Dragon’s Challenge to Indo-Bhutanese Time-tested Security Cooperation

An arena that is gaining traction other than the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theatres is the Indian sub-continent. Bhutan Prime Minister Lotay Tshering’s interview with a Belgian newspaper Le Libre, where he mentioned that “Doklam is a junction point between India, China and Bhutan. It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem. We are three. There is no big or small country, there are three equal countries, each counting for a third. We are ready. As soon as the other two parties are ready, we can discuss. India and China have problems all along the border. We are waiting to see how they will resolve their differences” elicited swift criticism and sparked fresh debates about the robustness of the India-Bhutan partnership and China’s intimidatory tactics.

In the face of growing apprehensions in India following his remarks, PM Tshering immediately reiterated, “I have said nothing new and there is no change in position” in the Bhutanese newspaper. PM Tshering’s take on Doklam, in the aftermath of the Sino-Bhutan 11^th Expert Group Meeting at Kuming in January 2023 and a lengthy propaganda piece in the Global Times- “How India tries to interfere in and take control of Bhutan” by Sun Xihui, a researcher with the National Institute of International Strategy, has raised many eyebrows. The pattern and timing are the real suspects with Beijing raking up the trijunction issue at a time when India’s frosty ties with China diving south.

Aside from stirring up the Bhutan boundary issue, in response to India’s G20 meeting held at Arunachal Pradesh which the Chinese representative participated virtually, Beijing has released a fresh list of 11 Chinese names for geographical locations in Arunachal Pradesh. Unable to convince India to normalise ties and the LAC terms as per its own terms, China is now exerting pressurizing on New Delhi. Renaming exercise to bolster its claims is part of China’s “lawfare” employed to have a legal high ground. The announcement came days ahead of the three-day visit of Bhutan King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk to New Delhi accompanied by Tande Dorji, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade and other senior officials on April 3^rd.

Beijing has infiltrated India’s immediate neighbourhood to encircle India. China settled territorial disputes with 14 neighbouring countries baring India and Bhutan. India has a longstanding relationship with Bhutan characterised by “trust, goodwill, mutual understanding” and to keep India on the edge, China is now slowly escalating another front in India’s north which is the Doklam trijunction. Five years ago, India stopped Chinese incursion at Doklam in a standoff that lasted for 73 days following which China has to pull back its forces.

Bhutan signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1949 and established diplomatic ties with India in 1968 but remained neutral to China despite its overtures. After China’s annexation of Tibet, despite India’s defeat in 1962, Bhutan chose to closely align with India and accommodate New Delhi’s interests after China started laying claiming its territories issuing new maps in 1959.  

Geographically located between two military powers of the region, India and China, Bhutan adopted a ‘Balance of Threat’ policy and refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with P5 countries. But, Thimpu always remained assertive and defensive in matters of self-interest and security that essentially dictated its foreign policy.

In 1979 China made major incursions into Bhutan¹ to push for direct open border negotiations on disputed regions as both countries do not have diplomatic relations. The disputed regions in contention were Doklam, Dramana, Shakhatoe, Yak Chu, Charithang Chu, Sinchulungpa, Langmarpo valleys which are rich pasture lands in the Western region and Jhakurlung and Pasamlung valleys in the north considered very sacred by the Bhutanese. Bhutan which had religious and cultural relations with Tibet had no clearly demarcated boundaries. After Tibetan annexation, China made seven claims in total which account for 10% of its territory. 

Finally, Bhutan commenced back-channel talks in 1984 led by the Embassy of Bhutan in India. Since then, both countries had 24 rounds of border talks and 11 expert group meetings. In 1988 both countries agreed on guiding principles. In 1996 the negotiations reached a major breakthrough when Beijing offered to concede 495 Sq Km in the north in lieu of the 269 sq km in the West at Doklam. Doklam plateau offers a commanding view of the Chumbi valley abutting Sikkim and is close to the 14 miles wide India’s land bridge, Siliguri Corridor, or the Chicken Neck. It connects India to the Seven sisters of the North East.

Bhutan resisted accepting this package which would have given China a significant terrain advantage and put India’s security interests under severe strain. Instead, Bhutan and China signed “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility in the Bhutan-China Border Areas-1998” Treaty to Maintain Peace and Tranquility in 1998 pledging no unilateral change to the status quo.

Being a habitual violator of agreements, Beijing went ahead with the construction of roads, buildings, and settlements along the border regions of the disputed regions. Along with border fortifications, China also adopted a carrot-and-stick policy to accept the exchange of territories proposal.

China offered economic assistance packages to cede Doklam region. After China launched the ‘Xiokang’ border village program in 2006, infiltration by Tibetan herders intensified in the northern regions of Bhutan. Owing to relentless encroachment, Bhutan came up with a new map in 2006 that excluded the northernmost Kula Kangri region. Under pressure, Bhutan gave up its glacial reserve in a bid to resolve border disputes with China².

Anticipating a change in Chinese tact, after gifting away Kula Kangri, Bhutan revised Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007 to make its own foreign policy decisions. Reportedly, Bhutan Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley met the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in June 2012 along the side-lines of the Rio Summit. But Bhutan’s dismay despite its concessions, Beijing continued to intensify its salami-slicing³.

In 2017, India objected to PLA’s infrastructure building spree close to the trijunction at Doklam in a bid to wrest control over the plateau, a region where China is strategically vulnerable and reminded China of the 2012 agreement.

In 2012 India and China reached an agreement wherein trilateral junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries⁴. While Bhutan criticised China for occupying the disputed region, which even the official legislature records note that Doklam is a territorial dispute between Bhutan and China⁵ it didn’t make any statement on the 2012 agreement.

Strategically located between the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, the territorial integrity of Bhutan is pivotal for India’s security. Post Galwan clashes India asked Bhutan to resolve its territorial disputes with China so that all three parties can concentrate on the trijunctions.

To put Bhutan under pressure and extract maximum concessions, China started adopting the usual maximalist approach. In June 2020, at the virtual Global Economic Facility (GEF) Meeting, China made new and non-existent claims to Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary (SWS) in Eastern Bhutan’s Trashigang district bordering Arunachal Pradesh. In fact, these claims about Sakteng weren’t made during their previous negotiations in July 2018. To nip the matter in the bud, Bhutan firmly rejected Beijing’s claims on the SWS at the GEF meeting⁶ and urged the organizers to purge all references to the SWS in meeting minutes as well.

By and large, Bhutan had always adopted silent diplomacy of not antagonizing China. Hence, even though satellite images clearly documented Chinese villages in the north, and in Pangda in the West, Bhutan’s ambassador Major General V Namgyel in 2020 declared that there were no Chinese villages in Bhutan⁷. PM Tshering also held on to the same position with a Belgian newspaper interview. Indeed, Bhutan accepted the ‘One China policy’ and stayed away from the Taiwan issue.

In October 2021, four years after the Doklam standoff, Bhutan and China formalised a “Three-Step Roadmap (TSR)” to expedite border negotiations. Bhutan assured India that TSR focuses on addressing the bilateral issues with China and wouldn’t impact the trilateral junctions⁸. For the first time in 2022, PM Tshering in his interview explicitly stated that Bhutan-China talks will not focus on trilateral junctions and hinted at settling the Doklam issue trilaterally⁹. Hence, all the hue and cry made by critics over PM Tshering’s interview is clearly ill-founded.

In October 2022, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong made a three-day visit to Bhutan to improve ties and expand the win-win cooperation. But China’s attempts to woo Bhutan hardly met with any success. Reportedly, during TSR negotiations Bhutan delegation told the Chinese counterparts that “diplomatic relations between the two countries can be established only after the final boundary settlement is arrived at and on-ground demarcation is completed”¹⁰. Until Bhutan establishes diplomatic ties with China, Beijing can’t pull out Bhutan from India’s orbit.

China’s intimidation of Bhutan is indicative of its urgency to end the border disputes and upend the special relationship between India and Bhutan. Beijing is thus using every trick in the book to force Bhutan to accept the 1996 proposal and settle the dispute in its favour to gain a strategic advantage against India which it considers a competitor in the region.

Amid China’s increasing intimidation, on Bhutan King’s visit to India, countries announced a framework for expanded cooperation. King Jigme and PM Modi held wide-ranging discussions. India agreed to step up support for Bhutan’s 13^th Five-Year Plan and extend additional standby credit for the next five years which is in addition to the existing credit facility¹¹.  Bolstering the hydropower cooperation, the cornerstone of the India-Bhutan relationship countries agreed to a trilateral subregional cooperation with Bangladesh. To strengthen bilateral trade and facilitate the private players in developmental projects, King Jigme held meetings with Indian business leaders.

Leaders contemplated expanding cooperation in trade, connectivity, technology, space, STEM, and startups and extending energy partnerships to non-hydro alternatives like Solar, wind, and e-mobility. India assured Bhutan of the supply of critical commodities like coal, petroleum, and fertilisers. Notably, in November 2022 countries successfully developed and launched the first satellite India-Bhutan SAT and inaugurated Ground Earth Station at Thimphu.

For hassle-free trade and movement of people, countries have set up the first Integrated Check post near Jaigaon and Phuntsholing with additional check posts between Bhutan and Assam. India announced support for the operationalisation of the Third International Internet Gateway for Bhutan and the building of cross-border rail connectivity between Kokrajhar in Assam and Gelephu in Bhutan¹².

China is exerting disproportionate pressure on Bhutan to have a strategic terrain and diplomatic advantage against India. While it would be churlish to believe that Bhutan can resist this intimidation for eternity, Bhutan’s trade, connectivity, infrastructure development, transportation, and communication are inextricably linked to India. India is the major developmental and trading partner of Bhutan.

From India’s ongoing negotiations with China over disengagement at the LAC, Bhutan believes that patience is the key while dealing with Beijing. Thimpu realises that generosity and extending concessions can’t alleviate its security concerns and threats. Certainly, while New Delhi can’t force Bhutan to take a stand, an assurance and robust framework of expanded cooperation can provide leverage to Bhutan in negotiating with China. By committing to make India an equal stakeholder in the Doklam dispute Bhutan has inadvertently reposed trust in its security cooperation with New Delhi.

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Weaker Political Constituency of India Offshoring Domestic Battles to Foreign Lands

On March 30, the German Foreign Ministry commented on the disqualification of parliamentarian Rahul Gandhi stating, “we have taken note of the verdict of first instance against the Indian opposition politician Rahul Gandhi as well as the suspension of his parliamentary mandate…. We expect that the standards of judicial independence and fundamental democratic principles will equally apply to the proceedings against Rahul Gandhi”¹. Taking to Twitter Congress leader Digvijay Singh wrote, “Thank you Germany Foreign Affairs Ministry and Richard Walker for taking note of how the Democracy is being compromised in India through the persecution of Rahul Gandhi”².

Earlier in the week, the US State Department deputy spokesperson in response to Rahul Gandhi’s issue said, “Respect for the rule of law and judicial independence is a cornerstone of any democracy. We are watching Mr. Gandhi’s case in Indian courts and we engage with the Government of India on our shared commitment to democratic values, including freedom of expression”.

Remarks of the German and the US establishments to a judicial ruling have raised many eyebrows coming in the wake of the desperate rants of Rahul Gandhi of “democracy in India is under brutal attack” and “surprising thing is that the so-called defenders of democracy, the US and Europe, seem to just be oblivious that a huge chunk of the democratic model has come undone” at Cambridge just a couple of weeks ago.

Indeed, this is not an isolated event of the Indian political constituency looking to the West. Not long ago in the recent past, Indian politicians and civil society amplified the tweets and comments of Canadian President Justin Trudeau and tweets of Rihanna, Mia Khalifa and Greta Thunberg (of course the toolkit as well) to build pressure on the Government of India on farm laws. While the tweets were later found to be part of motivated propaganda bordering on falsehoods and distortions, the endorsement received by the Indian ecosystem provided traction to this well-choreographed and funded perception and information warfare which is still etched in the memory of the Indian public. Sadly, this new trend of deriving political oxygen from these kinds of unverified and disproportionate propaganda has become more rampant since 2014.

The infiltration of the political ranks in India by external forces has been an unfortunate reality in the cold war era. India was deliberately played by the superpowers. But the current spectre of offshoring the narrative building by the Indian political constituency is truly mystifying and worrying. India which has been a major outsourcing and offshoring centre for foreign investors after the economic liberalisation seems to be offshoring its political battles to foreign lands.

Every major social, political, and religious divide manifested in India is now getting multiplied manifold by co-opting external sources. Seattle city council’s resolution against CAA, NRC and resolution in support of caste as a protected category in California is a testament to this new trend. The disruption of the Parliament over demand for a JPC into the Hindenburg research released by a short-seller by the political parties all these disparate events together indicate that India’s political power play is being planned and orchestrated by external players.

By shifting the theatre of domestic politics to foreign lands and giving them more control to manipulate the discourse, the Indian political constituency is playing a very dangerous game. The near absence of unequivocal condemnation of attacks on Indian Missions/Posts, paralysing the functioning of the Indian envoys stationed abroad by the entire political dispensation is truly disappointing. Lack of conciliation between the political parties even on the issues of national security, prestige and honour will bode ill for the country.

Support for anti-Indian activities from some political parties to pander to specific communities is going to be perilous. The silence of some political parties in condemning the targeted attacks on Hindus and Hindu temples in Leicester and the sceptical hesitancy even after an official investigation vindicating the Hindu stance has exposed the partisan political approach of Indian politicians. Extrapolating the domestic fissures to the foreign lands, the political parties in India are creating dissensions among the Indian Diaspora settled away from the motherland and in the process partly coopting the vested interests to fight the domestic battles away from India.

Incapable of taking on the ruling dispensation head-on Indian politicians appear to have embarked on the journey of deploying extraneous forces. In the process, they are not only tarnishing India’s image as a deeply divided political entity but inadvertently assisting the anti-Indian forces to widen existing chinks in the armour.

Seeking support and banking on the foreign country county resolutions to defend their stance essentially symbolises the political incapacity of winning the electoral mandate. Instead of establishing grassroots connections and fighting on issues of domestic relevance like poverty alleviation, infrastructure, smart cities, pollution, unemployment, skilling, women’s empowerment, inflation, etc., they are employing civil society groups, academia, and leftist lobbies to hamstring India’s rise.

Thanks to this malicious circuitous approach to take on the current ruling dispensation, Hindus who form the micro minority community in many countries are now at the receiving end. The benefit of the doubt usually proffered on the micro minorities otherwise is now denied to Hindus. The veritable bias which is the staple of the Indian political system is now extended to the Hindu community settled in distant lands. This political indifference and partisanship are emboldening the secessionist forces who are now harassing innocent Hindus settled outside India.  Ironically even as Islamophobia is duly acknowledged the relentless attacks on the indigenous religious communities of India or in short, Hinduphobia is outrightly rebuffed.

There can be no denying of this collusion. Else what explains the euphoria of the Congress leaders who welcomed the German government’s statement on India’s internal affairs? Would any self-respecting nation and the representatives of the people hail such remarks? In their pursuit to have an upper hand politically, so-called leaders are playing into the hands of breaking Indian forces already at work to topple the apple cart of rising India.

Rejected by the domestic masses, the perspective of the Indian opposition amplified by the international media alone has become a powerful weapon to be wielded against the Indian government by vested interests. While it is hard to believe, oftentimes, the language used by Indian adversaries is uncannily similar to the tone, tenor and verbatim used by some of our own Indian leaders. Political desperation and a series of electoral debacles have thrown established dynastic parties into irrelevance. Rather than endeavouring to resurrect their political mandate through intense public outreach, they are lazily resorting to these offhanded tactics and politicking.

In the process, they are casting aspersions on the democratic institutions in India and relentlessly peddling the myth of democracy in danger. Fed on this fodder of deliberate mispropaganda akin to vultures, Break India Forces are leaving no stone unturned to tar India’s global image. Living in an interconnected world, where fake news and disinformation spread a zillion times faster than truth, India is now facing an inimical threat from forces within and from outside.

Though colonial masters left the Indian shores over seven decades ago, their trusted lackeys are still hanging onto their coattails for approval. Offshoring suits the bloated egos of the colonists who want to still judge India by their own systems, which are inherently biased toward the indigenous civilisations. They still deem countries like India as colonies. The most galling consequence has been the adoption of a ‘light touch’ approach by the Western countries toward the anti-India, terrorist and secessionist forces operating in their territories.

Even as Khalistan supporters ran amok, vandalised, defaced and damaged the Indian consulates and destroyed symbols of Indian sovereignty all the countries party to the Vienna convention failed to provide any security. They chose to turn the other way even after India alerted them of the activities of the anti-Indian groups in their countries. By seeking validation from the Western countries and choosing to fight political battles away from Indian boundaries a section of the Indian polity is undermining Indian interests.

Given Washington’s concern towards Rahul Gandhi’s disqualification, should India reciprocate in kind and ‘closely watch’ the legal proceedings against the 45^th President of the US?

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India and Japan Renew their Commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

Geopolitical headwinds have led to major realignments across the globe. New frameworks are being rolled out the existing ones are being consolidated. The Ukraine crisis has hastened major geopolitical churn with countries marshalling diplomatic capital to leverage their strengths for consolidating their strategic interests.

The steady stream of world leaders to New Delhi after India assumed the Presidency of the G20 and more pertinently its emergence as the voice of the 125 countries of the global south has become a specific point of interest for Japan, the current chairman of the G7. At the helm of two strong forums, both leaders are objectively seeking to use their political influence to bring some consensus in these uncertain times. As the most pivotal partner in economic development and transformation and with similar security anxieties, Japan is India’s best friend in the region.

Countries normalised ties in 1952 with bilateral cooperation spanning different areas- political, economic, defence and security, science and technology, education over decades. In 2000, countries elevated the ties to ‘Global Partnership’, ‘Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006’ and ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ in 2014¹. Since 2006 both countries have held annual summit meetings. Enhancing strategic depth of security and defence cooperation, countries commenced 2+2 Defence, Foreign Ministers and National Security Advisers Dialogue in 2019. Deepening this cooperation, countries have initiated military and naval bilateral exercises “Dharma Guardian” and ‘Veer Guardian’ in addition to the existing trilateral biannual ‘Jimex’ exercises, Malabar exercises with US and Australia and the multilateral naval exercises ‘Milan’.

Similarly, Japan’s ODA (Official Development Assistance) has been instrumental in transforming India’s connectivity. Indeed, the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe unveiled the Indo-Pacific framework or the ‘confluence of two seas’ at the Indian Parliament in 2007 laying the foundation for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of the four democratic countries (Japan, India, US and Australia) or the democratic security diamond. After enduring initial delinquency and neglect, the framework which was resurrected in 2017 is now becoming a binding force for nations to evolve a common strategy for this region whose security is threatened by the hegemonic aspirations of China.

Chinese attempts to unilaterally change the status quo of the region and its muscular posturing in the Taiwan Straits more so, after speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit has firmed up Japan’s approach. The coming of age of Japan’s diplomacy bordering a confrontational approach, a break from its defacto pacifism is now firming up the contours of the regional alignments as well. China’s continued support of Russia and Xi Jinping’s coronation has made things worse.

Diligently upholding the West’s position on the Ukraine conflict, Japan has stepped up sanctions against Russia, and as the G7 chair made support for Ukraine a priority. Indeed, even a feverish pitch for the Indo-Pacific framework is finding a greater resonance with foreign ministers of Quad recently meeting at New Delhi; UK, US and Australia making new announcements on nuclear-powered submarines and IPEF members holding the second negotiating table at Indonesia. Around the same time, China is upping the game by mediating the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, presenting a 12-point Ukraine peace plan.

Incidentally, while Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has dashed to India for the regular annual summit meet, President Xi Jinping announced a state visit to Moscow. The dynamics of different frameworks in swift action in this region is truly ushering the world into a geopolitical churn.

On his two-day visit to New Delhi, Prime Minister Kishida and PM Modi held wide-ranging delegation talks and restricted leader meetings strengthening the existing pillars of cooperation-defense and security, economic partnership, climate change, energy transition, people-to-people exchanges, skill development and innovation. Rested on the pillars of trust and coordination India and Japan have robust and multi-dimensional bilateral ties.

Countries also exchanged notes on 4^th tranche of JICA ODA loan of Rs 18,000 crores for Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (HSR) and a Memorandum of cooperation in the field of Japanese language². Both leaders reviewed the progress of the JICA’s (Japan International Cooperation Agency) developmental assistance to the North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement an indispensable for India’s Act East Policy.

In an attempt to salvage the Buddhist roots and origins in India, New Delhi is now unleashing the common cultural connect to advance its global interests. To resurrect this connection, Modi and Kishida visited Bal Bodhi Tree in Buddha Jayanti Park and gifted a sandal wood Buddha statue enclosed in a kadamwood jaali box³ and later had a tete a tete enjoying pani puri.

As part of the larger vision of Act East policy, under the sub-segment of Indo-Pacific, leaders agreed to build resilient and trustworthy supply chains especially to mitigate the challenges faced by countries in the region in terms of the debt burden⁴. Indo-Pacific countries constitute the bulk of the Global South and voicing the priorities of the global South is the agenda of G20. Reiterating the prominent place for Global South in Japan’s latest White paper on development cooperation Kishida is seeking an opportunity to build bridges with the Global South.

Cognisant of the food, fuel, fertiliser and opaque financing challenges grappling the comity of nations, Modi and Kishida pledged to work together as the chairs of G20 and G7 platforms respectively. Underscoring the agenda of the summit meeting, Kishida wrote, “Prime Minister Narendra Modi and I affirmed that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force is unacceptable not only in the Indo-Pacific but also in any region, and a peaceful resolution based on international law needs to be sought”⁵.

Kishida’s reiteration is in line with Japan’s latest posturing of expanding and strengthening its scope of security alliance with the US, rapprochement with South Korea after 12 years and announcement of a new framework with the US, Canada and South Korea. China’s burgeoning incursions into Japanese waters and intensification of Taiwan annexation besides breaching the First Island Containment has pushed Japan to link Taiwan’s contingency with its interests. This has decidedly changed the course of action of Japanese diplomacy which pledged to defend Taiwan and undertake the responsibility of stability of the Indo-Pacific. To this end, Defense White Paper released in July 2022, interlinked Taiwan’s security interests with Japan’s national interests⁶.  

In mid-December, Japan released three papers- Japan’s New National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program to safeguard its security interests⁷. The new security policy deemed China as an “unprecedented strategic challenge”, indeed, even in public surveys in Japan, China has replaced North Korea as the number one threat⁸.

 Japan committed to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP and increase cooperation with the like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Alongside, Japan is quietly upgrading its submarine capabilities adding its newest stealthiest submarine Hakugei, Taigei class diesel-electric submarine to its fleet⁹ when Kishida was in India.

The Indo-Pacific framework officially took its shape in India in 2007. To make it more relevant and foster greater cooperation amid confrontation and division, Kishida shared a new FOIP plan- ‘Together with India, as an indispensable Partner’ during his lecture at ICWA in New Delhi. He set forth four pillars of cooperation of FOIP- principles for peace and rules for prosperity; address challenges through dialogue in the Indo-Pacific way; multi-layered connectivity; and safe use of the sea to the air. Kishida pledged Japan would mobilise $75 billion in public and private funds by 2030 for infrastructure development in the region¹⁰.

Burgeoning geopolitical uncertainties and resultant global challenges are catalysing a major recalibration of ties between the middle powers. In this context, undermining the indispensability of viable partnerships, India and Japan are seeking to firm up their vision on the Indo-Pacific, a region aflush with major confrontations and conflicts.

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China’s mediation of Iran-Saudi ties: Geopolitical Implications

On March 10, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the restoration of diplomatic ties and the re-opening of their embassies within two months. The Joint trilateral statement reaffirmed “the respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of states” and shared a desire “to resolve their disagreements through dialogue and diplomacy”¹. 

Saudi and Iran severed ties in January 2016 after protestors attacked the Saudi embassy in Tehran over the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. This was the last straw in the relations between Saudi and Iran already drawn into a prolonged war in Yemen with Houthi rebels backed by Iran fighting the Saudi coalition in the region. Drone attacks by Houthis on Saudi vessels in 2019 have further deteriorated the ties between the countries. With Houthis adhering to the ceasefire mediated by the UN, in April 2023, the agreement with Saudi and Iran springs a new hope of a peaceful resolution of nine year long war.

Besides the war, the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the 5+1 JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) nuclear agreement and the consequent economic sanctions have unsettled Iran. To reach a conciliation, Iran simultaneously initiated- Vienna talks to reach out to the US and dialogue with Saudi.

By 2021 the newly inaugurated Biden government stalled weapons sales to Riyadh and signalled strong disapproval of the Yemen war. Washington has refused calls with GCC countries regarding Iran’s studied missile development program and nuclear enrichment. With war draining the resources of both countries and Iran’s nuclear ambition looming over regional security, Saudi and Iran realised the need for a dialogue. The then Iraqi Prime Minister, a former intelligence chief Mustafa Al-Kadhimi who has good ties with leaders of Saudi and Iran hosted the intelligence officers of both countries in April 2021.

Since then, both countries held five rounds of talks in Iraq and Oman. But talks suffered a setback after Al-Kadhimi vacated the post due to the worsening of the domestic crisis in October 2022. New Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani hoped to resume the talks on his first visit to Iran in December 2022. Meanwhile, the Vienna talks continued to drag on with no signs of any breakthrough. China, a party to the JCPOA also remained silent but continued to forge strong economic ties with Iran. China and Iran signed 25 years cooperation agreement in March 2021 and Beijing pledged to inject investments to the tune of $400 billion².

As the largest oil importer China has close energy cooperation with Iran and Saudi. Heralding a new era of China-Saudi Partnership, President Xi on his visit to Riyadh in December 2022 reached a major alignment with Riyadh on a host of issues including the Iran nuclear agreement and its threatening consequences on regional security. In a conference with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Xi welcomed the proposal to hold a meeting with Iran to reduce tensions.

Post Riyadh Summit, Saudi summarily hinted at further dialogue with Iran. During Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s first state visit to Beijing in February, deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani demanded China expedite talks for an early return to JCPOA³ and expressed interest in a dialogue with Saudi on the restoration of ties.

Beijing hosted the negotiations between the NSAs of Saudi and Iran from March 6-10 leading to the announcement of the official re-establishment of diplomatic ties. The reimposition of punitive economic sanctions further widened rifts in US-Iran ties. Washington’s silence on Houthi drone attacks on Saudi vessels and Biden’s hardline stance during the campaign- “we were going to, in fact, make them pay the price, and make them, in fact, the pariah that they are”⁴ didn’t go down well with Riyadh despite his state visit to the Arab nation. This essentially foreclosed all chances of mediation between the Arab countries for the US.

China seized this opportunity with both hands. Effectively leveraging its economic heft mediated a détente that caused a global stir. China’s uncanny diplomatic prowess in sharp contrast to its Wolf-warrior diplomacy has stunned the world. Traditionally mediation has remained an exclusive domain of superpowers to showcase their global political heft.  Rightly so, Beijing’s triumph in Saudi-Iran mediation has certainly positioned it as a leading power.

But the real test of China’s diplomatic acumen is in the implementation of the deal within the next 60 days. Given the entrenched animosities, rampant egregious sectarianism, and history of violation of agreements, the chances of the deal proving to be a game changer for the region are rather slim.

China’s latest stint has definitely spurred an intense debate and this must be examined in the context of Beijing’s larger geopolitical aspirations. Having pulled up an ace, Chinese propaganda machinery will now gloat about America’s decline. On the contrary, though the US remains the most prominent power in the region, by shifting focus away from the Middle East steadily after the Iraq occupation, it has created a strategic vacuum.

In lieu of its retrenchment from the region, the US-brokered normalization agreements or Abraham Accords ushered the Middle East into a new era of cooperation. While US maintains a huge military presence in the region, through the newly minted Quadrilateral arrangement, I2U2 (India Israel UAE US), the US has outsourced regional security to focus on other interests. These diplomatic initiatives have significantly strengthened regional cooperation.

Since the turn of the first decade of the 21^st century, China began to seek parity with the US and pushed for G2. Steadily shifting the course from a “peaceful rise”, China under Xi began to effectively compete with the US. China resents the US-led world order. Indeed, the trilateral agreement has consciously avoided negotiations in English. Speeches and documents are made in Mandarin, Farsi, and Arabic. Making no secret of its ambitions to reshape the world order, China is slowly infiltrating various multilateral institutions and propping up alternative multilateral forums and organisations.

Vowing to alter the global governance mechanisms, China has the establishment of AIIB (Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank) and the New Development Bank and steadily expanding SCO, BRICS (process under consideration). For a while, China’s alternative global world order had many takers. Especially, the absence of political presuppositions or ideological strings-attached policies of Beijing found immense acceptance from authoritarian regimes which loathed the West’s ideological patronization. But the Covid pandemic exposed the weakness of China’s system. Further, China’s aggressive expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region and mercantilism alerted the countries of its unbridled superpower ambitions.

A backlash against China in terms of decoupling and building a rules-based international order picked up momentum leading to a spurt in interest-based coalitions. The West started applying the lessons learned from the Ukraine war on Taiwan. Additionally, China’s refusal to condemn Russia and its ‘no-limits friendship’ has further exacerbated the Sino-scepticism. To blunt this Western narrative, in February, China announced a 12-point Ukraine peace plan and expressed interest to seek a role in Ukraine settlement and talk to Ukraine President Zelensky for the first time since the start of the conflict.

Propping up economic heft and influence and putting its best foot forward, China has played the role of mediator in the Saudi-Iran talks. Irrespective of whether the deal has hit all the right notes, through its diplomatic maneuvering China has projected itself as an alternative to the West.

As opposed to the punitive sanctions of the West, pledging investments, China has adeptly pulled Iran into its orbit fashioning the emergence of the Iran-China-Russia group post-Ukraine. Saudi perhaps had hedged its bets on China in pursuit of ‘Vision 2030’ and diversification of the economy. Riyadh has kept the West in the loop and informed other powers- France and Russia ahead of the deal. On March 14, Saudi signed a landmark deal with Boeing for the purchase of 121 planes for its newly unveiled national carrier-Riyadh Air⁵. Formally announcing the deal, Saudi even sent feelers to the US seeking normalisation of ties with Israel in exchange for assurances on civil nuclear reactor⁶.

The geopolitics of the Middle East region is much more complex for any single power to dominate. But the timing of this brokered deal is a shot in the arm for China hankering for a major foreign policy achievement. The announcement of the Saudi-Iran deal culminated in the rubber stamp China parliament formally voting Xi as the President for the third five-year term. With this Xi might be more confrontational than ever toward the West given the window of opportunity for reunification is shrinking. Riding high on this diplomatic triumph, Xi has advanced his visit to Moscow. China announced participation in the Naval drill, “Security Bond-2023” exercises with Iran and Russia in Gulf of Oman⁶.

Clearly, China doesn’t have altruistic motivations or any long terms plans for the region other than advancing its self-interests. Having garnered the admiration of the countries for its diplomacy, China will now seal military, economic, trade, investment, defence deals and intensify arms, weapons sales and military exercises with countries in the Middle East. Make no mistake, the Saudi-Iran deal is more about posturing for Beijing and ostensibly showcasing its diplomatic abilities.

The steady reduction of oil dependence from the Middle East has shrunk Washington’s interest in the region. Swayed by an undertone of narratives, the US is undermining China’s diplomatic influence at its own peril. Ukraine crisis along with Western sanctions has crippled the pandemic-ridden developing economies. Food, fertiliser, and energy securities have intensified the pursuit of an alternative to dollar trade. The current diplomatic triumph can provide fresh impetus to China’s latent dedollarization and Renminbi trade transactions ambitions.

Dwindling demography has narrowed China’s strategic window of opportunity. Facing stagnating economic growth and repressed dissent, President Xi would up the game against the US. Syrian President Assad is in Moscow seeking to restore ties with Turkey and incidentally, Xi is traveling to Kremlin in the next couple of days⁸. In 2021 China extended a $2.3 billion loan to rescue Turkey's tottering economy. Will this be yet another occasion for China deploying its tremendous economic influence to pull off a diplomatic win?

 

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The Trajectory of Evolving India-Australia Ties

The speed with which India has transformed its ties with Australia is a case of strategic clarity which was amiss in New Delhi’s foreign policy previously. Seizing every opportunity, India is clearly defining its objectives and interests and forging new relations and resurrecting old ties to rightly position itself as a leading power.

For a long time, the India-Australia ties with immense potential suffered strategic neglect. The last decade witnessed a sharp reconfiguration of India-Australia ties. Observers believe that the visits of Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2012 and Tony Abbott in September 2014 have laid the ground for a new phase in bilateral relationships marred with mistrust.

The real turnaround came with PM Modi’s iconic address to the Australian Parliament in 2014 which articulated the connected history and shared inheritances of India and Australia. Other than predominantly hyphenated common interests- Common Wealth, Curry and Cricket, Modi spoke of – demand, demography and development with prospective opportunities for Australia in India. He underscored the strategic regional salience of Australia, saying “today, the world sees Australia to be at the heart of Asia Pacific (Indo-Pacific gained prominence in the late 2010s) and the Indian Ocean” ¹ Modi called for bilateral security cooperation.

In 2008, even though President Obama batted for an exemption for India and supported candidature for NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) Australia refused to sell Uranium nuclear fuel to India until it signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. India was part of the Quadrilateral security dialogue for democratic countries envisioned by Shinzo Abe in 2007 for an open, inclusive Indo-Pacific. But owing to the dominant pro-China foreign policy Australia remained indifferent toward India. Australia cultivated strong trading ties with China and at the risk of irking the Dragon, Australia even pulled out from Malabar exercises dampening the Indo-Pacific framework even before its take off.

The Fukushima disaster in 2011 brought down the demand for Uranium after major countries shut down nuclear reactors. This directly affected Australia, which has World’s largest Uranium resources ranking among the top five producers. On her three-day visit to India in 2012, Julian Gillard signalled the beginning of negotiations for Uranium sale and countries sealed a civil nuclear agreement during Tony Abbott’s state visit to India in 2014. After three years, Australia shipped Uranium supplies to India.

During the Cold war and much later, India and Australia always found themselves in opposite camps. Canberra’s act of recalling the diplomatic entourage post India’s nuclear tests in 1998 left a bitter aftertaste in the relations. Marred with hesitations, both countries had strained relations. Ostensibly, Chinese aggressive expansionism, trade war with China that intensified in the aftermath of Covid and the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties have galvanised, India-Australia engagement. The common threat brought India and Australia closer on two fronts- security and trade.

Giving a major fillip to the shared visions, interests and opportunities, with a focus on the non-traditional security issues of Indo-Pacific, countries worked together to elevate the senior officials meeting (SOM) of India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral to foreign ministers and defence ministers meetings in 2021². To ratchet up cooperation among the Indian Ocean littorals, France announced a trilateral with resident powers of the Indian Ocean, India and Australia in 2018. The trilateral India-France-Australia (IFA) suffered a setback due to the AUKUS agreement. Albanese’s visit to France in June 2022, witnessed a thaw in the relationship and the meeting of foreign ministers of the three countries subsequently along the sidelines of UNGA effectively revived the IFA³.

These mini-laterals have a defined objective of adherence to the rules-based order and ensuring a free, open, inclusive and conflict-free Indo-Pacific region. The revival of the Quad and the new mini-laterals have notably put several countries in the region at odds with China. All these countries have strong economic ties with China and are averse to any strategic security alliance. Reckoning with the sensitivities of the countries to take on the Dragon, India and Australia have always asserted the centrality of the ASEAN countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s revisionism is posing a significant threat to strategic security calculus in the sphere of influence of both India and Australia. The common concern about China’s assertiveness- the string of pearls in India’s immediate neighbourhood and sweeping security deal for the Pacific Island Countries (PIC) has brought India and Australia much closer.  Further, they reaffirmed strengthening cooperation in the Pacific in line with the needs and priorities of the Pacific Island Countries (PIC). Clearly, mutual interests are driving them together.

Overcoming the covid imposed hurdles on in-person diplomatic engagement, PM Modi and PM Scott Morrison held two virtual summits to bolster bilateral ties. In 2020, India and Australia upgraded the strategic partnership of 2009 to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”.

Anthony Albanese’s three-day three-city state visit to India on March 8^th marked the first in-person annual summit between both countries, an arrangement that was agreed upon last year. This is Albanese’s first visit to India as the Prime Minister. The last Australian Prime Minister to visit India was Malcolm Turnbull in 2017. India has an annual summit arrangement with Japan and Russia. Australia is now on the privileged list.

Additionally, both countries have a slew of institutional mechanisms – Foreign Ministers Frame Work Dialogue, 2+2 Defence and Foreign Ministers Dialogue, Defence Chiefs talks, Joint Trade & Commerce Ministerial Commission, Australia-India Education Council, Energy Dialogue and Joint Working Groups on different issues to strengthen the engagement on multi-faceted issues. The rapid expansion of ties between the countries is further strengthened by frequent high-level contacts and ministerial exchange visits. There were 18 ministerial exchanges between both countries last year.

The interim free trade agreement, ECTA (Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement) is India’s first-ever FTA with a developed country. This besides laying the foundation for robust economic cooperation has expanded opportunities for the diversification of trade for both countries. Both Parliaments ratified the ECTA which came into force on December 29, 2022.

As of 2021, India is Australia’s sixth-largest trading partner and fourth-largest goods and service export market. Now countries are working on CECA (Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement). Expediting negotiations and pledging to conclude CECA by the end of 2023, trade ministers of both countries have set an ambitious target of $100 billion in bilateral trade in the next five years⁴.

For open, secure, inclusive, robust and dependable global supply chains, in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic, India and Australia along with Japan unveiled Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI). To stabilise global supply chain resilience, the US has launched Indo-Pacific Economic Framework under the Quad, both countries have now identified this new platform to work together.

India’s climate goals are inexorably linked to the clean energy transition which is reliant on the availability and access to critical minerals. Realising the criticality of these minerals both countries signed MoU for their sustained supply last year and resolved to take this cooperation forward through India-Australia Minerals Scholar Network. Alongside, countries have agreed to enhance cooperation in agriculture, science, technology, innovation, space, renewable energy, hydrogen, solar energy, health, climate, security, cybersecurity, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, critical & emerging technologies, and education⁵.

Under the pillar of Defence cooperation, countries have commenced General Rawat Officers Exchange Program to foster cooperation through the exchange of young soldiers between the countries. Furthermore, to increase interoperability, maritime domain awareness and maritime partnership, Australia besides hosting the Malabar 2023 exercises for the Quad countries invited India to participate in Exercise Talisman Sabre 2023⁶. In November 2022, countries commenced the first military exercise- AUSTRAHIND22 in Rajasthan. The defence ministers of both countries are pushing for a Joint Working Group on defence research and material cooperation⁷. India along with Brazil stopped China from posing hurdles to the supply of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the US⁸.

Indians form the second-largest overseas community in Australia. Expressing concerns over a spate of temple vandalizations and attacks on the Indian community, Prime Minister Modi sought assurance of the safety of Indians in Australia⁹. In a major boost to the strong educational ties between India and Australia, Australia announced to recognise Indian educational degrees by signing the Mechanism for Mutual Recognition of Qualifications¹⁰. Also, Australia’s Deakin University and the University of Wollongong confirmed to set up their first overseas campuses at GIFT city.

Countries have signed an agreement on Audiovisual coproduction, MoU on Cooperation in Sports, Terms of Reference on India-Australia Taskforce and a Letter of Intent for furthering innovation¹¹.

PM Albanese invited PM Modi for the Quad Summit meeting in May in Australia and announced to return to India for the G20 summit in September. Needless to say, these frequent highest-level engagements are bound to bring both countries closer. To nurture the expanding bilateral ties Australian government pledged to fund $28.1 million Centre for Australia-India Relations¹². Bilateral relations over a period of time ebbed and flowed. But now there is a new political will to deepen the relations.

Leaders exchanged views on various bilateral, regional and global challenges including Myanmar, Ukraine, North Korea and Afghanistan. Australia congratulated India on assuming the Chairmanship of the Wassenaar Agreement.

Celebration of ‘colours, culture and cricket’ that symbolised the spirit of friendship has been on a grand display with Albanese participating in Holi celebrations and watching the Gavaskar-Border trophy test match at Ahmedabad with PM Modi. PM Albanese also became the first foreign leader to receive a guard of honour at India’s indigenously built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. He also visited the Indian Naval station at Kunjali.

Seismic changes in the geopolitical alignment, structural changes in the economy, and multi-dimensional challenges from China propelled the strategic alignment of democratic countries, India and Australia. This new ‘strategic equilibrium’ is not a derivative of what a third country does. As of now the strategic convergence over shared interests has overwhelmed the differences including those on the Ukraine issue. To sustain this momentum, it is incumbent on leaders to continuously reevaluate and review the ties to iron out the differences and build a long-term robust partnership.

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PM Meloni’s visit Opens a Fresh Chapter in India-Italy Ties

Mired by the legacy defence and security issues, India-Italy bilateral relationship has been rather underwhelming. Accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister, foreign minister and a high-powered business delegation, Italy’s second youngest and first female Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni made a two-day trip to India on March 2-3, to commence a bilateral reset. This marks the first visit by an Italian Prime Minister to India in five years. The last visit was by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s in 2018.

The 2012 Italian marines’ issue and the 2013 Finmeccanica kickbacks issue severely roiled the bilateral ties. These developments led to a diplomat spat with Italy vetoing India’s entry into the 34-member exclusive nuclear club- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The defence scandal eventually led to an embargo on the purchase of defence supplies from Italy by the Indian government. The ban was lifted last year and even the Supreme Court proceedings on the Marines ended in 2022 with Italy agreeing to pay the compensation. The relations haven’t returned to normal.

Meloni’s delegation which included business leaders from the defence firms is an effort to reopen the channels for defence deals. Also, the geopolitical reset and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict which is weighing heavily on the European countries has prompted a serious recalibration of their policies, especially with regard to the Indo-Pacific region.  Realising the criticality of the region and the growing assertive claims of China, Italy signalled an intention to enter the region.

Amid the growing pushback against China, former Italian Prime Minister Draghi joining the chorus against Beijing’s “unfair practices” highlighted by the EU, expressed interest to join a trilateral cooperation with India and Japan for a free and open Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the foreign ministers of all three countries officially launched India-Italy-Japan trilateral. Italy has strong ties with Japan and deep Indo-Japanese bilateral ties are indeed the pillar of the Indo-Pacific framework. Thus, the consolidation of ties between these three countries through economic cooperation besides having a beneficial effect on global supply chain resilience would cultivate an effective strategic and security dialogue.

The continuity of the engagement which took a hit due to the domestic political turbulences got a lease for life with the bilateral discussion between Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Meloni along the sidelines of the Bali Summit in November 2022. With stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region becoming a major concern in the wake of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, Italy is making a major foreign policy turnaround.

In 2019, Italy created a stir in the western world becoming the first G7 nation to sign BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). But two years hence, the MoU started tethering with Italy suspending space cooperation and increasingly leaning on the West’s stance regarding Huawei¹. A year later, with the unravelling of the pandemic, PM Draghi, an avowed Atlanticist and vocal critic of China’s human rights in line with the EU, froze the BRI MoU². Subsequently, PM Draghi substantially distanced China and even stalled some of the Chinese investments.

The conservative party, Brothers of Italy, headed by Meloni in power followed Draghi’s foreign policy. She is supporting Taiwan and opposes the auto-renewal of the BRI in 2024.

Around the same time, India’s ties with Italy improved with both countries signing an agreement in textiles and announcing a strategic partnership in renewable and clean energy along the sidelines of the 2021 Rome G20 Summit. Leaders have agreed on exploring partnerships in energy storage solutions, smart grids, gas transportation, integrated waste management, biofuels, and green hydrogen³.

With India tipped to assume the G20 chair, India became part of the G20 troika which also gave Delhi an opportunity to work closely with Rome⁴. Months after the bilateral discussion with PM Modi on regional and global security challenges, in a huge fillip to the India- Italy-Japan trilateral, Meloni elevated ties to a ‘strategic partnership’ on Japanese PM Fumio Kishida’s visit to Rome.

Echoing Italy’s Indo-Pacific aspirations, India invited Prime Minister Meloni as the chief guest and keynote speaker for the 2023 Raisina Dialogue, themed “Provocation, Uncertainty, Turbulence: Lighthouse in the Tempest”. Amid China’s burgeoning assertiveness, Italy is seeking rapprochement with India building on mutual interests, shared values and the commitment to a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific.

Nearly 70% of the EU’s trade passes through the Indian Ocean and the SCS region which make the Indo-Pacific. Hence what happens in Indo-Pacific has direct consequences for Europe. India is the resident power of the Indian Ocean and central to the Indo-Pacific. Italy as part of the EU’s anti-piracy mission in the Western Indo-Pacific, Operation Atalanta, is a natural partner of India. Clearly, Indo-Pacific is central to Italy’s maritime security.

In 2012 Italy became the second largest manufacturer surpassing France and after Brexit, it became one of the most important nations in Europe. Traditionally pillars of Italy’s foreign policy are- Europeanism, Atlanticism and Mediterraneanism.  Aflush with opportunities for investment and growth, Italy is focusing majorly on Mediterraneanism⁵.

Steadily it developed connectivity networks with the North African countries and Italian companies became one of the largest shareholders of the various oil companies in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Cyprus and Libya. In 2021, when the countries were struggling to manage their economies, Italy emerged as the rising economic power in the Mediterranean region becoming the largest trading partner of North Africa and the Balkan nations.

Giving wings to its commercial prowess, Italy gave shape to its ‘Enlarged Mediterranean’ strategy and signed China’s BRI which resonated with Rome’s pursuit of increasing its economic influence and geopolitical heft. But China’s muscular policies and aggressiveness forced a reset in Italy’s ‘Enlarged Mediterranean’ Strategy. Considering the shared conviction of rule of law, Italy is now finding greater congruence between its Enlarged Mediterranean strategy and the Indo-Pacific framework of India and Japan.

Inaugurating the multilateral Dialogue, Meloni enunciated her vision for Indo-Pacific and said, “India is a key player in this broad landscape, bathing in the Indo-Pacific much as Italy is at the heart of the Mediterranean, and our two countries have important contributions to make together”⁶. Explicitly describing her visit to India as a matter of strategic choice⁷, Meloni made New Delhi the destination for her first visit to Asia. Demonstrating an intent to resurrect the ties and evolve a functional framework for the India-Italy-Japan trilateral, the ties have been upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership’.

In line with its Indo-Pacific vision, Italy joined the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) under Science, Technology and Academics Cooperation pillar. To contribute to the concept of indivisible security and underscore the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific, Italy announced to send Morsini offshore patrol vessel to the region⁸ and planning to hold exercises with friendly naval countries.

Italy is among India’s top five trading partners in the EU. Last year, countries recorded an all-time high of $15 billion in bilateral trade. Recognising the range of opportunities in the Indian economic system for the Italian industries, leaders identified five sub-sectors for economic cooperation. These include- trade; investment; design, innovation, and manufacturing; friend shoring and supply chain resilience partnership; fifth sub-sector- converging on complementarities of skill sets available in India and the industrial ecosystem in Italy. Italy is Europe’s second-largest industrial power. To facilitate the movement of skilled personnel, countries signed a Declaration of Intent on Migration and Mobility and also announced India-Italy Startup Bridge⁹.

Concluding the MoU on defence cooperation, leaders agreed to cooperate strongly in manufacturing, co-development, co-design and co-innovation and also expand and deepen military and maritime cooperation. Leaders held a gamut of discussions on bilateral, regional and global cooperation and expressed their interest to advance cooperation in the respective Make in India and Make in Italy frameworks¹⁰. PM Modi and President Murmu have invited Italian companies to actively participate in Make in India initiative and make the best of the opportunities in India.

Italy strongly condemned the ‘unprovoked and unlawful aggression against Ukraine by the Russian armed forces’. As the G20 Chair, Italy wanted India to play a ‘central role’ in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite differences over the Ukraine crisis, both countries expressed concerns over the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, the destabilising effect of the conflict and its broader regional and global implications.

Countries have agreed to deepen cooperation in space, cybersecurity, HADR cooperation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), Internet of Things (IoT), advanced manufacturing, Bio and RNA technologies, energy transitions, conservation of biodiversity, agriculture and food technologies. Countries recognised the need for expanding cooperation on climate change and the energy crisis which are global challenges and also on beneficial multilateralism.

Unfortunately, one of the major hurdles in reforming and expanding the UNSC is the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) nicknamed Coffee Club founded by Italian ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci along with Pakistan, Mexico and Egypt¹¹. Slowly the group grew in numbers and strength, strongly opposing the G4 comprising India, Germany, Japan and Brazil rooting for UNSC reforms. Italy’s support for India’s UNSC membership can thus be a real game changer.

The recalibration of India-Italy ties began in 2017 with countries scripting a new chapter through a Joint Statement in 2018, Action Plan 2020-24 and strategic partnership in the energy transition in 2021. Meloni has infused new momentum in the bilateral ties proposing collaborations through the ‘Blue-Raman’ project, the state of art, high-speed submarine data cable connection that can connect India to Italy through the Middle East. This new-age digital communication network has two main branches- the blue system will connect Italy, France, Greece and Israel while the Raman branch will reach Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Oman and India¹¹.

As an influential player in the EU, India-Italy ties can augur well for the implementation of the India-EU connectivity partnership and the ongoing negotiations on the India-EU partnership. Italy is competing for a leadership position in the EU and strengthening its position as Europe’s energy hub through a series of energy partnership agreements with the MENA (Middle East and North African) countries as part of Mattei Plan¹².

Meloni referred to this in her address, to highlight Italy’s prioritisation of relations with countries in the South and along the Mediterranean. Meloni projected Italy as a strategically important global player ready for a mutually beneficial partnership.

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India and Germany Accelerate Multidimensional Cooperation

The overwhelming reams of editorials and extensive media debates on the first anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict have taken the wind out of the strategic importance of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s state visit to India.

With imbued geopolitical, economic and security significance, the visit is of great consequence to both the countries-India and Germany.  Accompanied by a business delegation comprising CEOs of 12 major companies, Chancellor Scholz made a two-day visit to India on Feb 25-26, not part of the regular ICG. India and Germany have an established format of biannual Inter-Governmental Consultations (ICG) hosted by respective countries alternately since 2011 to review the bilateral ties. Last year, PM Modi travelled to Germany for the 6^th ICG.

With India scheduled to host the G20 summit in September this year and the German Chancellor, all set to attend the event, the current state visit is rather unusual. This standalone visit first by a German Chancellor is truly unprecedented.

The Ukraine crisis has brought about a remarkable change in the global world order. While major powers are jostling to bolster their global heft, middle-order countries are trying to redefine their policies to leverage their strengths in this era of contestation. The Ukraine war brought a real crisis to Europe and more so to Germany which is dependent on Russia’s cheap oil supplies. With its autonomy compromised and its economy threatened, Germany is finding India’s autonomous position regarding the Ukraine crisis, a real hope for the much-needed peace negotiations.

This was evident from German Ambassador to India Philipp Ackerman’s press briefing ahead of Scholz’s trip to India, “India buying oil from Russia is none of our business. If you get it at a low price, I can’t blame India for it. India is an appropriate candidate to come up with a solution (to stop the Russia-Ukraine war). India has skilled and good diplomacy”¹. This indeed, is an unambiguous acknowledgement of India’s advocacy of “diplomacy and dialogue” for the Ukraine crisis.

At the recently held Munich Security Conference, Chancellor Scholz endorsed EAM Jaishankar’s reference to the “European mindset” of “somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problem is the World’s problem but the World’s problem is not Europe’s problem”. Scholz said, “he has a point. It wouldn’t be Europe’s problem alone if the law of the strong were to assert itself in international relations”². Jaishankar’s quotes are now part of the Munich Security Report.

Amid the perennial weapons supply pledges and military assistance which is ostensibly deepening the crisis, India’s middle position is finding acceptance in Germany which is now dragging its feet to tow America’s line. Forced to parrot the words of NATO and the US, European countries are now feeling the heat of the crisis with rising fuel prices, and record inflation affecting the domestic constituency. As the G20 chair, India can don a crucial leadership role in addressing global challenges and crises. Ukraine is thus one of the major issues of the visit.

Domestically, the Ukraine crisis has woken up Germany to new realities causing a rethink on increased defence spending and a strident security posturing. Having paid a heavy price for its dependence on Russian energy supplies, Germany is now applying the same lessons to China. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock suggested that Germany should reduce its economic dependence on China³. Unlike in the Merkel era, the political resolve toward China has shifted.

Reportedly, a muscular policy is underway with Minister Baerbock shaping the National Security Strategy of Germany who on her visit to India called Beijing a “systemic rival”. In a veiled reference she said, “we’ve seen, in a very brutal way, that when we have deep economic ties with partners who are not partners in values, it can have dramatic repercussions on our economies and this is not in our interest”. She added, “India is not a ‘substitute partner’ for Germany….. we are connected to India not only by economic or people to people partnerships but also by a partnership of values”⁴.

The Ukraine crisis has been a rude awakening for Germany and forced it to talk about security challenges beyond the borders of Europe. Germany is now part of India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and it has deployed a frigate for seven months in the Indo-Pacific region. With a focus on the Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany is strengthening ties with Japan and India.

Seeking closer ties with countries that share democratic values and to share an engagement with the Indo-Pacific region, Scholz made Japan his first destination for his Asia trip. He also met PM Modi thrice in the past year- 6^th ICG, G7 meeting, G20 Bali Summit and travelled to Vietnam and Singapore.

Notably, he became the first European leader to visit Beijing after President Xi’s elevation post-20th CCP Congress. While there is a shift in Berlin’s position on China, its policies are by and large dictated by German businesses.

India-German relations rest on the strong pillar of trade and investment. Germany is India’s largest trading partner in Europe and is among the top 10 global partners. The pandemic and the Ukraine crisis underscored the need to build sustainable, reliable and diversified supply chains. India’s versatile and resilient markets with immense growth potential are now propelling a latent decoupling of trade with China in Europe. German businesses betting on China plus one approach are seeking to outsource R&D and expand manufacturing to new shores.

In January Germany’s Siemens clinched a $3.2 billion Indian Railways order to manufacture 1200 electric locomotive units for a period of 11 years. In a boost to “Make in India” the locomotives will be manufactured at Siemens India unit and assembled in Gujarat. This order includes 35 years of maintenance and repair work⁵.

The new coalition government in Germany with Greens as a major coalition partner has added a new facet to the existing Indo-German bilateral agenda. At the 6^th ICG held in Germany, countries unveiled Green Sustainable Development Partnership (GSDP) to steer collective political commitment toward climate action. Shared interests in renewable energy and energy transition positioned Germany as a crucial partner for India in technological collaboration.

Germany pledged Euro 10 billion for this development cooperation for the period up to 2030 of which Euro 983 million commitments were finalized during the Annual Negotiation Meeting (ANM) held in November 2022. Countries have agreed on Green Hydrogen Mission and set up Green Hydrogen Task Force in September 2022⁶.

Besides the congruence over ambitious climate goals, India and Germany agreed on triangular development cooperation in third countries- Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi and Peru which is now in an advanced stage of implementation. This rapid progress in both areas together with Migration and Mobility Partnership signed by both countries in December 2022 will enhance cooperation in trade and investment and people-to-people ties.

India has already ratified the partnership. Pending its ratification in the Bundestag, Scholz on his Bengaluru leg of the trip has welcomed India’s skilled and talented pool to Germany. Countries have inked an MoU in skills during his visit. Scholz announced that India will host the Asia-Pacific of German Businesses in 2024. Indians form the second largest group of international students in Germany, pursuing higher education in STEM. Currently, 35000 Indian students are enrolled in Germany⁷.

The existing framework of bilateral cooperation includes security, defence and space. During Scholz’s visit, leaders unveiled a vision document to enhance cooperation and innovation in technology to use scientific and technological knowledge for the economic development of both countries and to address global challenges. This has five different aspects to it-energy partnership and clean technologies; strengthening the framework and ecosystem of technology enterprises; digital technologies; fintech to achieve SDG and artificial intelligence⁸.

India is among the fastest-growing developing economies in the world and given its centrality to Indo-Pacific and the EU’s growing interest in the region, an FTA (Free Trade Agreement) would augur well for the aspirations of both sides. Germany is a major player in India-EU FTA. Scholz asserted his commitment to expediting India-EU FTA and assured personal involvement⁹.

Defence cooperation also majorly figured in the talks with a discussion on a $5.2 billion proposed deal for Germany to build six conventional submarines for the Indian Navy. Associated aspects of defence cooperation like co-design, co-development, manufacturing and transfer of technology have featured in the meeting¹⁰. The two countries are actively cooperating to reform the multilateral institutions. Both countries within the G4 are working to reform the UNSC.

Since the Ukraine crisis, India has consistently articulated its position and robustly defended the criticism of being soft towards Russia. Summarily expressing discomfort “I know this is not an era of war”, India resonated with the West causing the shift in perceptions from a stinging rebuke to an uncommon appreciation. At the press briefing post-bilateral talks, PM Modi said, “since the beginning of the developments in Ukraine, India has insisted on resolving this dispute through dialogue and diplomacy. India is ready to contribute to any peace process”¹¹. India’s approach to seeking opportunities for a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis echoes the German position.

Ukraine crisis and China’s muscular adventurism have exalted European fears of a similar kind of scenario in the Indo-Pacific region. Amid major geostrategic challenges to counterbalance China and to advance the shared interests of a multipolar world, rule-based order and multilateral cooperation India and Germany are finding rare strategic congruence.

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