Decoding India's Multialignment

The Western strategic community still ensconced in the Cold war era, perceives the World in terms of the power “axis”. This deeply entrenched presumption had led to a dichotomy in their approach to foreign policy as well. Per them, there are two possibilities-“either you are with us or against us”. By far, this led to the expectation of undivided loyalty and reliance on alliances-based relationships. While this has been the integral feature of a bipolar world in the post world war II era, these ideas are no longer finding resonance with the developing countries.

The world has moved on refusing the classical way of earning support by claiming “entitlement”. The developing world, through trials and tribulations, has learned the hard way to wade through the geopolitical rivalries developing their own political institutions, organisations and through diligent bargaining seizing opportunities to secure their interests.

Since the Ukraine crisis and India’s refusal to tow the Western line, New Delhi has been at the receiving end for its neutral stance. In addition to the torment of being taunted for its stance at various strategic forums, now India’s abstentions on various resolutions and voting patterns post-Ukraine crisis are widely discussed.

Refusing to be drawn into any rhetoric, India has resolutely affirmed its positions- be it unequivocally condemning the civilian killings at Bucha or its concern for the safety of the nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhia, India has been quite vocal about the humanitarian crisis brewing in Ukraine and has rushed relief and medicines. At the same time, India refused to back moves to isolate Russia and expel it from the Human rights commission.

In light of these developments, India’s recent UN vote against Russia in favour of Zelensky’s virtual address to the UNSC was deemed an aberration. On the contrary, since Russia’s so-called “special operation” in Ukraine, India has consistently advocated and exhorted countries for “diplomacy and dialogue”. While India’s balanced approach has been misconstrued, India unflinching asserted its independent foreign policy decisions.

Unlike in 2018, when India stalled its oil imports from Iran in keeping with US sanctions, burdened with the task of post-pandemic economic recovery, India, an oil import-driven economy refused to succumb to the West’s sanction regime on Russia. With avenues for oil import from Iran and Venezuela, already shut, India routed its fuel supplies from Russia in keeping with the circumstances and interests.

Pursuing its interests, India deftly balanced its ties with the West welcoming an upgradation of Quad, strengthening I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US), the rollout of IPEF (India-Pacific Economic Forum) along with its sustained engagement with BRICS (Brazil India Russia China South Africa). Delivering a virtual address at the 7^th Eastern Economic Forum, Modi expressed interest to strengthen partnership with Russia on Arctic subjects¹.

Reflective of its wide-ranging relationships with multiple partners, India participated in Russian-led Vostok Army exercises recently along with China; but withdrew from Naval exercises in keeping with the sensibilities of Japan. Similarly, the Indian Air force contingent joined Australia-led Pitch Black along with 17 other Air forces, commenced JIMEX 22 with the Japanese Navy and concluded “Ex Vajra Prahar 2022” with US Special forces last month. Indeed, India’s special drill with the US Army, “Yudh Abhyas” close to LAC might coincide with India-led SCO-RATS (Regional-Anti Terrorist Structure) counterterror exercises next month. Heralding an independent foreign policy, India is balancing different blocs.

Unlike the great power conflicts of the Cold war period, when the third bloc of newly independent nations kept themselves away from both the powers, the developing countries, which were the third bloc countries of yesteryears, shedding diplomatic reticence are engaging with both groups. While the great powers are yet to come to terms with this change, which is evidenced by US’ disappointment over India’s participation in the Vostok exercises, India is actively exercising its strategic autonomy. Indeed, stumbling out this discomfiture perhaps has been the US decision of approving $450 million assistance to Pakistan for the F-16 sustainment program to meet counter-terrorism threats.

Defending India’s practice of strategic autonomy, at Bratislava, Slovakia Jaishankar has firmly reiterated, “I don’t accept that India has to join either the US axis or China axis. We are one-fifth of the World’s population, fifth or sixth largest economy in the world… we are entitled to weigh our own side”².

To achieve comprehensive security, which includes- energy, food, maritime and territorial security amid changing geopolitical realities refused to be lulled by idealism, Prime Minister Modi is steering India towards multi-alignment and his participation at SCO is just another dimension of India’s pragmatic foreign policy.

While India is the cornerstone of the West’s Indo-Pacific policy and the QUAD, New Delhi’s association with the SCO has lent credence to a group labelled as-Coalition of authoritarian regimes. To develop linkages with Central Asia, manage China and responsibly engage with countries that are beyond the western realm India is effectively diversifying its ties under the ambit of SCO.

In short, India is emerging as a “multilateral balancer”. With New Delhi set to assume the presidency of both SCO and G20, its real diplomatic acumen will be to a real test considering Western leaders’ plans to boycott Putin at the upcoming G20 summit.

The US would desire that India would subscribe to its sanctions regime and align its interests with American aspirations. India has certainly made its distinct choices and its assertions more or less are in line with doctrine predicated by S. Jaishankar in his book- The India Way, which says-“there will be convergence with many but congruence with none”. Consequently, a misguided interpretation of India’s aspirations leading to inconsiderate actions by the West besides damaging the pernicious stability can lend more strategic space to China in the sub-continent.

The world no longer believes in great power centres, instead, new strategic centres of power are steering the world towards plurilateralism anticipating result-oriented cooperation. Less structured groups with agenda-based cooperation are on the rise. With multipolarity an eventual reality, India is guided by the paradigm of- “reaching out in as many directions as possible and maximise its gains. This is not about greater ambition; it is also about not living in yesterday”.

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