Stabilisation of India-China Ties: A Work in Progress

The usual Chinese rhetoric has been on display once again at the Friends of BRICS countries meeting in Johannesburg. The talks between the NSA Ajit Doval and director of CCP foreign affairs commissioner and the current foreign minister of China, Wang Yi had huddled the attention for India’s forthright strategic messaging. Explicitly pointing to “eroded strategic trust and the public and political basis of the relationship” since the 2020 Galwan incident, Doval categorically emphasised for “restoration of peace and tranquillity at the borders so as to remove impediments to the normalcy in bilateral relations”.  Addressing the border issue is the priority for India which Beijing continues to defer.

China’s approach is evident from the Chinese readout, with Wang calling “for enhancing mutual trust, focus on consensus and cooperation, overcome obstacles and bring bilateral relations back on track of sound and stable development” and stressing, “China will never seek hegemony and stands ready to work with developing countries, including India to support multilateralism and support the democratisation of international relations, and promote the more just and equitable development of international order”¹.

Unflinched by China’s diversionary tactics, earlier in Jakarta along the sidelines of ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) Ministerial meeting, EAM Jaishankar delivered a similar message to Wang Yi. India has firmly resisted the mythical peace posturing of China. Defence Minister Rajnath in his talks with his counterpart also reiterated that “violation of existing agreements has eroded the basis of bilateral relations and disengagement at the border will logically be followed with de-escalation”² while General Shangfu persisted India and China have, “more common interests than divergences”³.

The discernible pattern of Chinese obfuscation is in line with China’s demurral to the 19^th round of Corps-Commander level talks for troop disengagement at Depsang Plains and Charding Ningnung Nallah (CNN) at Demchok junction and massive troop accumulation. The 18^th round of talks was held on April 23^rd ahead of the SCO Defence Ministers meeting. Bolstered by the rapid build-up of infrastructure across the LAC on both sides the heightened military confrontation has entered the fourth summer making borders restive. But China, intent on keeping the borders unstable to use as leverage against India is evading direct talks.

Taking away the focus from the border issue, post Doval-Wang meeting, the Chinese foreign ministry released a statement mentioning that Xi and Modi have arrived at an “important consensus on stabilising India-China relations” at G20 Bali Summit. The readout states, “the two sides should adhere to the strategic judgement of the leaders… that ‘they do not pose a threat to each other, and they are each other’s development opportunities’, truly implement the consensus on stabilising bilateral relations into specific policies, and translate them into concerted actions by various departments and fields, enhance strategic mutual trust, focus on consensus and cooperation, overcome interference and difficulties, and promote the return of bilateral relations to the track of healthy and stable development at an early date”⁴.

Post Bali Summit, briefing the press foreign secretary Vinay Kwatra has informed about both leaders exchanging courtesies and there was no mention of talk on border issues.  Issuing a clarification to the Chinese readout, the MEA spokesperson said, Foreign Secretary left out the two leaders speaking about the border situation then and added, that they spoke of the need to “stabilise our bilateral relations”.

Clearly, the timing of the release of the Chinese readout is a suspect. Given India’s domestic political landscape heating up in the run-up to elections analysts opine that China’s clever spin on the relations might provide a handle to the Congress to needle PM Modi. But in the global milieu, the management of China in the contemporary world order has become more challenging. The optimism over China’s rise has transformed into an exigency prompting the West to reorient their “Strategy of China”. Caught up in the clash of geopolitical and geoeconomic realities, despite economic opportunities, European countries are now reassessing ties with China. The looming insecurity in Indo-Pacific owing to China’s hegemonistic expansionism and its intransigence to a “consensus” with India has only accelerated this new shift.

Unconcerned about China’s consensus, the Indian chair of the G20 is not engaging with Beijing. But the upcoming BRICS Summit is certainly a testing ground for evaluating China’s worldview. Hence, China released the readout eight months after the summit to indulge India. While the Chinese statement on “consensus” is expected to keep India on the defensive, by issuing stapled visas to athletes from Arunachal Pradesh, part of India’s Wushu team, Beijing has shot itself in the foot. India promptly withdrew the Wushu team to make its stand clear.

Summoning the Chinese ambassador, India lodged a serious protest and strongly countered, “our long-standing and consistent position is that there should be no discrimination or differential treatment on the basis of domicile or ethnicity in the visa regime for Indian citizens holding valid Indian passport”⁵.

Unlike the stamped visa where a visit is recorded in the passport, the stapled visa is a document attached/ stapled to the passport and it leaves no trace of the trip carried out by the visa holder. Wielding this political tool, China intends to make a statement that it doesn’t recognise the claim of India over those regions. China also started issuing stapled visas to residents of Jammu & Kashmir in 2009.

These small and incremental steps in addition to the ruthless violation of the bilateral agreements, encircling India by advancing through Amu Chu, frequent trips of Chinese vessels to Bay of Bengal to collect Ocean bed data, setting up stealthy radar station at Coco Islands, stonewalling of India’s membership to the nuclear regime Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), vetoing inclusion of Pakistan-based terrorists like Masood Azhar, Sajid Mir and Rauf Ashgar in the UNSC 1247 sanctions regime have corroded the ties. China’s weaponization of water through the construction of multiple dams upstream of Brahmaputra and denial of hydrological data on the release of river waters has put India under perennial stress of drought and floods.

PLA’s adversarial incursion as part of strategic messaging asserting its hegemony coinciding with the state visits has undermined the neighbourly trust. Cursory efforts to recalibrate bilateral ties post 73 days standoff at Doklam in 2017 with the 2018 Wuhan Spirit and 2019 Mamallapuram reset hit a major block and were irrevocably damaged by the murderous 2020 Galwan treachery. China’s consensus on its terms for India, its obduracy and lack of reciprocity have deepened the entrenched mistrust.

Latest intelligence reports of Pakistan and China capitalising on the unrest in Manipur to push infiltrators and spies, former COAS MM Naravane’s remarks of plausible foreign hand in the Manipur crisis and recovery of Chinese-made weapons from the disturbed areas of the state have only vindicated India’s security concerns of China.

Hence contrary to the Chinese anticipation of the Bali summit readout of reaching a “consensus” doing magic is misplaced and illusionary. India is unlikely to back down on its stated position of restoration of the pre-April 2020 status quo ante at the LAC.

India is no longer reticent. As a member of SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), India has refused to endorse BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) and China’s Economic Development Strategy 2030 which echoed Chinese official policies. Replete with Chinese diplomatic catchphrases, India stiffly resisted China’s agenda. Thwarting China’s unbridled aspirations to enhance its influence by expanding BRICS, India along with Brazil are insisting on strict rules for BRICS membership.

New Delhi is now frustrating Chinese attempts to swamp Indian growing markets through its opaque investments and nebulous acquisitions conniving India’s rules and regulations. Given burgeoning global scepticism, India is closely monitoring China’s stakes in strategic assets, especially Indian banking sector. Strictly scrutinising investments from countries that share borders, India has rejected China’s $1 billion investment in EVs on the grounds of national security.

China’s unrelenting adversarial position is driving India to cement a multidimensional partnership with the US. Geopolitical tensions between the West and China, and Covid-induced supply chain disruptions are forcing investors to explore alternative investment and manufacturing destinations. As a political democracy with a pluralistic society, India’s demographic dividend and skilled human resources India are positioning her as a favoured investment destination.

Capitalising on the escalating Chip war between the US and China India has adeptly announced a guideline for semiconductor cooperation and successfully sealed pacts with the US and Japan. Spurning China’s intimidatory tactics, refusing to cower down, India is challenging China’s ‘Unipolar Asia’ pursuits.

Chinese insecurities over India’s strategic autonomy, perception of India as a threat to its superpower ambitions, and India’s rising potential as a counterbalance to Chinese aggressive assertions in the Indo-Pacific region have spawned a spirit of competition in lieu of mutually beneficial cooperation. Though India and China share similar concerns over global challenges like climate change, WTO, and reforms in international financial institutions etc, the areas of common interests are rapidly shrinking with divergences overpowering them. With shifting goalposts and a maximalist position of “what is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable” the border discussions have come to a nought. Apparently, bilateral ties laid on the foundation of unresolved border issues can’t remain stable.

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