Twilight in China

India and China are among the oldest civilizations of the World and always had an interesting relationship. Known to be resilient and vibrant, both the civilisations are held in high esteem till date for their rootedness. Despite the geographical proximity, Sino-Indian relations still remains a poorly researched and vastly understudied topic. With Sino-Indian standoffs becoming more frequent, posing a threat to the regional stability and peace, it is pertinent to delve into the dynamics and the chemistry of the Indo-Chinese ties. Historical underpinnings, socio-political and economic factors play a decisive role in deciphering and appreciating the contours of the relations.

Authored by the first foreign secretary of independent India, KPS Menon, the book “Twilight in China” precisely offers critical insights into how the two countries, India and China, weathered the exigencies of the geopolitical storm, the World War II and its aftermath. The book is essentially a collection of letters written towards the end of the World War II, with a brief overview to put the things into perspective. In 1942, British India established two diplomatic posts abroad-one in Washington and another in Chungkin, present day Chongqing and deputed Agent Generals Asif Ali and Sir Zafrulla Khan respectively. The choice of the first diplomatic posts started by the British inexorably point to the strategic interests of the allied powers.

Agent Generals of India are in turn expected to report to British Foreign Secretary Sir Olaf Caroe and Sir Hugh Weightman. After Zafrulla Khan left the post in 1943, KPS Menon succeeded him. Incidentally, after Jawaharlal Nehru formed the interim government in 1946, these diplomatic posts became full-fledged embassies and the Agent Generals became Ambassadors.

Deputed in China from 1943 to 1948, the book, an ensemble of Menon’s letters, documents a first account of intense internal and external turmoil faced by China, attempts to shed light on the interplay of policies of great powers. During the World War-II, China headed by the Nationalist government of Chiang Ki Shek sided with the allied powers to overthrow the Japanese. After invading Manchuria post Mukden incident in 1931, Japan extended its control over the Chinese east coast. Subsequently as the Japanese continued to breach the Chinese resistance; the government had to shift capital from Peking (Beijing) to Hankow (one of the three town which is now merged to become modern day Wuhan) to Chungking (Chongqing). By 1949 against the rising communist tide the nationalists led by Generalissimo Chiang abandoned Nanking and retreated to Canton before fleeing to Taiwan.

At a time when the World is staring at a second cold war amid increased confrontations between the US and China, the historical incidents of the World war-II documented in the book seems surreal. China was part of the Big Four that signed a short document on Jan 1^st 1942 which later on became the United Nations Declaration. Big Four included China plus the Allied power-US, UK and Soviet Union. US’s tactical alliance with China served the twin purposes of vanquishing Axis forces and extending its foot prints to the far-east. The rising Communist movement additionally prompted the US to co-opt China.

Towards the end of the World War-II when China stumbled to take on Communists, American Advisory Group (AAG) trained the Nationalist government forces to fight the communists. Besides strengthening the strangle hold over new territories and thwart the fascist regime, the mainstay of the War for the United States has been asserting ideological supremacy.

In their quest for geopolitical ambitions, the US took active interest in supporting the Nationalist government to curtail the undercurrent of communism that took Chinese people by storm. In the process, the US even transported ammunition from Manila and Okinawa to China and announced an aid of $300 million. But the Chinese considered it low and called it ‘drop in a bucket’ and US friendship undependable. Allies in their own interests spared no efforts to liberate China while Chiang concentrated on fighting the internal enemy. In fact, America poured into China many times the quantity of ammunition it supplied for war against Japan.

Moved by the plight of a badly managed Chinese economy and with a special interest in the far east, while the US extended lot of credit to China, the World and the allied powers remained unmoved by the worst Bengal famine of 1943. Indeed, wary of China’s collapse and to keep it a unified non-communist China, President Truman deputed General Marshall to China. He attempted to negotiate with -Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), assisted to broker ceasefire and proposed formation of unified government. But both sides failed to reach any agreement.

Exasperated by stubborn positions of both sides, Marshall leaves the US. He was replaced by General Wedemeyer, whose outspoken criticism provokes angry reactions which further resulted in a wave of anti-Americanism emotions. The end of US mediated negotiations renewed the Chinese civil war. Overpowered by guerilla tactics of Communists, the Nationalists eventually lose their bastions and finally retreat to Formosa (Taiwan). On October 1^st 1949, CCP announces the formation of Peoples Republic of China (PRC).

Menon’s wires eloquently highlight the socio-political developments in China leading up to the Civil war. Among his many observations, two main aspects are obvious: rampant corruption of the Nationalists resulting in US ammunition landing in the hands of Communists and little or no value to human life are very striking. Till date these twin features continue to riddle the Chinese society. The political system is still plagued by Corruption and the CCP’s despicable justification of official genocide of Uighurs rightly vindicates Menon’s impressions.

Menon’s critical analysis of China’s prominence in the geopolitical fulcrum during World War-II hits bullseye. Even his recommendations of the Indo-Chinese friendship for Asian solidarity makes the right noise. Suggestions to the British India of financial assistance to China saying- “Thy need is greater than mine” for building communication and rails reeked of unwarranted ingenuousness and undeserving generosity. During his five years of stay in China, Menon has cultivated excellent relations with Soong Sisters who have been influential in decision making and exerted tremendous political control.

Carrying the mantle of Chinese leadership, Chiang Ki Shek reinforced that “Destiny of China is integration of Mongolians, Manchurians and Tibetans as one”. Sadly, the Indian representative failed to assess the import of this vital pledge which has been integral to the DNA of the Han Chinese. Less than a year into the regime, even as Mao soldiers ransacked Tibet and annexed it, Menon at the helm of affairs as foreign secretary, offered a meek rationale of Britishers approving the suzerainty of China over Tibet. As an apologia, in the epilogue, he says, “India did not want to start on the wrong foot in its relations with China. It did not want to bequeath to future generations the kind of antagonism which France and Germany had inherited and which poisoned European history for centuries and turned Europe into a graveyard from time to time”.

Ironically, for all his rich lived experience in China, Menon should have alerted the Indian leadership of the consequences of a strong centralized Chinese government and its expansionist tendencies well in advance. On the contrary, despite the rude awakening of Tibet invasion, instead of adopting a hard-nosed approach, India sought umbrage of negotiations despite China’s maximalist position, spurious maps that claimed parts of Ladakh, incursions and highway construction through Aksai Chin.

Seeped in feckless idealism and lackadaisical approach while India was reluctant to recalibrate its approach, China silently extracted its pound of flesh. Indian bureaucrats including this author advocated bridging of gulf between India and China for Asian solidarity threw the basic threat to the sovereignty of the country to the wind. Thanks to the unrealistic ideological obsession, Indian diplomacy faltered at a very early stage and culminated in a humiliating defeat.

Recounting the missteps of India which led to deterioration of Indo-Chinese ties, Menon tries to defend the indefensible. He writes, “Nehru seemed personally disposed to negotiate on the frontier problem, but he gave up the idea and assumed an inflexible posture as a result of the opposition of some of his senior colleagues in the Cabinet and criticism in Parliament. The entire attitude adopted by Parliament during the crisis was unhelpful”.

He adds, “this is what happens when the Legislature tries to usurp the functions of the Executive. Some at least of the critics of our China policy were animated not so much by their burning patriotism as by their burning desire to embarrass Nehru, whose social and economic policies they disliked. And so, the very men who criticized our defence budget as unnecessarily excessive posed as the heroic advocates of the “forward policy” on the frontier”.

Hailing Nehru’s decision of taking Kashmir issue to the UN, Menon inanely remarks, “great powers would decide the issue based on its merits”. In line with his callowness, even after the 1962 Indo-China war, Menon sympathises Nehru’s leadership. It is thus a little wonder that surrounded by a coterie of yes men, unmindful of the long- term consequences Nehru has committed gravest blunders.  Among other things, while the book provides first hand information about the birth of the UN, rise of cold war, desperate Korean unification attempt, it also exposes the guilelessness, lack of tact and strategy of the bureaucrats who guided the decisions of the Indian leadership during the early days of independence.

By and large, the book captures the larger geopolitical strategies at play in this part of the World, with China as the centre stage during and in the immediate aftermath of World war-II. The book certainly makes for an interesting read for strategic affairs analysts and foreign policy enthusiasts.

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