and Bhutan. Beijing is thus using every trick in the book to force Bhutan to accept the 1996 proposal and settle the dispute in its favour to gain a strategic advantage against India which it considers a competitor in the region.

Amid China’s increasing intimidation, on Bhutan King’s visit to India, countries announced a framework for expanded cooperation. King Jigme and PM Modi held wide-ranging discussions. India agreed to step up support for Bhutan’s 13th Five-Year Plan and extend additional standby credit for the next five years which is in addition to the existing credit facility11.  Bolstering the hydropower cooperation, the cornerstone of the India-Bhutan relationship countries agreed to a trilateral subregional cooperation with Bangladesh. To strengthen bilateral trade and facilitate the private players in developmental projects, King Jigme held meetings with Indian business leaders.

Leaders contemplated expanding cooperation in trade, connectivity, technology, space, STEM, and startups and extending energy partnerships to non-hydro alternatives like Solar, wind, and e-mobility. India assured Bhutan of the supply of critical commodities like coal, petroleum, and fertilisers. Notably, in November 2022 countries successfully developed and launched the first satellite India-Bhutan SAT and inaugurated Ground Earth Station at Thimphu.

For hassle-free trade and movement of people, countries have set up the first Integrated Check post near Jaigaon and Phuntsholing with additional check posts between Bhutan and Assam. India announced support for the operationalisation of the Third International Internet Gateway for Bhutan and the building of cross-border rail connectivity between Kokrajhar in Assam and Gelephu in Bhutan12.

China is exerting disproportionate pressure on Bhutan to have a strategic terrain and diplomatic advantage against India. While it would be churlish to believe that Bhutan can resist this intimidation for eternity, Bhutan’s trade, connectivity, infrastructure development, transportation, and communication are inextricably linked to India. India is the major developmental and trading partner of Bhutan.

From India’s ongoing negotiations with China over disengagement at the LAC, Bhutan believes that patience is the key while dealing with Beijing. Thimpu realises that generosity and extending concessions can’t alleviate its security concerns and threats. Certainly, while New Delhi can’t force Bhutan to take a stand, an assurance and robust framework of expanded cooperation can provide leverage to Bhutan in negotiating with China. By committing to make India an equal stakeholder in the Doklam dispute Bhutan has inadvertently reposed trust in its security cooperation with New Delhi.


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Weaker Political Constituency of India Offshoring Domestic Battles to Foreign Lands

On March 30, the German Foreign Ministry commented on the disqualification of parliamentarian Rahul Gandhi stating, “we have taken note of the verdict of first instance against the Indian opposition politician Rahul Gandhi as well as the suspension of his parliamentary mandate…. We expect that the standards of judicial independence and fundamental democratic principles will equally apply to the proceedings against Rahul Gandhi1. Taking to Twitter Congress leader Digvijay Singh wrote, “Thank you Germany Foreign Affairs Ministry and Richard Walker for taking note of how the Democracy is being compromised in India through the persecution of Rahul Gandhi2.

Earlier in the week, the US State Department deputy spokesperson in response to Rahul Gandhi’s issue said, “Respect for the rule of law and judicial independence is a cornerstone of any democracy. We are watching Mr. Gandhi’s case in Indian courts and we engage with the Government of India on our shared commitment to democratic values, including freedom of expression”.

Remarks of the German and the US establishments to a judicial ruling have raised many eyebrows coming in the wake of the desperate rants of Rahul Gandhi of “democracy in India is under brutal attack” and “surprising thing is that the so-called defenders of democracy, the US and Europe, seem to just be oblivious that a huge chunk of the democratic model has come undone” at Cambridge just a couple of weeks ago.

Indeed, this is not an isolated event of the Indian political constituency looking to the West. Not long ago in the recent past, Indian politicians and civil society amplified the tweets and comments of Canadian President Justin Trudeau and tweets of Rihanna, Mia Khalifa and Greta Thunberg (of course the toolkit as well) to build pressure on the Government of India on farm laws. While the tweets were later found to be part of motivated propaganda bordering on falsehoods and distortions, the endorsement received by the Indian ecosystem provided traction to this well-choreographed and funded perception and information warfare which is still etched in the memory of the Indian public. Sadly, this new trend of deriving political oxygen from these kinds of unverified and disproportionate propaganda has become more rampant since 2014.

The infiltration of the political ranks in India by external forces has been an unfortunate reality in the cold war era. India was deliberately played by the superpowers. But the current spectre of offshoring the narrative building by the Indian political constituency is truly mystifying and worrying. India which has been a major outsourcing and offshoring centre for foreign investors after the economic liberalisation seems to be offshoring its political battles to foreign lands.

Every major social, political, and religious divide manifested in India is now getting multiplied manifold by co-opting external sources. Seattle city council’s resolution against CAA, NRC and resolution in support of caste as a protected category in California is a testament to this new trend. The disruption of the Parliament over demand for a JPC into the Hindenburg research released by a short-seller by the political parties all these disparate events together indicate that India’s political power play is being planned and orchestrated by external players.

By shifting the theatre of domestic politics to foreign lands and giving them more control to manipulate the discourse, the Indian political constituency is playing a very dangerous game. The near absence of unequivocal condemnation of attacks on Indian Missions/Posts, paralysing the functioning of the Indian envoys stationed abroad by the entire political dispensation is truly disappointing. Lack of conciliation between the political parties even on the issues of national security, prestige and honour will bode ill for the country.

Support for anti-Indian activities from some political parties to pander to specific communities is going to be perilous. The silence of some political parties in condemning the targeted attacks on Hindus and Hindu temples in Leicester and the sceptical hesitancy even after an official investigation vindicating the Hindu stance has exposed the partisan political approach of Indian politicians. Extrapolating the domestic fissures to the foreign lands, the political parties in India are creating dissensions among the Indian Diaspora settled away from the motherland and in the process partly coopting the vested interests to fight the domestic battles away from India.

Incapable of taking on the ruling dispensation head-on Indian politicians appear to have embarked on the journey of deploying extraneous forces. In the process, they are not only tarnishing India’s image as a deeply divided political entity but inadvertently assisting the anti-Indian forces to widen existing chinks in the armour.

Seeking support and banking on the foreign country county resolutions to defend their stance essentially symbolises the political incapacity of winning the electoral mandate. Instead of establishing grassroots connections and fighting on issues of domestic relevance like poverty alleviation, infrastructure, smart cities, pollution, unemployment, skilling, women’s empowerment, inflation, etc., they are employing civil society groups, academia, and leftist lobbies to hamstring India’s rise.

Thanks to this malicious circuitous approach to take on the current ruling dispensation, Hindus who form the micro minority community in many countries are now at the receiving end. The benefit of the doubt usually proffered on the micro minorities otherwise is now denied to Hindus. The veritable bias which is the staple of the Indian political system is now extended to the Hindu community settled in distant lands. This political indifference and partisanship are emboldening the secessionist forces who are now harassing innocent Hindus settled outside India.  Ironically even as Islamophobia is duly acknowledged the relentless attacks on the indigenous religious communities of India or in short, Hinduphobia is outrightly rebuffed.

There can be no denying of this collusion. Else what explains the euphoria of the Congress leaders who welcomed the German government’s statement on India’s internal affairs? Would any self-respecting nation and the representatives of the people hail such remarks? In their pursuit to have an upper hand politically, so-called leaders are playing into the hands of breaking Indian forces already at work to topple the apple cart of rising India.

Rejected by the domestic masses, the perspective of the Indian opposition amplified by the international media alone has become a powerful weapon to be wielded against the Indian government by vested interests. While it is hard to believe, oftentimes, the language used by Indian adversaries is uncannily similar to the tone, tenor and verbatim used by some of our own Indian leaders. Political desperation and a series of electoral debacles have thrown established dynastic parties into irrelevance. Rather than endeavouring to resurrect their political mandate through intense public outreach, they are lazily resorting to these offhanded tactics and politicking.

In the process, they are casting aspersions on the democratic institutions in India and relentlessly peddling the myth of democracy in danger. Fed on this fodder of deliberate mispropaganda akin to vultures, Break India Forces are leaving no stone unturned to tar India’s global image. Living in an interconnected world, where fake news and disinformation spread a zillion times faster than truth, India is now facing an inimical threat from forces within and from outside.

Though colonial masters left the Indian shores over seven decades ago, their trusted lackeys are still hanging onto their coattails for approval. Offshoring suits the bloated egos of the colonists who want to still judge India by their own systems, which are inherently biased toward the indigenous civilisations. They still deem countries like India as colonies. The most galling consequence has been the adoption of a ‘light touch’ approach by the Western countries toward the anti-India, terrorist and secessionist forces operating in their territories.

Even as Khalistan supporters ran amok, vandalised, defaced and damaged the Indian consulates and destroyed symbols of Indian sovereignty all the countries party to the Vienna convention failed to provide any security. They chose to turn the other way even after India alerted them of the activities of the anti-Indian groups in their countries. By seeking validation from the Western countries and choosing to fight political battles away from Indian boundaries a section of the Indian polity is undermining Indian interests.

Given Washington’s concern towards Rahul Gandhi’s disqualification, should India reciprocate in kind and ‘closely watch’ the legal proceedings against the 45th President of the US?


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India and Japan Renew their Commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

Geopolitical headwinds have led to major realignments across the globe. New frameworks are being rolled out the existing ones are being consolidated. The Ukraine crisis has hastened major geopolitical churn with countries marshalling diplomatic capital to leverage their strengths for consolidating their strategic interests.

The steady stream of world leaders to New Delhi after India assumed the Presidency of the G20 and more pertinently its emergence as the voice of the 125 countries of the global south has become a specific point of interest for Japan, the current chairman of the G7. At the helm of two strong forums, both leaders are objectively seeking to use their political influence to bring some consensus in these uncertain times. As the most pivotal partner in economic development and transformation and with similar security anxieties, Japan is India’s best friend in the region.

Countries normalised ties in 1952 with bilateral cooperation spanning different areas- political, economic, defence and security, science and technology, education over decades. In 2000, countries elevated the ties to ‘Global Partnership’, ‘Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006’ and ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ in 20141. Since 2006 both countries have held annual summit meetings. Enhancing strategic depth of security and defence cooperation, countries commenced 2+2 Defence, Foreign Ministers and National Security Advisers Dialogue in 2019. Deepening this cooperation, countries have initiated military and naval bilateral exercises “Dharma Guardian” and ‘Veer Guardian’ in addition to the existing trilateral biannual ‘Jimex’ exercises, Malabar exercises with US and Australia and the multilateral naval exercises ‘Milan’.

Similarly, Japan’s ODA (Official Development Assistance) has been instrumental in transforming India’s connectivity. Indeed, the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe unveiled the Indo-Pacific framework or the ‘confluence of two seas’ at the Indian Parliament in 2007 laying the foundation for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of the four democratic countries (Japan, India, US and Australia) or the democratic security diamond. After enduring initial delinquency and neglect, the framework which was resurrected in 2017 is now becoming a binding force for nations to evolve a common strategy for this region whose security is threatened by the hegemonic aspirations of China.

Chinese attempts to unilaterally change the status quo of the region and its muscular posturing in the Taiwan Straits more so, after speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit has firmed up Japan’s approach. The coming of age of Japan’s diplomacy bordering a confrontational approach, a break from its defacto pacifism is now firming up the contours of the regional alignments as well. China’s continued support of Russia and Xi Jinping’s coronation has made things worse.

Diligently upholding the West’s position on the Ukraine conflict, Japan has stepped up sanctions against Russia, and as the G7 chair made support for Ukraine a priority. Indeed, even a feverish pitch for the Indo-Pacific framework is finding a greater resonance with foreign ministers of Quad recently meeting at New Delhi; UK, US and Australia making new announcements on nuclear-powered submarines and IPEF members holding the second negotiating table at Indonesia. Around the same time, China is upping the game by mediating the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, presenting a 12-point Ukraine peace plan.

Incidentally, while Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has dashed to India for the regular annual summit meet, President Xi Jinping announced a state visit to Moscow. The dynamics of different frameworks in swift action in this region is truly ushering the world into a geopolitical churn.

On his two-day visit to New Delhi, Prime Minister Kishida and PM Modi held wide-ranging delegation talks and restricted leader meetings strengthening the existing pillars of cooperation-defense and security, economic partnership, climate change, energy transition, people-to-people exchanges, skill development and innovation. Rested on the pillars of trust and coordination India and Japan have robust and multi-dimensional bilateral ties.

Countries also exchanged notes on 4th tranche of JICA ODA loan of Rs 18,000 crores for Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (HSR) and a Memorandum of cooperation in the field of Japanese language2. Both leaders reviewed the progress of the JICA’s (Japan International Cooperation Agency) developmental assistance to the North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement an indispensable for India’s Act East Policy.

In an attempt to salvage the Buddhist roots and origins in India, New Delhi is now unleashing the common cultural connect to advance its global interests. To resurrect this connection, Modi and Kishida visited Bal Bodhi Tree in Buddha Jayanti Park and gifted a sandal wood Buddha statue enclosed in a kadamwood jaali box3 and later had a tete a tete enjoying pani puri.

As part of the larger vision of Act East policy, under the sub-segment of Indo-Pacific, leaders agreed to build resilient and trustworthy supply chains especially to mitigate the challenges faced by countries in the region in terms of the debt burden4. Indo-Pacific countries constitute the bulk of the Global South and voicing the priorities of the global South is the agenda of G20. Reiterating the prominent place for Global South in Japan’s latest White paper on development cooperation Kishida is seeking an opportunity to build bridges with the Global South.

Cognisant of the food, fuel, fertiliser and opaque financing challenges grappling the comity of nations, Modi and Kishida pledged to work together as the chairs of G20 and G7 platforms respectively. Underscoring the agenda of the summit meeting, Kishida wrote, “Prime Minister Narendra Modi and I affirmed that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force is unacceptable not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in any region, and a peaceful resolution based on international law needs to be sought5.

Kishida’s reiteration is in line with Japan’s latest posturing of expanding and strengthening its scope of security alliance with the US, rapprochement with South Korea after 12 years and announcement of a new framework with the US, Canada and South Korea. China’s burgeoning incursions into Japanese waters and intensification of Taiwan annexation besides breaching the First Island Containment has pushed Japan to link Taiwan’s contingency with its interests. This has decidedly changed the course of action of Japanese diplomacy which pledged to defend Taiwan and undertake the responsibility of stability of the Indo-Pacific. To this end, Defense White Paper released in July 2022, interlinked Taiwan’s security interests with Japan’s national interests6.  

In mid-December, Japan released three papers- Japan’s New National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program to safeguard its security interests7. The new security policy deemed China as an “unprecedented strategic challenge”, indeed, even in public surveys in Japan, China has replaced North Korea as the number one threat8.

 Japan committed to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP and increase cooperation with the like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Alongside, Japan is quietly upgrading its submarine capabilities adding its newest stealthiest submarine Hakugei, Taigei class diesel-electric submarine to its fleet9 when Kishida was in India.

The Indo-Pacific framework officially took its shape in India in 2007. To make it more relevant and foster greater cooperation amid confrontation and division, Kishida shared a new FOIP plan- ‘Together with India, as an indispensable Partner’ during his lecture at ICWA in New Delhi. He set forth four pillars of cooperation of FOIP- principles for peace and rules for prosperity; address challenges through dialogue in the Indo-Pacific way; multi-layered connectivity; and safe use of the sea to the air. Kishida pledged Japan would mobilise $75 billion in public and private funds by 2030 for infrastructure development in the region10.

Burgeoning geopolitical uncertainties and resultant global challenges are catalysing a major recalibration of ties between the middle powers. In this context, undermining the indispensability of viable partnerships, India and Japan are seeking to firm up their vision on the Indo-Pacific, a region aflush with major confrontations and conflicts.


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China’s mediation of Iran-Saudi ties: Geopolitical Implications

On March 10, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the restoration of diplomatic ties and the re-opening of their embassies within two months. The Joint trilateral statement reaffirmed “the respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of states” and shared a desire “to resolve their disagreements through dialogue and diplomacy1. 

Saudi and Iran severed ties in January 2016 after protestors attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran over the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. This was the last straw in the relations between Saudi and Iran already drawn into a prolonged war in Yemen with Houthi rebels backed by Iran fighting the Saudi coalition in the region. Drone attacks by Houthis on Saudi vessels in 2019 have further deteriorated the ties between the countries. With Houthis adhering to the ceasefire mediated by the UN, in April 2023, the agreement with Saudi and Iran springs a new hope of a peaceful resolution of nine year long war.

Besides the war, the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the 5+1 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) nuclear agreement and the consequent economic sanctions have unsettled Iran. To reach a conciliation, Iran simultaneously initiated- Vienna talks to reach out to the US and dialogue with Saudi.

By 2021 the newly inaugurated Biden government stalled weapons sales to Riyadh and signalled strong disapproval of the Yemen war. Washington has refused calls with GCC countries regarding Iran’s studied missile development program and nuclear enrichment. With war draining the resources of both countries and Iran’s nuclear ambition looming over regional security, Saudi and Iran realised the need for a dialogue. The then Iraqi Prime Minister, a former intelligence chief Mustafa Al-Kadhimi who has good ties with leaders of Saudi and Iran hosted the intelligence officers of both countries in April 2021.

Since then, both countries held five rounds of talks in Iraq and Oman. But talks suffered a setback after Al-Kadhimi vacated the post due to the worsening of the domestic crisis in October 2022. New Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani hoped to resume the talks on his first visit to Iran in December 2022. Meanwhile, the Vienna talks continued to drag on with no signs of any breakthrough. China, a party to the JCPOA also remained silent but continued to forge strong economic ties with Iran. China and Iran signed 25 years cooperation agreement in March 2021 and Beijing pledged to inject investments to the tune of $400 billion2.

As the largest oil importer China has close energy cooperation with Iran and Saudi. Heralding a new era of China-Saudi Partnership, President Xi on his visit to Riyadh in December 2022 reached a major alignment with Riyadh on a host of issues including the Iran nuclear agreement and its threatening consequences on regional security. In a conference with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Xi welcomed the proposal to hold a meeting with Iran to reduce tensions.

Post Riyadh Summit, Saudi summarily hinted at further dialogue with Iran. During Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s first state visit to Beijing in February, deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani demanded China expedite talks for an early return to JCPOA3 and expressed interest in a dialogue with Saudi on the restoration of ties.

Beijing hosted the negotiations between the NSAs of Saudi and Iran from March 6-10 leading to the announcement of the official re-establishment of diplomatic ties. The reimposition of punitive economic sanctions further widened rifts in US-Iran ties. Washington’s silence on Houthi drone attacks on Saudi vessels and Biden’s hardline stance during the campaign- “we were going to, in fact, make them pay the price, and make them, in fact, the pariah that they are4 didn’t go down well with Riyadh despite his state visit to the Arab nation. This essentially foreclosed all chances of mediation between the Arab countries for the US.

China seized this opportunity with both hands. Effectively leveraging its economic heft mediated a détente that caused a global stir. China’s uncanny diplomatic prowess in sharp contrast to its Wolf-warrior diplomacy has stunned the world. Traditionally mediation has remained an exclusive domain of superpowers to showcase their global political heft.  Rightly so, Beijing’s triumph in Saudi-Iran mediation has certainly positioned it as a leading power.

But the real test of China’s diplomatic acumen is in the implementation of the deal within the next 60 days. Given the entrenched animosities, rampant egregious sectarianism, and history of violation of agreements, the chances of the deal proving to be a game changer for the region are rather slim.

China’s latest stint has definitely spurred an intense debate and this must be examined in the context of Beijing’s larger geopolitical aspirations. Having pulled up an ace, Chinese propaganda machinery will now gloat about America’s decline. On the contrary, though the US remains the most prominent power in the region, by shifting focus away from the Middle East steadily after the Iraq occupation, it has created a strategic vacuum.

In lieu of its retrenchment from the region, the US-brokered normalization agreements or Abraham Accords ushered the Middle East into a new era of cooperation. While US maintains a huge military presence in the region, through the newly minted Quadrilateral arrangement, I2U2 (India Israel UAE US), the US has outsourced regional security to focus on other interests. These diplomatic initiatives have significantly strengthened regional cooperation.

Since the turn of the first decade of the 21st century, China began to seek parity with the US and pushed for G2. Steadily shifting the course from a “peaceful rise”, China under Xi began to effectively compete with the US. China resents the US-led world order. Indeed, the trilateral agreement has consciously avoided negotiations in English. Speeches and documents are made in Mandarin, Farsi, and Arabic. Making no secret of its ambitions to reshape the world order, China is slowly infiltrating various multilateral institutions and propping up alternative multilateral forums and organisations.

Vowing to alter the global governance mechanisms, China has the establishment of AIIB (Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank) and the New Development Bank and steadily expanding SCO, BRICS (process under consideration). For a while, China’s alternative global world order had many takers. Especially, the absence of political presuppositions or ideological strings-attached policies of Beijing found immense acceptance from authoritarian regimes which loathed the West’s ideological patronization. But the Covid pandemic exposed the weakness of China’s system. Further, China’s aggressive expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region and mercantilism alerted the countries of its unbridled superpower ambitions.

A backlash against China in terms of decoupling and building a rules-based international order picked up momentum leading to a spurt in interest-based coalitions. The West started applying the lessons learned from the Ukraine war on Taiwan. Additionally, China’s refusal to condemn Russia and its ‘no-limits friendship’ has further exacerbated the Sino-scepticism. To blunt this Western narrative, in February, China announced a 12-point Ukraine peace plan and expressed interest to seek a role in Ukraine settlement and talk to Ukraine President Zelensky for the first time since the start of the conflict.

Propping up economic heft and influence and putting its best foot forward, China has played the role of mediator in the Saudi-Iran talks. Irrespective of whether the deal has hit all the right notes, through its diplomatic maneuvering China has projected itself as an alternative to the West.

As opposed to the punitive sanctions of the West, pledging investments, China has adeptly pulled Iran into its orbit fashioning the emergence of the Iran-China-Russia group post-Ukraine. Saudi perhaps had hedged its bets on China in pursuit of ‘Vision 2030’ and diversification of the economy. Riyadh has kept the West in the loop and informed other powers- France and Russia ahead of the deal. On March 14, Saudi signed a landmark deal with Boeing for the purchase of 121 planes for its newly unveiled national carrier-Riyadh Air5. Formally announcing the deal, Saudi even sent feelers to the US seeking normalisation of ties with Israel in exchange for assurances on civil nuclear reactor6.

The geopolitics of the Middle East region is much more complex for any single power to dominate. But the timing of this brokered deal is a shot in the arm for China hankering for a major foreign policy achievement. The announcement of the Saudi-Iran deal culminated in the rubber stamp China parliament formally voting Xi as the President for the third five-year term. With this Xi might be more confrontational than ever toward the West given the window of opportunity for reunification is shrinking. Riding high on this diplomatic triumph, Xi has advanced his visit to Moscow. China announced participation in the Naval drill, “Security Bond-2023” exercises with Iran and Russia in Gulf of Oman6.

Clearly, China doesn’t have altruistic motivations or any long terms plans for the region other than advancing its self-interests. Having garnered the admiration of the countries for its diplomacy, China will now seal military, economic, trade, investment, defence deals and intensify arms, weapons sales and military exercises with countries in the Middle East. Make no mistake, the Saudi-Iran deal is more about posturing for Beijing and ostensibly showcasing its diplomatic abilities.

The steady reduction of oil dependence from the Middle East has shrunk Washington’s interest in the region. Swayed by an undertone of narratives, the US is undermining China’s diplomatic influence at its own peril. Ukraine crisis along with Western sanctions has crippled the pandemic-ridden developing economies. Food, fertiliser, and energy securities have intensified the pursuit of an alternative to dollar trade. The current diplomatic triumph can provide fresh impetus to China’s latent dedollarization and Renminbi trade transactions ambitions.

Dwindling demography has narrowed China’s strategic window of opportunity. Facing stagnating economic growth and repressed dissent, President Xi would up the game against the US. Syrian President Assad is in Moscow seeking to restore ties with Turkey and incidentally, Xi is traveling to Kremlin in the next couple of days8. In 2021 China extended a $2.3 billion loan to rescue Turkey's tottering economy. Will this be yet another occasion for China deploying its tremendous economic influence to pull off a diplomatic win?

 

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