Is Jaishankar’s eight principles framework the much-awaited India’s China policy recalibration?

For long the strategists opined that recalibration of India’s China Policy should have been underway. In continuum with the uninterrupted engagement with China to break the over seven- months long Sino-Indian logjam, India’s EAM Jaishankar Subramaniam for the first time enunciated eight principles for India-China ties. He outlined the framework for further engagement. Coming just days after the face-off between India and China troops at Naku La, Jaishankar, speaking at the 13^th All India Conference of China Studies organised by Institute of China Studies, has relayed an important strategic message to Beijing.

The eight propositions include¹

·       “Agreements already reached must be adhered to in their entirety, both in letter and spirit

·       LAC must be strictly observed and respected, any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo is completely unacceptable

·       Peace and tranquillity in the border areas is the basis for development of relations in other domains. If they are disturbed, so inevitably will the rest of the relationship

·       While both nations are committed to a multi-polar world, there should be a recognition that a multi-polar Asia is one of its essential constituents

·       Each State will have its own interests, concerns and priorities; but sensitivity to them cannot be one-sided. At the end of the day, relationships between major states are reciprocal in nature

·       As rising powers, each will have their own set of aspirations and their pursuit too cannot be ignored

·       There will always be divergences and differences but their management is essential to our ties

·       Civilisational states like India and China must always take the long view”.

Since China’s stealthy transgression at the height of the Wuhan virus outbreak and the pre-planned Galwan attacks, the first event since 1975 when blood was spilled and lives were lost, much water has flowed. Through bloody Galwan skirmishes China got taste of valour and bravery of Indian military might. And by occupying the Kailash mountain peaks, India delivered a strategic blow to PLA.

Post- Galwan, shedding its previous complacency, India beefed up troops along the LAC, ramped up battle readiness with rigorous missile tests, expedited defence acquisitions and replenished supplies boosting the indigenous production. Instead of cowering under pressure, India checkmated China’s nefarious attempts to transgress the borders and confronted the Dragon.

India and China thus far, held nine rounds of high-level military official talks to diffuse tensions across the LAC. Despite India’s repeated appeals for status quo ante restoration, Beijing effortlessly passed the buck, pinned the blame on India and anticipated the ties to be immune from provocations at the border.

Continuing with its ongoing strategy of encircling and entrapping India, CCP (Chinese Communist Party) egged on Nepali Prime Minister KP Oli to needle India with cartographic adventurism to abrade bilateral ties and create a new front. India smartly, evaded the Chinese trap and palliated the ties through a slew of developmental projects, pandemic medical assistance and supplies.  

Alongside, India stiffly resisted China’s infiltration attempts to penetrate the IOR (Indian Ocean Region) and influence the South Asian countries. With a Chinese friendly Sri Lankan regime at the helm, Beijing is relentlessly deepening Colombo’s dependency on China. To bolster maritime cooperation and frustrate Beijing’s IOR overtures, India reactivated the India-Sri Lanka- Maldives trilateral dialogue in the presence of observers Bangladesh, Seychelles and Mauritius².

To halt, ambitious China’s overreach to Dhaka, India expedited infrastructure projects at break-neck speed and revitalised bilateral ties. Having pledged assistance and cooperation in capacity building to combat the Wuhan virus outbreak, India trained the medical personnel and delivered medical supplies to all the SAARC nations (baring Pakistan which refused India’s offer).

Notwithstanding the infamy of unleashing the pandemic, China brazenly exported substandard medical supplies to countries when the World was reeling under shortage of resources. This disproportionately tainted China’s global image. As a result, South Asian countries also scrapped Chinese medical exports. Indeed, Bangladesh rejected China’s vaccine trials which came with “strings attached” approach of co-financing³.

In sharp contrast, within four days of launch of COVID vaccination, India generously gifted vaccines to immediate neighbours-Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Afghanistan. Through phased delivery of vaccines to countries like Seychelles, Mauritius, Bahrain, Indo-Pacific nations, CARICOM (Caribbean Community) countries, Nicaragua and Africa, India firmly consolidated its influence in South Asia and IOR through generous humanitarian assistance. As anticipated, offended by India’s aspirational diplomacy, China launched a smear campaign against India.

Since Galwan incident, aside confronting China in the region, India prioritised “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. Cognizant of Chinese aspirations of supplanting the US as the major power in the Indo-Pacific and its importance in shaping World order, India firmed up its approach. As a first step, instead of referring Indo-Pacific as a vision, New Delhi began strategizing with securitization of Indo-Pacific through joint military exercises and improved interoperability. India’s invite to Australia and outreach to like-minded democratic countries has been part of this exercise.

No longer smitten by the Pakistan obsession, and convinced of the futility of the illusionary Wuhan Spirit and Chennai Connect, India began tackling China in every aspect ranging from trade to regional and global collaborations. By firmly opposing BRI, staying away from RCEP, launching Supply China Resilience Initiative (SCRI) with Japan and Australia, India has firmly stood its ground and confronted China.

In response of China’s Xiaokiang (well-off) villages program⁴, India is now acquiring land along the strategic locations across LAC to counter China’s threats⁵. Though India’s response is too little too low, India’s renitent approach is becoming more evident. Jaishankar’s eight-proposition is certainly an offshoot of India’s renewed recalibration of its China policy.

Underscoring the need for study of China, as “its salience in global order is self-evident” and “as proximate neighbour of India only makes stronger studies a compelling case”, Jaishankar in his address outlined the history of bilateral ties, terming the rebuilding of ties after the 1962 war as “a very painstaking and arduous endeavour”⁶. Claiming that violence at LAC in Eastern Ladakh has “profoundly disturbed the relationship because they not only signalled a disregard for commitments about minimizing troop levels, but also showed a willingness to breach peace and tranquillity”. He pointed out, “we have yet to receive a credible explanation for the change in China’s stance or reasons for massing of troops in the border areas” and acknowledged that important issue is “what the Chinese posture signals, how it evolves, and what implications it may have for the future of our ties”.

Terming that India-China relationship witnessed “duality of cooperation and competition” before 2020, the EAM pointed to the seven divergences-

·       Practice of stapled-visas

·       Reluctance to deal with military commands

·       Opposition to NSG membership and to permanent seat in the UNSC

·       Promises of market access did not meet delivery

·       Blocking UN listing of Pakistani terrorists

·       Violation of Indian sovereignty by the CPEC

·       Border areas saw frictions on some occasions

Needless to say, cumulatively, these differences took a toll on the relationship. In 2017, at Asthana countries have agreed “not allow differences to become disputes”. But the events of 2020 have put the relationship under tension.

In an unequivocal message to China, Jaishankar stated that “three mutuals- mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests are determining factors. Any expectation that they can be brushed aside, and that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic”. In no uncertain terms Jaishankar said that India-China relationship is truly at crossroads and their ability to work together will determine the Asian century.

Besides, expressing India’s readiness for discussions, Jaishankar straight talk categorically divulged India’s exasperation with China’s dismal defiance and violation of the agreements. The timing is truly significant. Coming days after the face-off Naku La which China chose to brush under carpet and coinciding with takeover of Biden administration which is yet to unravel its China policy, Foreign Minister’s pronunciation of India’s redlines is a direct message to China.

In response to Jaishankar’s message, China’s foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said, “EAM Jaishankar’s stress on the significance of China-India relations showcases the importance the India side attaches to its ties with China. We approve of that. Meanwhile, I need to stress that the border issue shall not be delinked with bilateral relations. We hope the Indian side will work with us to properly manage differences, promote practical cooperation, and get bilateral relations back on the right track.”⁷

China insistence on ‘delinking the border’ despite India’s repeated clarification that with frictions at boundary it can’t be business as usual is reflective of Beijing’s hardening position towards India. By extension, tensions are unlikely to ease. Indeed, the violent face-off at Naku La is indicative of ensuing heightened military confrontations across the border.

Jayadev Ranade in his piece titled, “India-China tensions unlikely to ease”⁸ cited two articles by Hu Shisheng, Director of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) asserting that conflict at Ladakh was inevitable as a result of “high-risk, high-yield” policy followed by Modi regime and attributed, “India’s long-term pursuit of absolute security and dominance in the regional order and Modi government’s ambition to overtake China by taking advantage of India’s favourable external strategic environment” as reasons for the rivalry. To this effect, China has launched publicity blaming India’s aggressive “forward policy” for the stand-off. He contended that border contestations will move from, “reconciliation through dialogues” to “contention for control with real power” and “bottom line for tolerance will become redline lying between border troops of both countries”.

Hu’s second article outrightly accused “India of negative and obstructionist approach”. China’s response to EAM’s proposition is in congruence with Hu’s expositions.

Ranade also refers to an article on PLA website that claimed Indian Army is, “waiting for an opportunity to cause trouble next year” and added, “India must be the one that pays the greater price. India will waste decades on the misjudgement of Modi and Jaishankar’s strategy”. Clearly China is up for a long haul. The relentless negative propaganda by CCP’s propaganda machinery indeed points the same.

Perhaps, Jaishankar’s eight principles framework must have been a riposte to prevailing anti-India narrative perpetuated by Chinese analysts and intelligence agencies.

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