Very few books are written about gradual evolution of Indian
Diplomacy. The book “A life in Diplomacy” by Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra, offers
rare insights about the individuals and early events that shaped India’s fledging
foreign policy. He was among the second batch of 10 officers who joined the prestigious
Indian Foreign Services (IFS) in 1949. Born on September 11, 1924, in a humble
Dogra Brahmin family, Rasgotra obtained Masters in English from Punjab
University and began his career as a tutor. The opening chapters of the
autobiography gives the reader a glimpse of his childhood days, achievements at
school and college, eloquence in Hindi poetry and the travails endured during
partition. Aside emphatically interpreting crafty high-level diplomatic negotiations,
Rasgotra unhesitatingly, narrates the tragedy that stuck their lives when they
lost their 10-year old son. The equanimity and poise exuded by him is worth
emulating.
During his long and eventful career, Rasgotra held official
positions at mission offices at UN, UNESCO, Nepal, Britain, US, France,
Morocco, Tunisia, Netherlands, besides serving as Foreign Secretary during the
reign of former Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. He officially
retired from service in January of 1985 but continued to work as High
Commissioner to the UK till 1990 upon the Prime Minister’s request. Written
entirely from his memory, at the age of almost 90, the author eloquently
narrates the story of India, the trials and tribulations faced.
Rasgotra begins the story of
independent India by pondering on the unique contributions of pioneering
leaders in Indian Diplomacy- Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Dr. Sarvepalli RadhaKrishna,
V. K. Krishna Menon and K. M. Panikkar. Days before independence, majority of
the British officers who occupied high positions in External Affairs Department
began to return to London or went to Pakistan. India was tasked with the burden
of reorganization of the two departments, Departments of Common Wealth Relations
and External Affairs. Rasgotra pays ode to Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, who took
the onerous task of the overhaul and reorganization of the department as the
secretary general. Bajpai channelized and instituted the process of recruitment
young and talented candidates to foreign services.
The book, unveiled by Yashwant Sinha,
caught instant attention of strategic analysts with stunning revelations about
Nehru’s refusal to accept President Kennedy’s offer for help in detonating a
nuclear bomb in 1961. US intelligence was cognizant of China’s swift progress
towards developing a nuke in late 1950’s. Kennedy who was admirer of India’s
democracy wanted India to be the first country to test a nuke and not the
Communist China. Hence Kennedy sent a hand written letter through US ambassador
Galbraith with a technical note from the chairman of US atomic Commission
offering assistance to Indian scientists for detonating an American nuke from
the top of a tower in Rajasthan Desert. Being aware of Nehru’s commitment against
nuclear arms, Kennedy persisted that “Nothing is more important than nuclear
security”. Nehru shared the letter with G.
Parthasarathy and Dr. Homi Bhabha. Dr. Bhabha favored acceptance, but
Parthasarathy sought time. After holding talks with Galbraith and B.M. Mullick,
Parthasarathy recommended to spurn the offer. (B. N. Mullick, Director
Intelligence Bureau, was indicted by Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, for
failing to assess Chinese preparedness along the border in 1960-61 leading to
worst ever defeat of India at hands of China during 1962 war). A diplomatic
misjudgment and seeking counsel from incompetent authorities played a havoc for
India. This disclosure came at a time when India was valiantly lobbying various
countries for NSG membership. Fifty years, hence, India is now struggling to
get into the nuclear regime. The offer, if accepted then, could have averted
the wars of 1962 and 1965 with China and Pakistan respectively. Besides these
oft known diplomatic secrets, the book is replete of numerous anecdotes and
incidents that offer a glimpse of Rasgotra’s rare mastery over India’s
scriptures too.
Nehru was concerned about Tibet,
which remained as an autonomous region from 1911. Emboldened by its triumph
over Japan, China was eyeing to annex Tibet by late 1945. Rasgotra, mentions
how Nehru wary of Chinese ways, sent an emissary asking members of Dalai Lama’s
cabinet to apply for membership of the UN. Nehru indeed advised that newly
formed UN is a powerful body and if Tibet becomes a member of UN, other member
countries would definitely intervene in an event of Chinese occupation. Despite
repeated emissaries, Lhasa evinced no interest. Before, it could wake up and
realize the importance of UN membership, China annexed Tibet. Tibetan
reoccupation in January 1950 critically altered India’s security stratagem.
Till then India hardly bothered about the North-Eastern Frontier since, the
friendly Tibet and the majestic Himalayas served as impenetrable barrier.
Similarly the book sheds light on the
Shimla Agreement wherein India was criticized to have conceded to demands of
Pakistan. A popular perception “we won war and lost the peace” emerged. In
1972, India won convincingly over Pakistan. Bangladesh was liberated, 90,000
Pakistani prisoners of war were captured and India occupied areas of strategic
importance to Pakistan (through which Pakistan gained entry into Kashmir Valley
in 1965 and 1971). But according to the Shimla Agreement, India handed over
prisoners of war and agreed to vacate the strategic positions as a goodwill
gesture. Also, both countries agreed to resolve differences through peaceful
bilateral negotiations ruling out third party intervention and that cease-fire
line of 17th December 1971 will be converted into Line of Control
(LoC). Indeed Z.A. Bhutto in one-to-one talks with Indira Gandhi agreed to
treat LoC as the international border and promised to persuade his people to
support the same but later reneged. The architects of Shimla agreement were
Haksar, D. P. Dhar and P.N. Dhar. Rasgotra says that he later asked Haksar as
why he offered concessions at LoC, he revealed that Bhutto sought private
meeting with him and fell on his feet.
Bhutto begged Haksar not to send him back empty-handed as he will be
butchered by his enemies back in Pakistan. Haksar indeed trusted words of
Bhutto only to be backstabbed later. Besides throwing light on oft discussed
oracles of diplomacy, Rasgotra suggested few stratagems to evolve a sturdy
foreign policy suited for changing global scenarios of 21st century at
the end of the book.
Shedding light on factors that messed
up the Kashmir issue, Rasgotra indicated that armies of both India and Pakistan
during the 1948 war were commanded by British Officers. Officers fighting for
both sides were in touch with each other regularly and were controlled by
British authorities. The British officers fighting for India ignored Nehru’s
command and failed to Pakistan troops packing from the Gilgit-Baltistan region
creating a formidable rift between warring neighbors. Consequently, the
strategically important region is now jointly exploited by China and Pakistan. Harboring
grudging animosities against India, Britain always sided with Pakistan and
supported its stance on Kashmir at UN. Even as US gifted a submarine to
Pakistan despite repeated pleas, Britain refused to sell one to India. In
August 1953 India and Pakistan were close to resolving Kashmir issue through
Nehru-Bogra agreement but US sabotaged the bilateral settlement. Nehru wanted
to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir even it meant losing the valley. Bogra agreed
to appointment of neutral administrator for plebiscite in Delhi but after his
visit from US, he backtracked.
Though US displayed rejuvenated
interest in fostering ties with India in past decade bestowing the status of
strategic partner, he opined Russia had been India’s formidable ally. Russia
had indeed vetoed at several occasions to protect Indian interests at UN. India
must strive hard to strengthen bilateral ties with Russia. Regarding
neighborhood policy he believed that India must deepen relations with Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma and form a strong regional entity. He was highly
critical of the double-speak of Nepal and firmly believed that India should be
highly cautious of its Himalayan neighbor since it harbored anti-Indian forces
and conceded vast ground to both China and Pakistan. He conceded that during
70’s and 80’s India was considered to be preachy, argumentative by the
Machiavellian countries. India’s foreign policy buttressed by Non-Alignment was
an idealist concept. Pragmatism, idealism and realism worked hand in hand in
this policy. This concept evoked a flurry of reactions from nations ranging
from curiosity to hostility. Major Powers misconstrued India’s policy and
disliked it. With global the fall of
Soviet Union, NAM movement held no ground and it withered away throughout India
firmly held on to the democratic principles and laid emphasis on peace and
cooperation. With changing times, India has opened up its markets and adapted
itself to the tunes of modern globalized society. These new transformations are
now welcomed by nations and are keen on forging bilateral ties with India. Rasgotra
advocates that India has entered such a propitious phase. But he warns that
India should take lessons from past and should develop stable and unwavering
neighboring policy rooted in the principles advocated by Kautilya. Above all he
opines that foreign policy as a doctrine is primarily determined by
civilizational and cultural cues.
Together, the book is an amazing read
to all foreign policy enthusiasts offering a fantastic overview of India’s
diplomacy during the early years of independence and later. For all the rich
details and rare insights the book, it qualifies to be a compendium on Indian
diplomacy.
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